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ABSTRACT 
This study on the assessment of ordinary consumer representation in the liberalised mobile 
telecommunications market in Nigeria is situated within the broader perspective of the public 
interest and in the context of policy and institutional failure (what happens after policies are 
adopted?). It focuses on aspects of compliance monitoring and enforcement; areas that do not 
receive adequate attention in policy literature. 
The study is conducted using the New Institutional Economics framework and its analytical 
tools: transaction costs, property rights and agency. It adapts and extends the Saleth and Dinar 
(1999) institution decomposition model to deconstruct the mobile institution into four main 
components: policy, law, administration and enforcement for analytical purposes. Using 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews as main methods, this study provides insights 
into how the regulatory framework relegates the protection of ordinary consumer interest and 
how this has implications for the delivery of the stated policy objectives. 
The main findings reveal that: 1) due to inconsistency in the procedural definition of consumer 
interest and weak institutional structures, such as enforcement mechanisms, the regulator and 
mobile service providers do not hold ordinary consumers’ interest at levels consistent with 
policy and law; 2) there is need for legal provisions for independent statutory consumer bodies 
to ensure ordinary mobile consumers’ influential participation in the regulatory-decision-
process and facilitate their capacity to harness the legal provisions in their interest; 3) there is 
need to make the arbitration process focused on the ordinary consumer, as currently it involves 
substantial resources-funding, time and expertise- beyond the capacity of ordinary consumer. 
Telecommunications policy and the institutional framework in place have so far benefitted 
mobile companies in Nigeria rather than ordinary consumers. The existing policy failure, as 
discussed in this case study, can provide inspiration for rethinking the place of the ordinary 
consumer. The study’s focus on mobile is important given the growing significance of this 
sector throughout Africa and globally too. 
Keywords: Communications; Telecommunications; Mobile telephony; Consumer; New 
institutional economics; Ordinary consumer representation; Enforcement; Nigeria 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background on the Issue, Objectives and Research Questions 
Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy, with an estimated population of 170 million, and has the 
largest mobile market in Africa, with mobile telecommunications contributing over 8.5% of the 
nation’s GDP (GSMA, 2014). The Nigerian mobile market has recorded an annual average of 
ten million subscriber active lines, since 2001. This constitutes one major success story in the 
telecommunications sector. The number of active mobile lines and penetration (connection) 
level have increased exponentially from 25,000 lines and 0.025% in 2001 to 148,681.36, and 
107.8%, respectively, in 2015, with about 98% of connected subscribers registered on the pre-
paid payment platform (NCC.Communicator, 2015). Before the liberalisation of the mobile 
market in 2001, deployment of fixed telecoms infrastructure was grossly insufficient and 
problematic due to inadequate infrastructure, uneconomic investment patterns, poor 
maintenance culture and management, and unreliable public electricity supply. The 
telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas, if it existed, was rudimentary. Links were 
installed to serve political elites without complementary external line plants to serve potential 
ordinary consumers (Thussu, 2006).  
Considering the limitations of fixed technology, mobile proved to be an appropriate and 
effective technology in servicing everybody wherever it was deployed government, public 
servants, farmers, petty traders, companies, providers of utility services, schools, households. 
This is an indication that liberalisation of the mobile telecommunications sector in Nigeria 
despite its attendant competition problems did positively influence higher network penetration. 
Consequently, market liberalisation has improved the life of Nigerian consumers in terms of 
social relations, work, employment, banking, education and security. For most of the 
consumers, their first access to telecommunications has been through mobile.  
These benefits are the result of issuing mobile (GSM technology) licences to network/service 
providers, MTN, AIRTEL and M-TEL. The attempt by M-Tel to roll out a GSM network was 
unsuccessful largely due to the aborted planned attempts to privatise M-Tel’s mother company 
NITEL. Subsequently, GLOBACOM and ETISALAT joined the mobile market in 2003 and 
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2008 respectively. These four mobile service providers offer digital mobile services in the 
900/1800/2100 MHz spectrum bands. The latest data on market share (GSM technology) as of 
December 2014 are as follows: Etisalat 15%, Airtel 20%, Globacom 21% and MTN 44% (refer 
to Chapter 3 for more details on GSM market). Mobile telephony accounts for 98% of total 
telephone subscriptions and remains the preferred means of communication in Nigeria. 
However, the Nigerian ICT policy (2012) observed that over 20% of total landmass in the 
country has no form of basic telephony. Sequel to this, the Universal Service Provision Fund-
USPF1 (2013) identified a total of two hundred and seven (207) clusters, with an estimated 
population of thirty six million and eight hundred thousand (36.8m) people, as areas with gaps 
in voice telephony and transport networks in Nigeria. The USPF plans to use these data to 
design projects to cover the identified areas with basic telephony as well as inform service 
providers’ rollouts such that everyone in Nigeria, irrespective of location, is connected in the 
21st century. The 2013-2018 national broadband plan specifies coverage targets for this period 
as 35% in 2013, 60% in 2015 and 80% in 2018 (ICT.policy, 2012). It would appear that the 
USPF is silent on universal service obligations. It does not specify if basic level provision of 
universal service in telecommunications is defined in fixed/fixed wireless telephony, mobile 
telephony, or broadband service. It is also silent on expanding challenges to ordinary consumer 
take-up of mobile telephony such as special pricing schemes to facilitate affordability.   
Meanwhile price affordability and mobile coverage are identified as two key barriers to mobile 
penetration to un-served and under-served areas of Nigeria (GSMA, 2014). For instance, the 
GSMA Analysis -Country Overview: Nigeria, June 2014 Report- remarks that the cost of 
running a mobile in Nigeria is about 5% of personal income, seen to be significantly above the 
threshold value of 2-3% of personal income, below which penetration rates begin to increase 
                                                 
1 USPF is established by the Nigerian Federal Government to facilitate the achievement of national ICT policy 
goals for universal access and universal service in rural, un-served and under-served, areas in Nigeria. The fund 
is managed to support the widest possible access to affordable telecoms services for social equity and inclusion 
for Nigerian citizens.  
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sharply. For instance, making an international call in Nigeria at present attracts a rate of N 60 
(US$ 0.3) per minute and it amounts to 10% of the daily minimum wage of N 600 (US$ 3). 
According to GSMA (2015), a large proportion of the unconnected people in Nigeria fall within 
the low-income bracket, classified by the World Bank as the poverty line for developing 
countries.  
Nigerian telecommunications has better mobile infrastructure provisioning in urban areas than 
in rural areas, as discussed in chapter 3. The GSMA -Analysis: Country Overview: Nigeria, 
June 2014- reports of high penetration rate masks a pronounced mobile divide. In spite of the 
fact that Nigeria has a 50:50 split in population between urban and rural areas, urban ownership 
is around 1.4 times higher. Similarly, another striking divide, in terms of mobile subscription, 
exists between the southern and northern regions of Nigeria: in terms of access within a 
household to mobile phones, the southern regions (including major metropolises such as Lagos) 
are well ahead of northern regions (GSMA, 2014:14). In addition, the security challenges posed 
by terrorist groups in the North East regions adversely affect network expansion and 
maintenance.  
Therefore, it would appear that despite the success story of the Nigerian telecommunications in 
terms of penetration, the ordinary consumer is paying too high a price for the benefits from 
liberalisation of the mobile market. The reason being that since the Nigerian mobile market was 
opened up for competition in 2001, it has been incessantly plagued by poor quality of service, 
inaccurate billing and high prices, loss of service, inability to load credit, drop calls, unsolicited 
messaging, and inefficient customer care services (NCC, 2005; Okonji, 2012; Okonji, 2015). 
These issues progressed and remained unresolved such that in 2003, 2008 and 2012 the 
telecommunications industry witnessed extremely poor network performance. In each of the 
three occasions, the Nigerian Press was over-laden with so much consumer grievances that as 
a result both the Senate and the House of Representatives jointly called for a public hearing on 
the poor telecommunications network performance. Sequel to the hearing in 2008 the Nigerian 
Communications Commission had to impose sanctions on the culpable mobile service 
providers to make a uniform token refund to each of their consumers for service degradation. 
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In spite of this intervention, quality of service remained poor and consumer grievances 
unabated. 
This study will use the three examples, given in Box 1 below, to illustrate the level of poor 
quality of service that prevails in the Nigerian telecommunications sector. 
BOX 1.  VIEWS ON THE STATE OF TELECOMS SERVICE IN NIGERIA 
1) In 2011, the Lagos State House of Assembly urged the Federal Government to strengthen 
efforts in monitoring activities of the telecommunications providers in the country in view of 
their poor services. In summary, the Speaker of the House said, “We are all affected; I have 
up to a dozen cell phones linked to all the service providers. The incessant drop calls and 
unwanted deductions for calls not made can be annoying. In spite of the multitude of 
complaints, from citizens, the problems still persist” (Punch, 2011). The Assembly adopted 
the motion to commence a debate on a Consumer Protection Bill aimed at empowering and 
protecting consumers;  
 2) An online columnist wrote, “The mobile telephone crisis is across the board – and it’s 
become nothing short of a scandal . . . Why has the government failed to compel these 
companies to plough some of their stupendous earnings into infrastructural development? … 
Why does the government look the other way as Nigerian consumers are forced to accept 
substandard service – and perhaps blatantly exploited?” (Ndibe, 2013); and 
3) The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Communications expressed concern over poor 
telecoms service in the country to the Minister of Communications Technology during the 
budget defence by the Ministry at the National Assembly, saying: “Until there is a seamless 
network service, there is no way the committee can shy away from raising alarm in the face 
of poor quality of service because the situation is perplexing”. He accused the Ministry of   
apparent quietness and reluctance to kick start the National Rural Telephony Project which, 
according to him, would have relieved pressure on the GSM” (Elebeke, 2014). 
The On-line Columnist (quote 2 in Box 1), reflected the voice of consumers in general and the 
Speaker of the House of Assembly (quote 1 in Box 1) spoke on behalf of the ordinary consumer 
– when he referred to “complaints from citizens” – while the Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Communications (quote 3 in Box 1) reflected the concern of the legislators. These voices 
show the pervasive nature of the problem. “We are all affected” the speaker affirmed. However, 
in this national malaise the ordinary consumer, particularly the vulnerable and the low-income 
earners, are more affected. 
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In the years following liberalisation, no attention was paid to quality of service. This is 
confirmed in a graphic explanation of the genesis of poor quality of service by the first Chief 
Executive of the Nigerian Communications Commission, in his 2009 annual report where he 
described the Nigerian telecommunications as:  
"A man in the desert and all he wanted was water. He was not concerned about the 
quality; pure or dirty as long as it is water. So also is the case of Nigeria telecoms. All 
we wanted was a telephone to communicate with, and we were not concerned with 
quality of service. As the industry began to leave its infancy and maturing, the quality 
of service becomes a major concern” (NCC Annual Report, 2009:12). 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in its recommendations E. 880, defines 
service quality as “the collective effect of service performances, which determine the degree of 
satisfaction of a user of the service”.   Ordinary consumer satisfaction is key to this study, which 
seeks to evaluate the extent to which the Nigerian mobile telecommunications market has 
enabled or not mobile policy implementation and outcome with focus on the promotion and 
protection of ordinary consumer interests. This involves understanding the interplay that 
continuously goes on between the major participating market players: ordinary consumer, 
service providers, the Commission and Legislator in the competitive mobile market.  
However, before proceeding with delineating the study’s objectives and research questions, it 
is important to define who the ordinary consumer is in this study and to set the study in broader 
perspective.  
How is the ordinary consumer defined?  
In broad terms, ‘ordinary consumer’ is defined as household (or residential) as opposed to non-
household (or business) consumers. In this study, ‘ordinary consumer’ is defined as a person 
(an individual) who has a SIM card duly registered in her/his name. It excludes a person who 
has or uses mobile phone services in his/her official capacity. The ordinary consumer is also 
legally defined, in this study, as a person – as distinct from a corporate body or partnership – 
who subscribes to and uses a mobile communications service. In line with this, the term 
ordinary consumer also excludes representatives of corporate organisations, big or small, 
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governmental and non-governmental, profit or not-for-profit, international, national or local. A 
detailed explanation and implications of key terms in the legal definition is given in Chapter 5. 
Situating the study in broader perspective 
The foregoing discussions highlighted four key consumer issues: access, affordability, network 
coverage, and quality of service, which have direct implications to ordinary consumer 
protection in the liberalised mobile markets. These four issues align with both universal service 
and the public interest and underpin the promotion and protection of ordinary consumer 
interests, which also form the rationale for regulation (e.g. Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, 2012; Lunt 
& Livingstone, 2012). Liberalisation does not automatically work for the public interest. 
Consequently, it makes sense to situate this study within the broader perspective of the public 
interest in the context of policy and institutional failure in terms of what happens after policies 
are adopted which surprisingly has received little attention theoretically or empirically, at least 
in telecommunications (For more details refer to Chapter 2).   
 The research objectives and research questions for this study 
The objectives of this research are to investigate how the key industry players (the legislators, 
regulators and the services providers) defined the ordinary consumers’ interests; to examine the 
regulatory framework with a focus on the structures and processes that have been deployed to 
engage and empower the ordinary Nigerian mobile consumers to effectively participate in the 
regulatory process; and to evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of the complaints management 
processes of the market players and the regulator and assess how effective the existing 
complaint handling mechanisms have been. According to the ITU: “access to a fair and 
transparent complaint process, with sanctions for non-compliance, remains an essential part of 
an effective consumer protection framework” (ITU, 2009: 27).  
In addition, this study evaluates the effectiveness of the existing enforcement mechanisms with 
focus on ordinary consumers’ interests and protection. “Markets need clear and certain rules 
but they also require that such rules are effectively enforced” (Vukowich, 2002:96).  
  
28 
 
The three research questions that are addressed in this study are: 
RQ1. If and how have the legislators, regulators and market players in Nigeria defined the 
ordinary consumer interest in the field of mobile communications? 
RQ2. Focusing on regulatory structures and processes, how have ordinary consumers been 
represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile market in 2001? 
RQ3. What processes have been established in the Nigerian mobile sector for the resolution of 
ordinary mobile consumer complaints and how effective have they been?  
1.2 Study Methodology  
1.2.1 Epistemological/philosophical considerations 
In the process of conducting social research the considerations that are taken into account 
between qualitative research and quantitative research, depend on a range of factors including 
the nature, objectives and epistemology of the research (Snape & Spencer, 2003). The 
phenomenon of mobile telecommunications market embodies man-science interface and as 
such, a comprehensive insight into its complex interrelations can only be achieved through a 
mixed methodological approach. This is clearly reflected in the empirical documents used in 
this study, which contain both qualitative data (for example, legal documents and media reports) 
and quantitative data (for example, Commission’s Annual Reports and Industry Statistical 
Reports).  
Qualitative research requires an understanding of an event in its natural or social setting: often 
it is perceived as inductive in the sense that it uses evidence “as the genesis of a conclusion” 
while quantitative research is deductive, using “evidence in support of a conclusion” (Snape & 
Spencer, 2003:14). Furthermore, the assumptions that underpin social research are referred 
under two opposing epistemological stances: positivism, which upholds that the methods of 
inquiry in natural sciences are appropriate in social sciences, and interpretivism, which opposes 
the application of such methods in social research (Bryman, 2012). In this study, both induction 
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and deduction are employed in extracting findings and arriving at conclusions in accordance 
with the nature of the data in line with Snape & Spencer, (2003). 
The empirical material relevant to the study’s purpose are grouped in two broad categories: 
primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources, comprising the policy and legal 
documents are authentic sources and are of universal application in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector and as such these documents were objectively analysed according 
to the ‘spirit and letter’ which admits an interpretative approach. This approach was also applied 
to some of the secondary sources. 
The secondary sources (e.g. Commission’s internal and industry reports, research/ academic/ 
official reports etc.) are considered as ‘text’ which have specific meaning regardless of their 
origin from which the researcher endeavoured to extract findings. Although media reports (e.g. 
the NCC Communicator and online newspapers) are part of the secondary sources they are 
treated qualitatively as social products that provide context, meaning and colour to the events 
and issues in the sector. The data these documents yield were analysed inductively to support 
and/or validate the data from the other secondary sources. 
 Data collection was also supplemented with semi-structured interviews. These interviews 
deepened my understanding and threw more light on my experience of some key issues in the 
mobile telecommunications market. The interviews helped me to access the experiences of the 
interviewees and to compare their perceptions of those experiences with the views, which I had 
developed during my professional career in the industry and my involvement in the 
Telecommunication Consumer Parliament – a consumer outreach programme organised by the 
Nigerian Communications Commission (Commission). These interviews, which were recursive, 
also helped to clarify some grey areas. For example, the interview with a senior officer from 
the Association of Licensed Telecoms Operators of Nigeria (ALTON) did not only confirm the 
neglect of consumer interests by services providers but also threw light on why the operators 
are unable to fulfil their obligation to their consumers (See Box 5, Section 7.4.4). The subjective 
aspects of these interviews were taken into account during data analysis by adopting an 
interpretative approach.  
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Triangulation is necessary in document analysis because documentary information is usually 
context-based and as such “must be contextualised with other forms of research”, (Forster 
1994:149 cited in May, 2001:187). Hence, the rationale for triangulation is because “no single 
method ever adequately solves the problem of rival explanations”, because various sources of 
data “reveal different aspects of empirical reality” (Patton, 1999:1192; Denzin, 1978). The 
findings emanating from this study benefitted from triangulating the primary and secondary 
sources with semi-structured interviews. Triangulation of sources was not necessarily to 
confirm that the data sources produce similar results rather it enhanced my access to additional 
data that, to some extent, filled the gaps left by the difficulties I encountered sourcing 
documents from the Commission and services providers. Triangulation also facilitated to 
enhance the researcher’s confidence by increasing her knowledge of the various 
phenomena and issues from different perspectives emanating from various data sources. Hence, 
the validity of this study rests on the fact that appropriate methods have been chosen and applied 
and the findings are based on relevant empirical documents (Flick, 2009).  
1.2.2 Case study design 
Case study is a commonly applied method in research in many disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology, political science and economics due to its distinguishing feature, which 
facilitates the understanding of complex social phenomena (Yin, 2009 cited in Maegli, 2012). 
The case study method is preferred “when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events” (Yin, 2003:1).  Case Study research allows the 
use of different sources of data collection techniques: such as document analysis and survey 
(e.g. e-mail and interview questionnaires), it can be either qualitative or quantitative or both 
while case study designs may involve single- and multiple-case studies (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2003). 
A single-case study method is often employed in telecommunications policy research with 
focus on single country case, since multiple-case studies are difficult to conduct and replicate 
over time and geography due to rapid changes in technologies/markets and variation in 
countries’ adaptation of the so-called global best practices in institutional endowments and 
arrangements (Sutherland, 2016).  
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Therefore, this research employs a qualitative single-case method to gain in-depth 
understanding of the context that setup the competitive mobile market. For instance, how 
historic institutional evolution influences telecommunications policy, legislation and regulatory 
regime; how regulatory regime interacts with market players and how regulatory incentives 
shape markets and the behaviour of market players. Yin (2003:10) confirmed that: “case studies, 
like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes”. 
The case for this study is Nigeria, chosen based on increasing and recurring consumer 
grievances. In addition, the scarcity of research on the demand side of the markets particularly 
with focus on telecommunications policy and institutional performance in terms of what 
happens after policies are adopted in mobile telecommunications markets stimulates in the 
researcher a strong desire to contribute to academic literature in the area of ordinary consumer 
representation. Thus following from the previous discussion, this case study on ordinary 
consumer representation in the Nigerian competitive mobile market is conducted using 
document analysis; primary sources in triangulation with secondary sources and semi-
structured interviews, to gain deeper understanding of the extent to which ordinary consumers’ 
interests have been promoted and protected.  
1.2.3 Data collection methods and sampling techniques 
Research design provides means to collect and analyse data from a population (May, 2011). 
This study adopts qualitative data collection methods from relevant policy documents, 
secondary sourced documents and semi-structured conversational interviews. The key 
instrument used for data collection is document analysis. Purposeful Sampling technique was 
employed in the selection of primary and secondary documents that are relevant to the study’s 
research questions. Purposeful sampling technique allows a researcher to rely on personal 
judgement to select samples with particular characteristics, which will facilitate full 
investigation, and understanding of the research problem (Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003). Fink 
(2003:1) agrees that: “A good sample is a miniature version of the population – just like it, only 
smaller”. Purposeful sampling was also employed in the selection of participants for interviews. 
In this study, the criteria used for selection of participants is experiences or expert knowledge 
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in policy implementation in the Nigerian telecommunications sector as well as in the field of 
telecommunications with focus on the study objectives. The reason was to draw participants 
with high level of expertise, within and outside Nigeria and the Nigerian Communications 
Commission (Commission), who provided the necessary clarification and confirmation for this 
study.  
Document analysis 
Document analysis is suitable for this study as policy documents are usually well articulated 
and tend to explain in detail, circumstances surrounding the provisions given, reasons backing 
them up, when they apply or not apply, as well as provide materials to facilitate further research 
investigation (Karppinen and Moe, 2012; May, 2011). In addition, document analysis can be 
unassuming and thus tends to minimise transcription errors due to loss of meaning (Silverman, 
2006; Creswell, 2009).  
The legal and policy documents in Nigerian telecommunications sector - such as the 
Telecommunications Policy, 2000, Communications Act, 2003, regulations and Digital mobile 
licence - serve as primary sources of data in the telecommunications sector and are relevant in 
achieving the study objectives and answering the three research questions, formulated to guide 
this telecommunications policy research (Bryman, 2004; Karppinen and Moe, 2012).  
The secondary data sources include the Nigerian Constitution and historical documentation, 
research conducted by the Commission and other national and international regulatory agencies, 
industry annual statistical reports, official studies/reports from International 
Telecommunication Union, European Union, and the World Bank, academic articles, books, 
press releases and newspaper articles. The media-online newspaper articles on Nigerian 
telecommunications sector, as well as reports from the BBC, have proved very useful in this 
research by facilitating analysis of ‘documents as texts’ beyond the conventional method of 
analysis of ‘document as sources’ in which documents are written with the authors’ intention.  
Karppinen and Moe (2012:186) explain that analysis of ‘documents as sources’ provides factual 
data and historic background of their development while in analysis of ‘documents as texts’ 
“documents can be treated explicitly as texts or social products that have consequences in 
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themselves irrespective of their authors’ intentions”, by providing context and meaning to 
events reported in other documents. For instance, the newspaper articles facilitate to expose the 
context and informal influences surrounding activities of the Commission and other visible and 
invisible players in the liberalised mobile market, which have implications on the protection of 
ordinary consumers in the mobile market.  
However, in general, document analysis even when documents are used as sources still suggests 
some form of textual analysis, which can be achieved by developing suitable analytical tools 
with which to interpret the texts (Bryman 2001 cited in Karppinen and Moe, 2012). In this 
regard, the theoretical framework-New Institutional Economics (NIE) with its analytical tools- 
discussed in Chapter 2 facilitates the interpretation of the texts, during document analysis. 
The classes of documents collected and analysed include the following:  
Legislations include: 
1. Nigerian Communications Act, 2003. 
2. Nigerian Telecommunications Policy, 2000. 
3. National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) final Draft Policy, 2012.  
4. Council for Consumer Protection Act, 1992. 
 The Commission’s regulations include:  
5. Three Licences: Digital mobile service, Pre-paid calling card service, and framework 
for value added services. 
6. Ten Regulations: Competition practices 2007, Universal access and universal service 
2007, Consumer code of practice 2007 and Individual consumer codes of practice 2010, 
Enforcement processes 2005, Quality of Service 2012, Mobile number portability 2014, 
Registration of telecoms subscriber 2011, Code of corporate governance for the 
telecommunications industry 2014, Business rules & port order Processes for mobile 
number portability 2013, and Enforcement processes 2013 (draft). 
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7. Five Legal guidelines: Advertisement and Promotions; Consultations 2007; Dispute 
resolution 2004; Procedure for granting approval to disconnect telecommunications 
operators; and Complaint adjudication (draft). 
8. Determinations: Reports on the Public Enquiries. 
9. Consultation paper on Dominance in selected communications markets including digital 
mobile market. 
10. Mobile Number Portability regulations; Registration of SIM card regulations; 
Advertisement & Promotions; and Enforcement Processes Regulation and other 
regulatory documents, including: 
11. Eight Consumer fact sheets: Consumer bill of rights; Procedures for lodging a consumer 
complaint; Phone etiquette; Number portability; Obligations of service providers to 
Nigerian consumers of telecoms services; Safety tips for driving using mobile; What 
you need to know about SIM registration; and Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB). 
12. Yearend Subscriber/Network Data Report for Telecommunications Operating 
Companies in Nigeria for 2013 and 2014. 
13. Nigerian Communications Commission Strategic Management Plan (2014 – 2018). 
14. Five Commission’s Annual reports, 2009 to 2013. 
15. Two Commission’s Consumer Affairs Bureau Annual Reports, 2011 and 2012.  
16. Four Consumer Affairs Bureau quarterly reports. 
17. 9 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement quarterly reports.   
18. Two Evaluation Criteria: CAB and Technical Standards Department. 
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19. Secondary research report: Consumer Protection in Nigeria commissioned by 
Consumer International; and Consumer Satisfaction Survey commissioned by the 
Commission. 
20. Memorandums of Understanding between the Commission and two agencies: 
Consumer Protection Council and Advertising Practitioners Council of Nigeria. 
21. Telecoms newsletter and Bulletins. 
22. Media – online newspaper articles covering telecoms events and reports that impact on 
consumer protection and market competitions. 
23. Relevant on-line documents and articles on consumer protection and communications 
policy adoption and implementation.  
In addition, this research benefitted from materials and the views of experts who have 
contributed to the development of the Nigerian communications’ legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Documents used also came from the NGOs involved in consumer protection as 
well as insights from some leading telecommunications equipment manufacturers and vendors 
especially on the features offered by the billing platforms susceptible to abuse by mobile service 
providers. Adequate care was taken to ensure that all the documents collected and analysed 
facilitate to evaluate the extent to which the ordinary consumer has been represented in the 
Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector. 
Interviews  
The complementary semi-structured interviews or conversations with purpose (Lindolf, 2002) 
were undertaken with key policy-makers, stakeholders and other informants within and outside 
the Nigerian telecommunications sector whenever the need arose mainly for clarification 
purposes as well as getting familiarised with the context during document analysis. Lindlof and 
Taylor (2002) agree that interviews can be used in verification and validation stages as well as 
allow researchers to comment on information obtained from other sources. Therefore, 
interviews or (conversations) held in this study facilitated the understanding of some blind spots 
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in consumer issues and the historic context that led to their development which are usually not 
captured in policy documents. Blind spots include none-institutional or socio-political practices 
such as cronyism which impact on policy implementation and cause detriment to ordinary 
consumer (Freedman, 2008). 
The researcher conducted fourteen interviews with key telecommunications policy-makers and 
stakeholders in Nigeria (third quarter 2014) and in London (second quarter 2015). The 
objectives for this study were duly communicated to the interviewees and their consents were 
obtained. The interviews consist of: four 2-hour semi-structured interviews; three 1.5 hour face-
to-face interviews, including one conducted via Al Jazeera, for the ‘Head to Head’ TV show at 
the Oxford Forum, Oxford, UK, on 14th April 2015; and seven mixture of phone/e-mail 
interviews. Some of the interviews either started as face-to-face or as telephone discussions 
before the interviewees requested that the questions be sent through e-mail. The reason adduced 
was mainly due to time constraints, as the interviewees appear to be very busy people. In 
addition, the e-mail communications proved useful during the document analysis stage, as the 
researcher went back and forth to discuss gaps in the findings with these experts, both in Nigeria 
and in London including some Commission staff and consumer advocacy bodies, to get their 
views and confirm doubts. This researcher finds the e-mail interview beneficial as it eliminates 
the time and errors due to transcription. In addition, the respondents have sufficient time to 
think through the questions, add supporting data and evidence and sometimes extend the 
questions. On the other hand, its major disadvantage is that it takes more time to conclude an 
interview because the interviewees work at their pace.  
The following semi-structured interviews are deliberately included in this methodology section 
because they facilitate better understanding of the context of the study. 
The first semi-structured interview was with the Minister of Communications at the time of the 
Nigerian telecommunications reform of 1992 and an Executive Commissioner in the Board of 
the Commission (from 2000 to 2010) at the time the mobile market was opened up to 
competition in 2001. This interview is particularly important because the Minister of 
Communications served as the telecommunications sector regulator during the monopoly era 
in Nigeria. The two-hour semi-structured interview revealed that consumers were accorded 
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rights, which were well documented before the reform. Secondly, it revealed that the previous 
ministers who were military men were not aware of the digitalisation trends in the world until 
he, a civilian permanent secretary who has been representing Nigeria in ITU meetings, took 
over from the last military minister in 1990. He hired a consultant and handed him copies of 
the Australian and the British Telecommunications’ Acts to study and come up with a document 
for Nigeria. This document scaled through the Council of Nigeria Ministers as well as 
Government approval in 1991 and was published under the Military regime as Decree 75 in 
1992.  
The key driver for the reform was the need for telecommunications infrastructural development 
and the need to avoid digital exclusion. The second driver, he said, was the handicap ordinary 
people had to overcome in order to have access to basic telephony, which was, at that time, 
regarded as a luxury. This trend was reversed with the licencing of private operators to compete 
with the incumbent.  
The Minister confirmed that the Decree allowed only limited competition in the 
telecommunications sector. Hence, although the Nigerian telecommunications sector was 
liberalised in 1992, the National Assembly reviewed Decree2 75 in 1999, by when the civilian 
government came into office, to become an Act and to allow full competition in 
telecommunications sector. The Telecommunications Act, 1999 (reviewed Decree 75) ushered 
in the second phase of telecommunications reform in 2001, with opening up of mobile market 
to competition. The review of the Telecommunications Act, 1999 was initiated, executed, and 
funded by the Commission when the interviewee - Minister – was Executive Commissioner in 
the Commission’s Board and this researcher was the Director, Standards in the Commission. 
The review, which received Government approval, was published in 2003, as the Nigerian 
Communications Act, 2003. 
The second semi-structured interview was with the telecommunications consultant who was 
commissioned by the Minister of Communications to develop the legal framework- Decree 75 
                                                 
2 Decree, 75: the name decree implies that the Government in power is Military that has not been democratically 
elected by the people for the people. 
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which informed the telecommunications reform in Nigeria in 1992 and also, with due 
amendment in 1999, became Act, 1999 which led to the opening up of the mobile market to 
competition in 2001. This in-depth interviewee confirmed the Minister’s account of the 
Nigerian telecommunications legal transformation. He revealed that the document he produced 
for the then Hon Minister of Communications which was published as Decree 75 was an 
adaptation, not a carbon copy, of the Australian Act which he found more relevant to Nigeria. 
He did not use the British telecommunications law because he did not find it suitable for 
Nigeria, for instance, besides having Oftel as the regulator, the British system has no board of 
governors or directors or whatever, hence he advised the Minister accordingly.  
Another semi-structured interview with ex-Director of the Commission’s Consumer Affairs 
Bureau sought to understand why there existed a significant gap between the formal rules in 
consumer protection and the rules in use in the competitive mobile market. The interviewee 
revealed that in Nigeria it is the seller’s market hence the situation in the mobile 
telecommunications market is not different. 
 The above semi-structured interviews bring to fore the role of path-dependency and strategies 
employed by dominant policy-makers, in this instance the Minister of Communications, serving 
as telecommunications regulator then, to single-handed initiate and introduce the Decree 75, 
which informed the Nigerian telecommunications reform in 1992. This was the norm during 
the thirty years of military authoritarian regimes preceding the regulatory regimes discussed 
above. It is part of the legacy the politicians and technocrats inherited from the military rule 
and held onto because it served their personal interest. It confirms that history matters and draws 
attention to the importance of historic policy legacies and broader country characteristics such 
as weak democracy, weak institutions marked by bureaucratic corruption non-transparent 
transactions as well as very little history of civil society. These legacies still prevail in the socio-
economic, political and regulatory environment in the Nigerian telecommunications sector as 
evidenced in Part II-empirical section of this study. It also explains why ordinary consumers’ 
views are not sought for and taken into consideration by the Commission in implementing 
policies on matters of interest to them.  
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However, it is worth mentioning that the researcher made abortive attempts to interview the 
then Commission’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) under whose watch the mobile market was 
opened to competition in 2001 and who initiated the review of the Telecommunications Act, 
1999 to create the current Nigerian Communications Act, 2003. Unfortunately, he did not 
manage to get back to me in this regard, as he promised, probably because he was then fully 
engaged with his campaigns to be elected to the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
 One wonders why these conversations seem novel. This question is answered by Kingdon 
(1995 cited in Van den Bulck, 2012:224) who found out that:  
“Policy-makers often do not know where policies have come from. He concludes 
from it that the policy process is tainted by coincidence and chance as much as 
negotiation and insight”. 
The other interviews have been equally very useful in complementing the document analysis 
as evidenced from the empirical Section-Part II of the study. 
1.2.4 Data Analysis 
Institution Decomposition Model 
Saleth and Dinar in 1999 established a comprehensive model for evaluating institutional 
performance. To achieve this, Saleth and Dinar (1999) decomposed water institution into 
three main components: policy, law and administration and in the second stage, they further 
decomposed each of the three components of water institution into the component’s aspects. 
However, this study seeks to extend Saleth and Dinar (1999) decomposition model by 
introducing enforcement as the fourth component of the mobile institution. In this way, this 
study seeks to fill a gap and to facilitate the evaluation of the Nigerian mobile institution with 
focus on consumer representation. 
The Nigerian mobile telecommunications institution is decomposed into four main 
components, namely: mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile 
enforcement. The aim is to 1) assess if the regulatory reform in the mobile market is supported 
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by appropriate institutional arrangements, and 2) to ascertain the contribution of each of the 
four components of the mobile institute (policy, law, administration and enforcement) to the 
promotion and protection of the ordinary consumers’ interest in the Nigerian mobile 
telecommunications sector.  
The study will also take notice of the extra-institutional factors like the prevailing regulatory 
environment in drawing conclusions. It will be guided by the NIE approach particularly the 
Transaction cost, Agency and Property right aspects in evaluating how each of the main 
components of the Nigerian communications institution has enabled or disabled the definition 
of the ordinary consumer and ordinary consumer interest in the liberalised mobile market.  
Transaction cost with reference to ordinary consumers includes the cost of accessing and 
assessing information, the preparation and submission of documents to public inquiries and 
arbitration, time and effort required to contact the Commission’s or services providers’ help 
desk or contact centres and switching costs. On the part of the Commission it includes the cost 
of monitoring and enforcement because the proper functioning of institutions, with reference to 
the Transaction Cost Theory, depends on the costliness of enforcement (North 1990). Agency 
problems are likely to occur between the Nigerian Legislature, as the principal, and the 
Commission as the agent, if the politicians/service providers capture the Commission. 
Alternatively, if the Commission acts in a manner that is not transparent or inherently difficult 
to monitor or if the Legislature lacks the control mechanisms to achieve effective and direct 
impact on the Commission’s behaviour. It is not easy to ascertain or assess if an agent will 
always act in the best interest of the principal (North, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Property rights include the operating guidelines such as the roll out obligations as well as 
several incentives- disincentives embedded in the licenses. It has implications for the 
availability, accessibility and affordability of telephones services. The promotion and 
protection of consumer interest is tied to how these situations play out in practice.  
In general, in each of the three empirical chapters of part II, the researcher starts the analysis 
with the National Telecommunications Policy (NTP), to find out if the NTP in its vision of the 
telecommunications sector had issued any directions on the promotion and protection of 
ordinary consumer with focus on the chapter’s objective. Thereafter, the analysis shifts to the 
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mobile law (the Act 2003) to assess if there are provisions in mobile law for the promotion and 
protection of ordinary consumer with focus on the chapter’s objective to facilitate the 
actualisation of the directives of the NTP and to ensure if there are provisions for achieving 
these in practice. Thereafter, the analysis shifts to the mobile administration and finally to the 
mobile enforcement respectively to examine how these components of the mobile institution 
have contributed to influencing the realisation of the policy objectives as it relates to the 
chapter’s specific research question.  
1.2.5 Role of the researcher and genesis of the researcher’s interest  
One of the strengths of this study is the researcher’s ‘insider status’ and cognate experience in 
the diverse fields of telecommunications in Nigeria from 1978 to 2010. The researcher is not 
only familiar with the research context but also has been an integral part of the market players 
during her professional career in the sector. The researcher has worked in various capacity, in 
the Nigerian Incumbent Network from 1978 to 2001: starting as pupil engineer in Nigerian 
External Telecommunications Limited (NET) to serve as Deputy General Manager (Planning 
and Operations) in Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) from 1993 to 2001. 
The researcher also has worked as telecommunications regulator in Nigerian Communications 
Commission (Commission) from Sept. 2001 – Jan. 2010: serving as Director of Standards from 
2001 to 2004 and as Director of Traffic and Network Optimisation from 2005 to 2010. 
Therefore, the researcher’s cognate experience in the diverse fields of telecommunications 
facilitates this study. Experience shows that in developing countries, service providers are 
sceptical of regulators and that both regulators and service providers, seldom engage with 
independent researchers concerning inquiry about their performance (Eniola, 2006). Thus 
mindful of the challenges that this study might bring, concerning critical engagement with the 
sector during data collection, it was necessary to choose policy document analysis as the 
primary source of data.  This facilitates to create a critical distance for the researcher but at the 
same time enables the researcher to conduct unbiased research with high accuracy in data 
interpretation.  
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However, it is important to add that the researcher encountered many difficulties trying to get 
an interview with the immediate past Executive Vice Chairman of the Commission despite the 
introductory letter for the study, which the researcher’s Director of Studies sent to him. The 
feedback from his assistants was that all regulatory documents were on the Commission’s 
website. Unfortunately, the documents on the Commission’s website did not sufficiently satisfy 
the study requirements. Furthermore, the Commission lags behind in publication, for instance 
its latest Annual Report is that of 2013. The same goes with their publications on the website, 
for example, the Technical Standards website has the Performance Indicators Comparative 
Report (mobile service) of January 2014 still tagged as latest (new) report as at March 2016. 
At last, the researcher passed her requests to the Consumer Affairs Bureau and Public Relations 
Directorates through the Commission’s Lagos Zonal Controller. Despite several phone calls 
and persistent e-mail exchanges for over two years- 2014 and 2015 inclusive, only three items 
were received out of the several items requested. In the end, the Zonal Controller confirmed 
that the Commission was not responding to the researcher’s request.  
It is equally important to note that one of the active voluntary telecommunications consumer 
advocacy body-NATCOM did not have the consumer code of practice and was willing but 
unable to source the consumer code, on behalf of the researcher, from the mobile service 
providers. The researcher had similar experience with some of the Commission staff, who were 
willing to assist but encountered difficulty sourcing the information on the researcher’s behalf.  
Non-online secondary sources such as the Commission’s internal quarterly and annual reports, 
the individual consumer codes of the three mobile networks and other policy documents, proved 
very useful in the empirical section- Part II of the thesis. These documents were informally 
sourced from my former colleagues/friends who are still in the Commission and others who are 
now working in the mobile service providers’ networks. As Metcalf (1998: 327) rightly 
observes, relationships forged with colleagues prior to conducting research frequently provide 
the researcher “much-needed emotional support” to the gains of the study. The internal reports 
contain actual events with corresponding data, which were either omitted or altered in the 
published versions. 
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With the exception of AIRTEL, the other three mobile service providers were reluctant to give 
out any consumer-related information. The enormity of this challenge can be seen from the 
following incident: The Commission hired a consultant to carry out a study on Operators 
Compliance Index. When the consultant was invited to make a presentation on the status of the 
project on 4th February 2013: 
“the Commission received a report from the consultant highlighting the 
challenges faced in obtaining data from some network operators in Lagos State. 
The Commission visited the affected companies to facilitate the consultant to 
obtain the necessary data.  Finally, the consultant made a presentation on 
4th October, 2013” (NCC Annual Report 2013:81). 
The inclusion of the above incident in the Commission’s 2013 Annual Report, indicates the 
magnitude of the problem. It is also an evidence of the Commission’s level of aptitude in 
handling violations of the provisions of the law by network operators (discussed in Part II-
chapters 5, 6, and 7). It also confirms that operators are very reluctant to give out information 
about their activities even to the Commission. This experience is common among academic 
researchers in the telecommunications sector in Nigeria as observed by Dr Eniola Samuel 
(2006). 
The researcher’s interest to study ordinary consumer representation in the digital mobile market 
can be traced to her observations from 2001 to 2009, while participating in Telecommunications 
Consumer Parliament (TCP) sessions as member of the Nigerian Communications 
Commission’s (NCC) team. This researcher observed that, consumers comprise diverse groups 
of people of varying interests and needs with ideologies and behavioural biases to which neither 
the regulator (Commission) nor service providers paid adequate attention to understand. 
Consumers are generally not adequately informed and most times service providers present 
them with choices that are not clear or neutral or which they cannot easily comprehend (for 
example, tariff plans).  Hence, they tend to make wrong choices that impoverish them; 
consumers are generally unaware of legal provisions and their rights as well as existing 
channels of redress in the telecommunications sector and as a result are unable to hold their 
service providers accountable.  
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Furthermore, the consumer often appears to be helpless without the support of statutory 
advocacy bodies in the telecommunications sector, to nudge them in directions that are 
beneficial to them without limiting their freedom of choice (Thaler and Sustern, 2009). It would 
appear, as is erroneously assumed in literature on neoclassical economics, that ordinary 
consumers in Nigeria telecommunications were assumed rational and could maximise their 
preferences, at zero transaction cost, without consumer advocacy and representation. Finally, 
this researcher observed that under consumers’ helplessness, quietude, and the absence of 
independent consumer representative bodies, services providers are able to avoid compliance 
to rules for a long time. These observations and reflections left in the researcher a strong 
determination not only to contribute to academic debates in literature in this context but also to 
enhance consumer interest and protection in practice. 
However, to ensure a proper disposition to conduct this study having served in the Nigeria 
Communications Commission for ten years this researcher joined the UK Ofcom’s Consumer 
Forum for Communications (CFC) in 2014. Ofcom-the UK Communications regulator-, hosts 
the CFC but it has an independent Chair, who is also independent of Ofcom. The CFC consists 
of more than eighty-(80) organisations and individuals who represent consumers and citizens 
and have an interest in communications. The CFC uses the eye of the consumer to monitor 
Ofcom’s activities. For instance, it uses set criteria to evaluate if Ofcom has carried out a proper 
programme of research, to correctly judge and reflect consumers’ interests while deciding on a 
particular matter as well as to establish the effectiveness of new policy that Ofcom implements 
on the particular matter. CFC uses outcome performance to ascertain the effectiveness of newly 
implemented policy by assessing: if all the service providers have adopted best practice for the 
sector on the particular matter; if performance improved over time on the particular matter, and 
if performance improved compared to other sectors in the UK as well as other countries outside 
the UK on the particular matter. The researcher has participated actively in the activities of CFC 
since 2014 and looks forward to actualising the indispensable experience gained from CFC in 
Nigeria particularly to ensure ordinary consumers are properly represented in the 
telecommunications sector.  
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The scope of this study period spans from the year 2000 to t year 2015. The reason for starting 
in year 2000 is that a new Nigerian Telecommunications Policy (NTP) was published in 
October 2000, in preparation for the liberalisation of the mobile market in 2001. The reason for 
ending in year 2015 is that fifteen years of post-liberalisation is appropriate to evaluate the 
aftermath of the Nigerian mobile market reform with focus on policy implementation and its 
implication for the representation of ordinary consumer in the competitive mobile market. Thus, 
2000-2015 is an appropriate timeframe to address the research aims. 
The limitation of this study is that since the key documents sourced for analysis in this research 
are developed purposely for the Nigerian telecommunications sector, it may tend to restrict 
generalisation of findings. However, some cross-country comparisons were made and the study 
references other countries, both developed and developing.  
This section has discussed the use of single case study method involving triangulation of 
sources of data collection (primary and secondary sources of data and semi-structured 
interviews), used in conducting this research and this researcher’s motivation and challenges in 
the course of this study. The next section discusses previous research and contribution to 
knowledge.   
1.3 Previous Research and Contribution to Knowledge 
This research on communications policy with a focus on the aftermath of policy adoption in the 
Nigerian mobile market, which was opened up to competition in 2001 offers the first critical 
study on promotion and protection of ordinary consumer interests in the mobile market and 
aims to contribute to the scarcity of research literature in this area. In addition, this research 
aims to contribute to wider debates on policy failure in academic literature, a field that has not 
attracted adequate theoretical or empirical attention in telecommunications. 
This study of ordinary consumer representation is timely as there is increasing recognition of 
the important role of the demand side of markets in the dynamic and complex regulatory process 
because competition alone is unable to achieve policy objectives. Thus engaging consumers 
appropriately as a means of achieving policy objectives in the mobile market is still evolving 
in many countries. 
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The literature reviewed revealed an interesting shift from the supply side (supply of service) to 
the demand side of the market (consumer welfare) with on-going debates, particularly in the 
UK and Australia, about the representation of citizens and consumers in communications policy 
and regulation. In this context and relevant to this study is an important paper written by Damian 
Tambini (2012) an ex-member of Ofcom’s Communications Panel titled: Consumer 
Representation in UK Communications Policy and Regulation. The aim of the paper is to 
examine the role of the consumer representation in policy making with focus on the 
communications sector in the UK. The paper argues that there is an important role for Ofcom’s 
Consumer Communications Panel and also that consumer advocates have an important role to 
play as a result of information overload, market failure and consumer behavioural biases. The 
paper’s finding is that an ongoing role exists in media and communications for consumer 
advocates who should be independent of government and the regulatory body.  
The above paper examines consumer representation in the UK communications policy-making 
process as an on-going concern as opposed to ex post assessment of ordinary consumer 
representation in the Nigerian competitive mobile market, with a focus on the aftermath of 
policy adoption, which is the thrust of this study. As explained above, recognition of the 
importance of the demand side (consumer welfare) of markets, such as engaging consumers 
appropriately with necessary institutional structures and processes, is evolving in many 
countries. This perhaps explains the dearth of literature on the topic. 
Academic debates with regard to the regulation of commercial communications in general seem 
to focus on the design of optimum regulation or rules to stimulate the liberalised market 
performance. For instance, Levy and Spiller (1994) carried out a research of five countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, the Philippines and the United Kingdom) and highlighted the major 
constraints in the design of optimum regulation as institutional endowments and regulatory 
governance. They argued that these two factors – institutional endowments and regulatory 
governance – influence the regulatory incentives (i.e. regulation or rules) and consequently the 
sector’s performance. Their findings reveal that performance varies from one country to the 
other. Researchers using Levy and Spiller’s regulatory governance framework such as 
Increasing Regulatory Capacity have conducted many country case studies. The role of the 
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region in shaping national ICT policy in Southern Africa (Gorp, 2008). However, these country 
case studies did not pay any significant attention to consumer interests and protection. 
Concerning the state of consumer interest and protection in Nigeria three research reports, exist. 
In 2013, the Consumer International and Open Society Initiative for West Africa commissioned 
a Nigerian NGO - Consumer Awareness of Nigeria to undertake a study: ‘Research Report on 
the State of Consumer Protection in Nigeria: A review of the Consumer protection in the 
Telecommunications sector in Nigeria’, the result of which was published in January 2014. The 
project’s aim was to empower individual consumers through the realisation of their rights. The 
Focus Group Discussions revealed that most consumers are neither aware of the relevant laws 
that give them protection in their daily transactions nor aware of the channels of redress. 
Consumers detest using the court for redress because of the high cost of litigation and because 
they lack faith in the judicial system and “for similar reasons including sentiments, complaints 
are not readily lodged with service providers” (CI, 2014:6).  
The second research ‘Nigeria Consumer Satisfaction Survey’ was undertaken in 2012 for the 
Consumer Affairs Bureau in the Commission by the NCC Consumer Satisfaction Survey Team 
(NCC.CSS, 2012). The research team comprises the Commonwealth Telecommunications 
Organisation and three other national companies. It is the first and only nationwide consumer 
survey conducted by the Commission since 2001. The objectives of the project were to: 
determine the quality of service provided by mobile, fixed phones, and internet service 
providers, and the robustness of their complaint management process; ascertain consumer 
complaints’ profile and frequency; determine consumer awareness of their rights, benefits and 
the obligations to service providers; and make recommendations for how consumer awareness 
of their rights could be improved. The findings of this research include that 32% of mobile 
phone users made a complaint in previous year; high status users and more sophisticated groups 
of mobile phone users were more willing to complain reflecting a stronger sense of 
empowerment. 
The third research is an academic research conducted by Dr. Eniola Samuel in 2006 for a degree 
of Master of Business Administration – ‘Customer Satisfaction in the Mobile 
Telecommunications Industry in Nigeria.’ The aim of the research was to investigate the overall 
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customer satisfaction of the mobile telecoms industry; the relationship between satisfaction and 
demographics; and factors influencing satisfaction. The research findings are: 5% of 
respondents were highly satisfied and 57% satisfied; a mix of network quality, billing, and 
customer support and validity period had stronger relationship with satisfaction while age, 
gender, employment and location variables presented weak relationship. The author remarked 
that unlike the developed countries there is dearth of research despite the economic and social 
benefits of the mobile telecoms to the Nigerian economy and market, and confirmed that his 
contacts with the mobile service providers for any useful information yielded no response. He 
wrote that the few pieces of literature available focus on the impact and development of 
telecoms, communications and mobile telephony and that the limitations affected his study.  
Contribution to knowledge 
This study about the aftermath of policy adoption in the Nigerian telecommunications sector is 
novel. It offers the prime critical study on the promotion and protection of ordinary consumer 
interests in the liberalised competitive mobile market since 2001.  
This study seeks to make four main contributions to the field of telecommunications policy 
research: 
First, the empirical study conducted in Part II suggests this study as a good case of policy failure, 
a field that has not attracted adequate attention either theoretically or empirically in literature 
(Bovens and Hart, 2016).  Hence, the study contributes to the knowledge base in academic 
literature on policy failures, by giving explanations to what went wrong with protection of 
ordinary consumers in the competitive mobile market as well as evaluating the practical issues 
involved. In particular, this study by using the new institution economics framework draws 
attention to the importance of policy legacies and broader country characteristics such as lack 
of independent statutory consumer bodies and well-resourced civil societies as well as the weak 
institutional structures and capacities, including none-responsive monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism, to explain policy failure.  
Second, in contrast to neo - liberal thinking this study confirms the importance of regulation 
not only in facilitating the introduction of competition but also in delivering policy objectives 
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and the anticipated benefits to ordinary consumers. Therefore, since most debates in the 
literature reviewed on post-liberalisation are centred on policy and regulatory frameworks that 
specifically target competition, the results of this research aim to contribute to broader debates 
that liberalisation also requires policy and regulatory framework that specifically targets the 
ordinary consumers’ interests and protection. 
Third, this study makes another contribution by adapting the institution decomposition 
analytical framework by Saleth and Dinar (1999) to provide the means of evaluating how the 
Nigerian mobile institution has enabled or disabled the representation of the ordinary consumer 
in the competitive mobile market. In addition, the study extends Saleth and Dinar (1999)’s 
three-components (law, policy and administration) by introducing enforcement as the fourth 
component of institution. In this way, this study aligns with North (1990, 2005) 
to emphasise that the consideration of enforcement mechanisms is important for institution 
decomposition analysis in telecommunications.  
Fourth, this is especially the case for developing countries. The study presents detailed evidence 
about the issues surrounding consumer interest and influential representation in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector and aims to contribute to knowledge in this area. 
Finally, the study’s focus on the mobile sector is important given the global significance of this 
sector. To the best of my knowledge, there seem to be no empirical research or methodological 
approach to evaluate how ordinary consumers have been represented in digital mobile 
telecommunications markets, perhaps due to continued emphasis on the supply side of markets 
and on policy-making, which is only recently shifting to the demand side.  
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part offers the analytical 
framework and background, comprising of three scene-setting chapters. The second part is the 
empirical research comprising three empirical chapters and the thesis conclusion. 
This section explains the structure of the thesis. 
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The next chapter sets the scene by first situating this study -ordinary consumer representation 
in liberalised mobile market- into its broader perspective of public interest before building the 
theoretical and analytical frameworks that underpin the empirical research undertaken in the 
second part of the thesis. Thus, the chapter elaborates on the process for adoption of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) as well as draws on literature on the conceptual framework of 
NIE, which focuses on transaction cost, agency and property right to provide the necessary 
guidance for the empirical chapters.  
 
In addition, this chapter adopts Saleth and Dinar’s (1999) Institution Decomposition Model to 
guide institutional data analysis in the empirical part of this study. However, in contrast to the 
water institution which Saleth and Dinar (1999) have broadly decomposed into three major 
components – policy, law, and administration – this study seeks to extend the model by 
separating the enforcement mechanisms as the fourth component of institution to facilitate 
institutional analysis. This conceptual separation is necessary because the enforcement function 
is vital for the regulatory agency to secure mobile sector compliance to existing regulations and 
thus enhances promotion and protection of consumers’ interests. This is evidenced in the 
findings in Part II - the empirical chapters.  
 
Study findings reveal that, in practice, it is difficult for the regulatory agency to be effective 
without the industry perceiving that tough enforcement mechanisms, which are in place, are 
ready for action (Ayres and Brathwaite, 1992,). Thus, Bandaragoda (2000:28) argues, “the gap 
between the declared rules and the rules-in-use is basically a result of the laxity in rule 
application and enforcement”.  
 
In Chapter 3, the study presents a brief overview of the major historical events that shaped the 
present socio-political and economic environment of Nigeria in which the telecommunications 
industry operates. First, it flags Nigeria’s natural and human endowments, which placed her as 
the largest economy in Africa with a telecommunications industry that is one of the fastest 
growing in the world. 
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In a short overview of the socio-political history it shows how the 3 years of civil war (1967-
1970) at the heel of independence from Britain, the 30 years of military rule that followed and 
the discovery of oil in the 1970s left as a legacy a culture of corruption, clientelism and 
impunity.  In 16 years of democratic rule, this legacy has been raised to unprecedented levels 
by the political elites. The result has been weak institutions, lack of infrastructural development, 
unemployment and poverty. It also gives an insight on how the bureaucratic and other forms of 
corruption have infiltrated and influenced the regulatory function as it relates to the promotion 
of the ordinary consumer interest and representation in the telecommunications sector. 
 
In subsequent sections of this chapter, the study highlights the factors that led to the failures 
that characterised the evolution of the Nigerian telecommunications through the early years 
until 2001, the suppressed demand and the subsequent exponential growth in subscribers’ 
numbers in the years following the liberalisation of the sector. It looked at the challenges the 
socio-political and economic environment presents to businesses and to the telecommunications 
industry in particular and argues that it adversely affects cost of doing business and the price 
the ordinary consumer pays. Finally, it highlights the vulnerability of the ordinary consumers 
and the different challenges they encounter in the liberalised, complex and fast changing mobile 
market and advocates for more commitment towards pro-consumer regulatory interventions. 
Chapter 4 aims to explore the current global trend in ordinary consumer representation and 
complaints management, which will form the background for the interpretation of the findings 
in the empirical Chapters 6 and 7 of this study which focus on processes of ordinary consumer 
representation and complaints management respectively. The chapter starts by discussing the 
inevitable need for regulation in liberalised competitive markets. It asserts that the ultimate goal 
of regulation is the attainment of policy objectives that include the promotion of consumer 
interest. It reviews and affirms the crucial role of consumer representation bodies in facilitating 
consumers’ influential participation in the regulatory process, which also tend towards the 
achievement of policy objectives. Finally, the chapter looked at consumer complaints 
management processes that are, at the same time, a potential cause of consumer complaints and 
an important dimension of consumer representation.  
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Chapter 5 is the first of the three empirical chapters. In its introductory section it reminds the 
reader that the major data collection methodological approach for the three empirical chapters 
will be ‘Document analysis’ guided by the theoretical framework based on New Institutional 
Economics with its three analytical tools: transaction costs, property rights and agency concept 
and facilitated by the adapted Saleth and Dinar (1999) Institutional Decomposition Model. The 
model decomposed water institution into three components: policy, law and administration 
while this study extended it to include the enforcement component of mobile institution. The 
chapter explains the decomposition of the Nigerian mobile institution into four major 
components – mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement. It 
goes further to explain the evaluation of how each of the main components of the Nigerian 
telecommunications institutions and their main aspects have contributed to the definition of the 
ordinary consumer and ordinary consumer interest in the liberalised mobile market.  
The main purpose of this Chapter is to address the first research question. It seeks to ascertain 
by analysing the policy and legal documents, if and how the legislators, regulator and market 
players in Nigeria have defined the ordinary consumer interest in the field of mobile 
communications. In each section it focuses on one component of the mobile institution and by 
analysing the provisions in the National Telecommunications Policy (mobile policy), the 
Nigerian Communications Act and regulations (mobile law), the Nigerian Communications 
Commission reports, publications etc. (mobile administration), and other relevant documents 
relating to monitoring and enforcement (mobile enforcement) it assesses the extent to which 
each mobile component has contributed or otherwise to the definition of ordinary consumer 
interests.  
In this chapter, the thesis highlights the justification of conceptualising enforcement as a 
component of mobile institution for analytical purposes. It argues that without effective 
enforcement of set rules the provisions of the Act and regulations are at best mere optional 
guidelines. It also highlights the existence of conflict of interest in the Commission, which 
undermines ordinary consumer interests. 
The focus of Chapter 6 is on the institutional structures and processes for the ordinary 
consumers’ influential participation in the regulatory process as it seeks answer to the question: 
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Focusing on regulatory structures and processes, how have ordinary consumers been 
represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile market in 2001? In seeking to answer 
this query, it examines the structures and processes, which are specifically provided to facilitate 
the realisation of four of the key dimensions of consumer representation, which were articulated 
in Chapter 4. These are provision of choice, provision of information, consultation, and efficient 
framework for consumer representation. 
Following the strategy in Chapter 5, the thesis evaluates the individual contributions of the 
mobile policy, law, administration and enforcement to the representation of the ordinary 
consumer. It starts by investigating if the National Telecommunications Policy, in its vision of 
the proposed telecommunications sector, had issued any directions that relate to the four 
dimensions of consumer representation. Then the search is shifted to mobile law (The Act and 
its regulation) to assess if the provisions in the mobile policy have been given sufficient legal 
backing to ensure that ordinary consumers’ opinion and interests are adequately considered in 
the policy-adoption processes with a focus on ordinary consumer representation. Attention is 
again shifted to the mobile administration and enforcement components of the mobile 
institution to assess how these components have contributed in influencing the realisation of 
the policy objectives as it relates to the representation of the ordinary consumer. 
One of the important findings in this chapter is that there is no provision in the legal documents 
for the establishment, inclusion or support of independent consumer advocacy groups. Hence, 
the main argument in this chapter is that without well-resourced independent consumer body, 
the ordinary consumer will neither be able to harness the provisions in the mobile law nor hold 
the Commission and services providers to account. Nigeria has very little history of civil society 
and advocacy groups and this chapter highlights the importance of these issues. 
Complaints resolution is one of the key dimensions of consumer representation and the focus 
of Chapter 7. The other dimensions – provision of information, consultation, and provision of 
choice and efficient framework for consumer representation – featured in the previous chapter. 
In this chapter, the focus is on the question: What processes have been established in the 
Nigerian mobile sector for the resolution of ordinary mobile consumer complaints and how 
effective have they been? 
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To address the Research Question Three, this study employed the extended Institutional 
Decomposition Model, which was used in the previous two empirical chapters. The   analysis 
is based on the four main components of the mobile institution– mobile policy, mobile law, 
mobile administration and mobile enforcement and their main aspects in order to ascertain how 
they have influenced the ordinary consumer complaints management. In this chapter, the study 
also relied on the NIE analytical tools: transaction cost and agency in drawing conclusions.  
The main findings include that the services providers’ complaint handling process is 
inaccessible and ineffective. This prevailing situation is another outcome of the Commission’s 
soft-handed approach to the enforcement of rules. 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the main findings of the thesis in its attempt to answer the 
three research questions. 
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CHAPTER 2 Sourcing Ordinary-Consumer-Centric Theoretical and Analytical 
Frameworks 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter has two aims: first, to situate the study in a broader perspective of public interest 
and in the context of policy and institutional failure, and second, to establish a suitable 
theoretical framework to guide this study in assessing the extent ordinary consumers have been 
represented in the liberalised Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector. These aims are 
organised in four broad sections.  
The first section reviews the traditional framework for the management of the 
telecommunications sector and locates it in the realm of public interest. It then attempts to come 
up with a clear definition of the public interest in telecommunications for the purposes of this 
study. This is necessary because the notion of the public interest appears ubiquitous, but rarely 
visible in practice. 
The second section discusses the Economic Theory of Regulation and the Neoclassical 
Economic Theory and explains their limitations. For instance, the Neoclassical Economic 
Theory assumes that the consumer is fully armed with all the required information and that the 
consumer is both an articulate and rational being. The contrary argument is that although 
information is necessary, it is not sufficient by itself to guarantee competition benefits to the 
consumer due to consumers’ limited capacity (Korobkin and Ulen, 2000). This and other gaps 
in neoclassical economic assumptions pose difficulties in the use of the neoclassical approach 
as a methodology for this study. 
The third section compares the weaknesses and strengths of five institutional approaches, which 
facilitate the adoption of the broader New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach, which 
provides theoretical guidance for this study. This part discusses the three major analytical tools 
of NIE that are important for the study, namely: the transaction costs, property rights and 
agency. It confirms that institutions matter and highlights two critical claims of NIE about 
institutions which provide useful insights in this study: 1) it analytically allows for a clear 
distinction between institutions as the rules of the game (example: the United States 
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Constitution, the Nigerian Communications Act 2003) and organisations as the players in the 
game (example: the Senate, a regulatory agency); 2) it emphasises that the real incentive 
structure that shapes human exchange in a society consists of formal rules, informal constraints 
and their enforcement characteristics (North, 1990). These two claims are crucial in the 
understanding of the influences of institutions and institutional change.  
Having established the significance of institutions in the theoretical section, the fourth part of 
the chapter answers the query - if institutions matter (theoretical framework), how can we study 
them (analytical framework)? This last section disintegrates institutions into key elements for 
analytical purposes. These elements will help to guide and structure the empirical part of the 
thesis. The analytical framework consists of an adaptation of the Saleth and Dinar (1999) 
institution decomposition model and extends it to include the enforcement component of 
institution. The decomposition process involves two levels: 1) The mobile institution is 
decomposed into four components, namely: mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration 
and mobile enforcement; 2) the four components are further decomposed into their constituent 
aspects, sourced from literature and topical debates on consumer interests and protection. These 
institutional aspects form the basis for evaluating the contribution of the mobile institution to 
ordinary consumer representation in the Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector. Finally, 
the section explains how the institutional aspects facilitate to answer the three research 
questions.  
2.2 The Public Interest in telecommunications: It underpins ordinary consumer interests 
in competitive mobile telecommunications market  
Governments and their agencies have the peoples’ mandate, which obligates them to act in the 
public interest. Hence, governments will always intervene in order to achieve public interest 
goals like the migration of the broadcast industry from analogue to digital platform or to 
safeguard the public interest by enhancing national security through the establishment of a 
national telephone subscriber’s database. Governments exercise this role through various 
regulatory mechanisms. However, what qualifies as public interest is open to debate. This 
section seeks to position this study into a broader framework by contextualising it within the 
public interest in telecommunications and in the context of policy and institutional failure. 
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The telecommunications industry and three other industries - transportation, energy and 
currency systems - are called infrastructure industries because they are imbued with a public 
function or affected with public interest since they influence commerce and discourse among 
the people in a society. Hence, infrastructure industries are always subject to regulatory 
intervention (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012). 
 
The concept of regulating in the public interest was first conceived in the United States of 
America (USA) and public interest was defined as the interest of the public or the public 
welfare. The Man-Ekins Act of 1910 gave AT&T a monopoly right and protected it from 
competitive market entry with a mandate to achieve public interest goals such as universality 
and price controls to promote affordability (Iosifidis, 2011; Blackman, 2007). Thus, AT&T’s 
first advertising slogan – One system, one policy, and universal service – illustrates the 
company’s philosophy of regulating telecommunications in the public interest. Some 3 
developed countries of the world mostly in Europe soon adapted, in varying degrees, the USA 
model of using traditional monopoly operators to provide telecommunications services in the 
public interest.  
 
Regulation of telecommunications tends to be more complicated than regulation of the other 
infrastructure industries. For instance, telecommunications operate as a common carrier under 
the old common law of social equity that obligates it to serve all customers without 
discrimination, in contrast to the transport sector where different modes of transportation may 
be more appropriate for different customers. In addition, and similar to other infrastructure 
industries, the regulator earns the trust and confidence of the stakeholders when the views of 
market players, including the ordinary consumers, are taken into account in regulatory process 
(Prakash and Potoski, 2015; Mansell and Raboy, 2011; Bhaher, 2011; Blackman & Srivastana, 
2010; Muzzini, 2005; Baldwin and Cave, 1999, Arnstein, 1969).  
                                                 
3 For Milton Mueller (2013), AT&T came up with the aim of universal service in order to persuade government 
that a (AT&T) monopoly is necessary.  
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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established in 1934 to regulate the 
USA’s telecommunications sector with, “a mandate to secure broader public interest goals such 
as universality, fairness and equity” (Iosifidis, 2011:46): an acceptance that the market on its 
own was not working properly. The idea to regulate telecommunications in the public interest 
was aimed at providing various telecommunications services, at a fair price and reasonable 
quality, to as many consumers as possible (Blackman, 2007).  
In a similar fashion, the telecommunications reform started first in the USA, in 1948, with 
Britain joining in the reform also in 1984 (Mayer-Schonberger and Strasser, 1999; Hills, 1986). 
Although these countries had achieved significant levels of universal service, improved 
efficiency and industrial development, persistent problems in the telecommunications sector, 
was the main argument for the reforms.  
In contrast, reforms in the developing countries began when their telecoms sector was 
characterised by low penetration, poor efficiency and poor funding. Most developing countries 
lack basic telecoms infrastructure, technical/managerial skills and sufficient financial resources 
required to build full national networks. Their telephone penetration, in most cases, is far below 
the ITU recommendation of one telephone per 100 inhabitants. According to William Melody 
(1997), their main concern was building national telecommunications infrastructure almost 
from scratch.  Hence, while in developed countries market liberalisation was introduced in order 
to improve efficiency and solve the persistent problems in the telecommunications sector, in 
developing countries liberalisation was introduced to secure funding for infrastructural 
development.  The envisaged socio-economic benefits of liberalisation such as funding for 
infrastructural development, providing unserved consumers access to networks, at good quality 
of service and affordable prices were the major consideration and the underlying reason for 
telecommunications reforms in developing countries (Sanatan and Melody 1997).  
Although liberalisation is a necessary step, it does not guarantee the benefits of competition. 
On its own, liberalisation could become a hindrance to the growth of the telecommunications 
market if it is hijacked by predatory entities. Armstrong et al. (1994) argued that to entrench 
effective competition, legislative and pro-competitive policies are needed as well as sound 
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interconnection conditions, price controls and the pursuit of public interest goals (Petrzzini, 
1997). 
Several years after the establishment of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 
1934, Haring and Weisman (1993:17) urged the USA telecommunications to adopt a new 
philosophy of regulation, which they referred to as ‘customer necessity’ regulation, with the 
objective of “maximising societal welfare rather than the welfare of competitors”. The 
implication of this argument is that universal service is a broader concept than universal access 
– which the USA and most developed countries of the world have already achieved – and 
includes other consumer benefits from liberalisation that constitute additional challenges. 
Essentially universal service covers availability, accessibility, affordability, and quality of 
service and others such as its funding strategies, which vary between countries. For instance, in 
Nigeria most Nigerians have a mobile phone. Thus, with a teledensity of 107.87%, there is 
evidence of significant progress with regard to universal access. However, 207 clusters4, with 
a total population of approximately 36.8 million people, are identified as underserved or 
unserved areas of Nigeria that lack basic telephony and transport network. Furthermore, in spite 
of the progress made with respect to universal access in Nigeria, the tariffs are not affordable 
(Chapter 3). In short, if we define the public interest in telecommunications in terms of universal 
service, which is multi-faceted, then the need arises to examine all its interrelated aspects. This 
is one of the objectives of this thesis.  
In line with the foregoing, Lunt and Livingstone (2011:36) put forward the nature of the public 
interest in telecommunications as “the fundamental justification for regulation” and add that it 
“underpins both citizen and consumer interest in media and communications sector”. In 
confirmation, Flathman (1966) says that there is no option to applying the concept of public 
interest, in the telecommunications sector, since the difficulties associated with achieving the 
public interest in telecommunications are mainly attributed to politics and morals. Therefore, it 
                                                 
4 Result of a study carried out in 2013 by the Universal Service Provision Fund (USPF) with an objective to 
identify clusters of voice gap in Nigeria.  
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would appear that a vital aspect of economic performance of the telecommunications industry 
is that it covers the public interest.  
Hence, moving forward the relevant query should be: how satisfied are the ordinary consumers, 
with the services they are receiving in the competitive mobile market and not how many active 
subscribers have the mobile service providers connected, which is the same as how much are 
the mobile service providers carting away in the competitive struggle. The issue is that, for long, 
the number of active subscribers’ lines has, erroneously become the performance benchmark in 
the telecommunications sectors, especially in developing countries like Nigeria. The reality is 
that it is not just number: they are persons (Pope Francis, 2015). Little wonder, then, Prakash 
and Potoski (2015:4) argue that institutions function well when “they channel private interests 
toward collective ends”. This study agrees totally with this argument. It implies that the 
representation of ordinary consumers in the Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector will be 
assessed in the broader context of public interest. 
Based on the above literature review on the public interest in telecommunications and in the 
context of this study, the public interest is conceived under four considerations: 1) there is 
availability of, at least, the basic modern mobile service everywhere in Nigeria including the 
most remote communities. This coheres with the mobile law in Nigeria as the mobile licences 
issued to the four service providers stipulate national coverage; 2) this basic mobile service 
should be made accessible,  with properly specified take-up, to all ordinary consumer to ensure 
ordinary consumers enjoy full benefits of socioeconomic inclusion; 3) the study recognises that 
the possibility of consumers receiving fair deals and value for money may be achieved through 
the promotion of open and competitive mobile market. It equally recognises that the mobile 
market currently is not fully competitive and can never be since it relies on a limited natural 
resource (radio frequencies). It is an oligopoly and hence the need for effective price and quality 
of service regulation; 4) finally the study argues for functional legal incentives, as safeguard 
for the public interest. 
This study, therefore, defines the public interest, as ordinary consumer ubiquitous access to 
modern mobile telecommunications service, offered at affordable prices and good quality. The 
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certainty of this definition will be achieved, when there is influential advocacy for ordinary 
consumers, empowered by effective independent ordinary consumer representation.    
The debate on regulating in the public interest continues in the next section, under Economic 
theory of regulation. 
2.3. Economic theories of regulation: Is regulation in the private interest or in the public 
interest? 
Traditionally there are two broad contending theories of regulation in the academic literature. 
These are the Public Interest Theory, which explains that regulation pursues the protection and 
benefit of the public and the Private Interest Theory or the Chicago Theory, also known as the 
Economic Theory (ET) of regulation, which suggests that regulation protects only the interest 
of the private groups (business owners) and does not protect the public.  
Academic literature has it that Posner (1974) was the first to associate “the traditional rationale 
for regulation at the time to a theory based on the concept of the public interest” (Hantke-Domas, 
2003:165). The Public Interest Theory operates on the basis of two general assumptions:  
regulators have adequate information and the necessary powers, resources and dispositions to 
pursue the public interest, implying regulation has zero transaction cost (Hertog, 2010); and 
that markets have the disposition to fail (Hantke-Domas, 2003).  
On the other hand, the Private Interest Theory or Economic Theory (ET) of regulation 
originated, three years earlier, in 1971, through a conference paper written by George Stigler. 
The ET stems from different assumptions that the economic agents, such as telecommunications 
regulators, do not have sufficient market information in terms of: the cost of the 
product/services; the exact content and quality of the product/service; the size of the suppliers 
and other important characteristics of the suppliers. Under this condition, the economic agents 
are not able to promote the public interest while controlling the suppliers. The other assumption 
of the economic theory is that the economic agents have different objectives and incur different 
levels of costs and as such, the differences in their various objectives and economic costs may 
result in some agents pursuing their own interests (Hertog, 2010). 
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According to Stigler (1971), interest groups tend to influence the outcome of the regulatory 
process by providing financial and other supports, especially information, to politicians or/and 
regulators. The theory has been useful in many academic policy studies because it brings to 
bear the notion that regulatory bodies, if captured by the operators, leave the benefits of the 
reform with the operators instead of with the consumers.  Its main challenge is to explain when 
one regulatory action tends towards public or private interest and great regulatory scholars like 
Baldwin and Cave (1994), advocate that the justification for regulation should be considered 
when a government is acting in the interest of the public. The assumption that regulators act in 
the interest of consumers has long been questioned based on rent seeking and incentives to 
regulators (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1971; Peltzman, 1970). 
Rent seeking arises because of government’s restrictions on economic activities in market-
oriented economies and can sometimes be considered legal; although in many other occasions 
rent seeking, “takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black markets” 
(Krueger, 1974:291). The common denominator for the different forms of illegal rent seeking 
is corruption. Corruption is increasingly being recognised, in academic literature, as a dominant 
factor that impairs growth and development and according to Jain (2001:73): “there is 
consensus that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public office is used in a manner 
that contravenes the rules of the game”. As many studies have, confirmed corruption is a deep 
and long stranding feature of Nigeria with adverse impact on the interest of ordinary consumers 
and the development of the sector (Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013; Okonjo-
Iweala, 2012). 
Jain (2001) claims that corruption requires co-existence of three elements: first, discretionary 
power which includes power to make and administer regulations; second, economic rents, 
which must be associated with this power; third, the legal/judicial system that has very low 
probability of detection of the wrong doing and/or prescribe penalty. A combination of the first 
two elements forms incentives for corruption while the third element serves as deterrent (Becker, 
1968).  
It would appear that having discretionary or monopolistic powers to allocate available resources 
ranks first in promoting corruption (the higher the power the higher the incentive) and 
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Kaufmann (1998:149) Cited in (Jain, 2001:77) confirms it is “one of the most insidious forms 
given the huge rents and bribes involved”. The existence of rent seeking certainly affects 
customer’s perception that economic-market does not operate in the public interest or consumer 
interest; a situation which tends to increase regulatory interventions, thereby “increasing the 
amount of economic activities devoted to rent seeking” (Krueger, 1974:302). 
For several years, the Economic Theory of regulation ET, as discussed above, provided the 
framework for developing legislation and regulations in telecommunications markets (Stigler, 
1971). It explains the demand side of regulation, which deals with the public interest, implying 
that the market alone cannot look after it. Its major weaknesses are that it completely omits the 
supply side of regulation and that it treats institutions as a static/black box (Spiller and Tommasi, 
2003), for example, it ignores the incentive dimension (consequences of default) of regulation 
(Laffront and Tirole, 1993). Furthermore, as the market grew more complex in the years 
following liberalisation, it became obvious that the traditional Economic Theory could no 
longer effectively deal with emerging issues that are of interest to the current policy makers, 
the theorists and market players (Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Bauer, 2010). In response to this 
challenge, scholars proposed the neo- classical economic theory, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
2.4 The Fallacies of Neo-classical Economic Theory: Perfect markets, rational 
consumers and information symmetries  
Neo-classical economic rational consumer behaviour, propounded by Thorstein Veblen in the 
late nineteenth century, states that consumers are fully armed with their set of preferences and 
that they are able to maximise their utility by simply exercising their preferences and making 
rational choices (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005). The Neo-classical Economic Theory asserts 
that by ensuring consumers are well informed; the market will work efficiently through 
increased competition between suppliers, in terms of price, quality and choice of products on 
offer.  It predicts that in the absence of economies of scale, if competition - a direct offshoot of 
telecommunications liberalisation – is to deliver the envisaged benefits to consumers, they must 
be able to choose their preferred services and networks (OECD, 2008). It assumes that the 
consumer is fully armed with all the required information and that the consumer is both an 
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articulate and rational being. Although neo-classical economics recognises that numerous 
consumer welfare issues are bound to arise in markets that allow existence of operators with 
dominant powers, it proposes remedial actions through boosting competition and through 
consumer informed choices. In short, the assumption is that: “competition, when managed 
appropriately, benefits consumers’ self-interest and wider consumer welfare” (Stevens, 
2009:1).  
Many scholars and behavioural economists have challenged the notion that information 
guarantees market efficiency (Cseres, 2008; Xavier, 2008). They argue that although 
information is necessary, it is not sufficient, by itself, to guarantee the benefits to the consumer.  
Moreover, the consumer may be disadvantaged when information is incomplete, excessive, 
erroneous, or deceitful (Cseres, 2008; Xavier, 2008). The debates focus on the fact that the 
nature, quality and volume of consumer information provided by the suppliers can limit its 
effectiveness and that the actual consumer behaviour tends to deviate systematically from the 
neo-classical assumptions.  
The empirical findings of behavioural economics also challenge the assumptions made by neo-
classical economics regarding the actual things consumers do with the information they require 
and how they interpret the information to make informed decisions that facilitate their welfare. 
Their findings confirm that consumer preferences fluctuate according to the various situations 
in which they make the decisions (Cseres, 2008). For instance, an individual consumer has 
challenges when it comes to making informed decisions in the face of loads of information 
emanating from a rapidly changing technological industry like telecommunications. In such 
situations, the individual consumer tends to exhibit cognitive related errors such as inability to 
remember, miscalculations and content evaluation errors (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000).  
The neo-classical economics analysis usually involves comparing market outcome with 
theoretical benchmark of perfect competition (static mode of analysis of regulation). This 
abstraction has been strongly criticised because it fails to address the real world situation. Thus:  
“Contemplation of an optimal system may provide techniques of analysis that would 
otherwise have been missed and in certain special cases; it may go far to providing a 
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solution. In general, its influence has been pernicious. It has led economists to derive 
conclusions for economic policy from the study of an abstract of a market situation” 
(Coase, quoted in Klein, 1999:457-458).  
Hence, drawing insights from behavioural science, scholars have challenged the assumptions 
of neo-classical economic theory, and have expanded and progressed the traditional theory into 
the broader framework of the Institutional Economics (IE) which took the primary bold step to 
open the black box to regulation, in order to analyse the interactions that take place among 
institutions that supply regulation (Levy and Spiller, 1994; 1996; Spiller, 1995; Spiller and 
Tommasi, 2003; Spiller, 2012).   
2.5 Analytical Framework: Adoption of the broader New Institutional Economics (NIE)   
In the previous section, the limitations of the neoclassical economic approach were highlighted, 
such as acting like a static box- unable to explain the role of institutions in influencing economic 
phenomena. This section starts by presenting the five analytical approaches, in institutional 
economics, in a comparative format. It outlines and highlights the considerations that led to the 
preference of the new institutional economics approach, for this study. It then draws from the 
literature on the NIE, with focus on the three major analytical tools that underpin this study. 
They are transaction costs, property rights and agency concept. Thereafter, the chapter discusses 
the importance of the three dimensions of NIE that are relevant to this study (formal rule, 
informal constraint and enforcement). The section ends with applying the NIE approach to the 
study. 
2.5.1 Stylised comparison of institutional approaches: The weaknesses and strengths of 
each approach facilitate the adoption of the broader New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
approach 
An increasing number of researchers explore solutions to problems, in different contexts, using 
the institutional approach probably due to the ineffectiveness of the neoclassical approach, 
discussed in the previous section, which assumes a perfect market with zero transaction costs, 
complete information and rational consumers. In this respect, Williamson (1994:3), made the 
assertion that: “policy prescriptions, which have moved from ‘getting the prices right’ to 
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‘getting the property rights right’, now centre on ‘getting institutions right’,” cited in (Saleth 
and Dinar, 2004:23).  
The table below, illustrates five institutional approaches in a comparative overview, in terms of 
six aspects: 1) generic scope; 2) assumptions; 3) unit of analysis; 4) causal explanations; 5) 
focus; and 6) limitations5.  
 
                                                 
5 The five approaches, despite their differences, attempt to overcome the main limitations of 
neoclassical economic approach: “especially its inability to explicitly incorporate the 
institutional aspects within its analytical framework” (Saleth and Dinar, 2004:67). 
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TABLE 1.  STYLISED COMPARISON OF INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES 
ASPECTS                                                                          APPROACHES 
Aspects of 
Comparisons 
Old 
institutionalis
m 
Neo- 
institutionalism 
Meso-corporatism     
policy community 
networks       
Game theory Transaction cost theory, 
agency theory, theory of contract  
1.Generic scope Macro-analysis 
of                               
complete 
institutions      
Macro-analysis 
of 
incomplete 
institutions     
Variations on 
micro- analysis of 
incomplete 
institution      
Micro-analysis 
of complete 
institutions                 
Micro-analysis of incomplete 
institutions 
2.Assumptions  
Interdependence 
Information 
Rationality 
       
No 
Complete  
Comprehensive 
                            
No  
Incomplete 
Bounded 
                         
Yes  
Incomplete 
Bounded 
                   
Yes  
Complete 
Comprehensive 
 
Yes 
Incomplete 
Bounded 
3. Unit of 
analysis    
Institutional 
structures    
Institutional 
structures    
Meso-institutional 
Structures        
Institutional 
structures 
Institutional transactions 
4. Causal 
explanations             
Institutional 
structures 
determine 
individual                              
behaviour              
Incomplete 
institutions 
create incentives 
for opportunist 
behaviour               
Actions of 
individuals are 
rendered 
compatible through 
efficient and                                                                                                             
Rational 
individuals 
select 
equilibrium 
solutions
Incomplete institutions create 
incentive for opportunism which 
induces individuals to 
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equitable use of 
incomplete 
institutions                                                        
invest in institutions that minimise 
cognitive competence and 
opportunism 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
5.Focus                 On formulation 
of 
classifications 
of                             
institutional 
structures    
On opportunities 
and constraints 
built into 
institutional 
structures                       
On opportunities 
and constraints 
built into meso-
institutional 
structures     
On the degree of 
stability of 
equilibrium 
solutions 
On technical coordination, 
warranty monitoring, and costs of 
incentives 
6. Limitations       - High level of   
aggregation  
- Ad-hoc 
description 
- Individuals 
do not 
calculate                      
-High level of 
aggregation 
-Ad hoc 
explanations       
-Average level of 
aggregation 
-Ad hoc 
explanations         
                      
-Institutions are 
highly abstract    
-Institutions are 
exogenous        
-.Intuitions are 
minimal                           
-Difficult to derive equilibrium 
solutions 
Source: Adapted from Landry (1996) cited in Saleth and Dinar (1999:47)
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A variety of theories or approaches are used to explain institutions, institutional performances 
as well as institutional evolutions in various disciplines such as economics, social, anthropology, 
cultural, political and law. For instance, since the relevance of the approaches vary with the 
different aspects of institution such as level of analysis, it is crucial to evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of institutional approaches in order to identify the institutional approach (or 
approaches) that is suitable for study objectives (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). Hence this chapter 
undertakes an analytical review of five institutional approaches including the fifth approach or 
the institutional transaction cost, agency and contract approach. The reason for this review, 
therefore, is facilitate the adoption of the broader New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach 
for this study as well as situate it in the perspective of the institutional approaches. 
Thus, the six aspects of comparison, which highlight the weaknesses and strengths of the five 
institutional approaches, given in Table 1 above, are used to indicate the study interests as 
follows:  
1) The generic scope: study of the complete Nigerian mobile institution to capture issues such 
as incomplete information (Macro-analysis of incomplete institutions). 
2) The three assumptions – interdependence, information and rationality- the study has key 
interest in the assumption of interdependence. This is because institutional linkages that is the 
internal linkages between the components and aspects of the mobile institution (as we will 
discuss in the next section) are central to this study. For instance, it facilitates insights to 
understand the interactions that go on between the key players in competitive mobile markets 
as well as the impact of institutions on economic performance. Considering the second and third 
assumptions of information and rationality, the study also has key interest on the limitations on 
these, i.e. incomplete information and bounded rationality.    
3) Unit of analysis: This study’s interest is on institutional transactions. This has implications 
to the concepts of transaction cost, agency and contract.  
4) Causal explanations: The study has interest on incomplete institution such as incomplete 
information, absence of consumer advocacy, which creates incentive for opportunistic 
behaviour etc.  
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5) Focus: This study has crucial interest in compliance monitoring and enforcement.  
6) Limitation: The study interests include high level of aggregation.  
The study interests, based on the six aspects of comparisons, of the five institutional approaches 
highlighted in Table 1 above, fall closer to the two shaded institutional approaches namely the 
Neo-institutionalism (2nd approach) and the Institutional transaction cost, agency and contract 
(5th approach).   
Consumer representation in competitive mobile markets encompasses a wide range of issues 
such as consumer advocacy, asymmetry of information, transaction costs to switch service 
providers, take-up associated with service accessibility, affordability and behavioural biases. 
Hence, this study critically requires a broad and flexible theoretical framework that ensures 
effective analysis of these issues. For instance, NIE is a multidisciplinary approach, which 
operates in the field of economics. NIE consists of analytical tools, from a variety of disciplines: 
business organisation, history, law, economics, anthropology, political science, psychology, 
and sociology, that when: “put together properly, form a wheel of analysis capable of 
addressing a broad variety of issues” (Alston, 2011:1). According to Spiller (2012) the 
differentiation of the NIE approach, from neo-classical and other approaches to regulation lies 
in NIE’s interest in institutional interactions, of both the institutional structure and the 
performance of regulation. NIE analyses the supply side of regulation from the perspectives of 
transaction costs and regulatory commitment and these are the essential tools in evaluating 
regulatory performance. Regulatory governance, viewed from the perspective of the new 
institutional economics, is defined to mean the mechanisms employed, in any setting in 
societies, to constrain regulatory discretions and to resolve conflicts that may arise in relation 
to these constraints (Levy & Spiller, 1994).  
Drawing from all the above discussions, the preference for the broader New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) approach to guide this study is clear. In this regard, Saleth and Dinar (2004:48) 
commented that: 
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“Although these approaches have differences, they are not alternatives but complements 
for a comprehensive understanding of institutions and their performance implications at 
various analytical levels and in different evaluation contexts”. 
This comment suggests the adoption of the broader New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
approach, which in the context of this study combines the Neo-institutionalism (2nd approach) 
and the Institutional transaction cost, agency and contract (5th approach) from the five 
approaches illustrated in Table 1 above, to guide this study. 
The next section discusses the New Institutional Economics (NIE). 
2.5.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE). Emphasis on Institutions and three main 
analytical tools: transaction costs, agency, and property right  
In the last section, a systemic approach - Stylised Comparison of five Institutional Approaches- 
facilitated the adoption of NIE as the theoretical framework to guide this study. This section 
introduces the NIE approach and discusses the three major analytical tools of NIE that have 
relevance to the study context.  
The NIE is a multidisciplinary approach, which operates in the field of economics. Academic 
literature has it that Williamson (1975), gave the name New Institutional Economics (NIE), to 
the work, which originated from Coase’s analysis of the firm, in 1937. In the views of Coase 
(1964) and Williamson (1975, and 1985), the approach is recognised as a powerful framework 
because it extends and builds on the neoclassical approach with the intention of optimising the 
gaps in the neoclassical approach. For instance, 1) NIE modified the neoclassical assumption 
of scarcity and competition by suggesting that competition does not present optimal solution in 
all economic settings. 2) NIE rejects neoclassical assumptions that individuals have complete 
information that results in their acting in a rational manner (unbounded rationality) and 3) NIE 
also rejects the assumption of a frictionless market with transactions that are instantaneous and 
costless (zero transaction costs). NIE diverges radically from neoclassical economics by 
making institutions key to economic and policy studies and insists that comparative institutional 
analysis guides policy analysis.  
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The three analytical tools of NIE, namely: transaction costs, agency, and property rights, which 
are useful for this study are discussed in order in the following sections.  
2.5.2.1 Transaction Costs: The Costliness of Institutions and Information Has Impact on 
Regulatory Performance  
NIE places importance on transaction costs asserting that transaction costs are involved in the 
setting up, implementation and evolution of an institution. For instance, North’s Theory of 
Institutions combines the Theory of Transaction costs and the Theory of Human Behaviour. 
According to North (1990:27): “the costliness of information” is key to transaction costs theory, 
based on the fact that in an exchange one party has better information and may stand to gain by 
hiding the information from the other.  
The two behaviour assumptions, which involve Transaction Costs Theory, are unbounded 
rationality and equilibrium. NIE assumes that individuals do not possess sufficient information, 
at any given time and that, in the real world, they are not fully aware of the realities on the 
ground because they have limited capability to source, store or process information, without 
error, and as a result of these limitations, they face uncertainty concerning unforeseen activities 
and outcomes. Furthermore, their ideas, the prevailing socio-political circumstances and the 
cost of acquiring information influence their choice making which may not yield the desired 
result (Furubotn & Richter, 1991:4-5; North, 1993; Menard and Shirley, 2005). 
NIE contradicts the assumption of equilibrium of neoclassical theory that has it that in choosing, 
individuals have to maximise their personal preferences and by so doing, their decisions may 
result into efficient outcomes (Eggestsson, 1990). In contrast, NIE holds that each individual 
will seek to take full advantage of a given situation within the “limitations of institutional 
constraints and transactional costs” (Furubotn & Richter, 1991:4-5). NIE also believes, contrary 
to the neo-classical economics, in the notion of feasible foresight, which offsets transaction cost 
by taking into consideration the human primitive ability to generate foresight and think ahead, 
capitalising on experiences they have gathered over time irrespective of their limited cognitive 
capabilities. For example, this is manifested in the decision of consumers to switch services 
providers.  
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2.5.2.2 Agency Concept: Principal-Agent Relationship has Implications for Consumer 
Welfare  
The Agency Theory involves a contractual relationship between the principal and the agent. It 
is not certain nor easy to assess if the agent will always act in the best interest of the principal 
(North, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976): the probability of capture by the industry or the 
political elites cannot be overlooked. However, the behaviour of the agent can be constrained 
by the principal’s ability to put in place precise rules that will facilitate the monitoring of the 
activities of the agent (Jain, 2001). In the context of this study, the Legislators elected by the 
Nigerian voters to create and oversee the legislation - Nigerian Communications Act 2003 
(NCA 2003) which governs the Nigerian telecommunications sector - acts as the principal, 
while the Nigerian Communications Commission, appointed by the Government (politicians) 
with full autonomy and discretionary power to administer the Nigerian Communications Act 
2003 and the Telecommunications Policy 2000, acts as the agent. However, agency problems 
are likely to occur between the Nigerian legislature, as the principal, and the Commission as 
the agent, if the Commission is captured by the politicians or acts in a manner that is not 
transparent or inherently difficult to monitor. On the other hand, the legislature in its oversight 
role may lack the control mechanisms to achieve effective and direct impact on the 
Commission’s behaviour. The promotion and protection of consumer interest depends, largely, 
on how these situations play out as will be discussed the next chapter. 
In the second scenario, the Nigerian Communications Commission, the Commission, acts as 
the principal, while, the mobile service providers, act as agents. The discretionary power of the 
Commission lies in creating the mobile licences and relevant rules including the pro-consumer 
rules, in line with the NCA 2003 and Telecommunications policy, to govern the behaviour of 
players in the telecommunications sector. The rules leave some discretion with the service 
providers since monitoring is expensive, such as the development and administration of the 
individual consumer code of practice. The two agents, the Commission and the mobile service 
providers, have “incentives to further their interests at the expense of their principals”, the 
Legislator and the Commission, respectively (Jain, 2001:78). For instance, in the context of this 
study, the continual presence of information asymmetry which leads to the Commission’s 
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dependence, for information and expertise, on the regulated companies or because of the 
attraction of career opportunities or other benefits in the regulated company and eventual 
regulatory capture, tend to, harm competition and the consumers in developing countries and 
in developed markets like Canada and the USA (Armstrong et. al., 1994; Melody, 1997; Hertog, 
2010). The study of information asymmetries is very relevant in the agency theory. 
It is noteworthy that the two behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour that apply in the transaction costs theory also apply in the agency theory.  
2.5.2.3 Property Right: Property Right defined within the Public Interest will enhance 
Consumer Welfare  
Property rights are defined as:  
“[t]he rights individuals appropriate over their own labour and the goods and services 
they possess. Appropriation is a function of legal rules, organisational forms, 
enforcement and norms of behaviour - institutional framework” (North, 1990:33).  
From the above definition, the legal framework has direct impact on property rights and 
consequently on individual contracts. In this regard, North (1990:52) remarks, “Contracts will 
reflect the incentive-disincentive structure imbedded in the property rights structure (and the 
enforcement characteristics)”. In addition, property right accommodates the “concept of a 
representative body reflecting the interests of constituent groups” (North, 1990:49) such as the 
ordinary consumer groups, to facilitate exchanges between consumers and their mobile service 
providers.  
Thus in the Nigerian telecommunications sector and in the context of this study, mobile 
infrastructure property rights are framed in the telecommunications mobile-licences, 
unilaterally issued to the four mobile service providers - MTN, AIRTEL, GLOBACOM and 
ETISALAT (Ndukwe, 2002; Ukodie, 2006). The property rights, designed by the Nigeria 
Communications Commission, allow the service providers to deploy their individual networks 
and provide digital mobile services to both business and ordinary consumers, within and outside 
Nigeria.  
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The licences stipulate the operating guidelines such as the roll out obligations as well as several 
incentives measures such as exclusivity period of five years for mobile services operation in 
Nigeria, pioneer tax relief status (NCC, 2005). The implication is that if the mobile-licence or 
the property rights are not well defined with regards to the public interest, or are not sufficiently-
enforced, ordinary consumer detriments, associated with issues of accessibility; affordability; 
and quality of service would abound. For instance, a well-defined and sufficiently enforceable 
roll out obligations should, specifically, emphasise measurable roll out into the 
unserved/underserved areas or integrate the underserved areas with the served areas in the roll 
out plan. In addition, the plan should be backed up with clear rules and sanctions that can be 
enforced. In the Nigeria case, where there is an extreme disparity in incomes levels (NCC, 
2005), a well-defined and sufficiently-enforceable pricing structure may require the 
implementation of differential tariff, for corporate and individual/ordinary consumer to cater 
for issues of affordability and quality of service.  
2.5.2.4 The Dimensions of NIE - Formal Rules, Informal Constraints and Enforcement: 
History Matters  
Institutions are conceptualised as humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and 
consequently by defining the ‘rules of the game’ structure political, economic and social 
behaviour of society (North, 1990). North (1990) made two critical claims about institutions: 
1) he emphasises a clear distinction between institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ and 
organisations as the ‘players of the game’; 2) he also emphasises that the real incentive structure 
that shapes human exchange in a society consists of formal rules, informal constraints and their 
enforcement characteristics. These two claims are crucial in understanding the influences of 
institutions and institutional change. 
 The formal or explicit rules include written rules and agreements that control contractual 
relations and corporate governance constitutions, the enabling laws and the rules that govern 
politics, government and society, sanctions and constraints with their enforcement 
characteristics. North (1990, 1991, 1993 and 2005), maintains that central to NIE is that 
institutions matter; they are important and influence economic change. In continuation, North 
(1993) claims that acceptable solutions in the world can be attained through establishment of 
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institutions, to structure the rules of the game, along with the appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms, which facilitate to alter pay-offs in order to engender cooperative solutions or 
compliance. North’s (1993) definition includes evidence of economic processes embedded 
within political and social processes, implying that political and social factors influence 
economic performance and should therefore be taken into account when evaluating economic 
performance. In addition, it highlights that successful interaction between institutions and 
organisational arrangement is necessary for positive economic change to occur.   
The informal or implicit rules include unwritten/unregistered codes of conduct/practice; 
conventions; the norms of behaviour and beliefs (Menard and Shirley, 2005). Both the formal 
and the informal constraints working together with effective enforcement, determine the way 
the players interact in social-economic and political environment in which organisations are the 
players, in their different interest groups with common objectives which may include self-
interest (North, 2005).  In other words, organisational governance is influenced by the three 
dimensions of institution: formal rule, informal constraints and enforcement. In the same vein, 
Menard and Shirley (2005) recognise the importance NIE places on the study of institutions 
and how institutions (rules) interact with organisational arrangements to shape the behaviour 
of humans and economic exchanges. The authors confirm that there is increasing concern, 
among the advocates of NIE over mental models and certain aspects of cognition that define 
how individuals interpret reality, which in turn, shape the institutional environment they build 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). In this regard, North (2005:71), specifically states that, 
“Humans start out with generic features which provide the initial architecture of the mind; the 
mind interacts with the cultural heritage and the experiences of individuals to shape learning”. 
This interaction between culture and experience may logically explain cases where shared 
cultural norms embedded within the economic and political processes, which prevail in the 
telecommunications sector, influence consumers’ behaviour: the way they learn things; process 
information; and make decisions, as discussed in chapter 4. These definitions are appropriate 
and cover the scope of this study. 
The formal and the informal constraints determine the real incentive structure of an economy 
and together they provide the foundation for continual incremental changes that occur within 
77 
 
every institution (rule of the game). According to North, these changes tend to alter the 
institutional settings such that it presents a different set of choices than it began with. North 
(1990) further explains that these institutional changes trace the pattern of path dependence; 
they are influenced by the course of history. Similarly, Menard and Shirley (2005), reiterate the 
fact that NIE focuses on how institutions emerge, operate and evolve to shape the various 
arrangements, which support production and exchange, and how these arrangements act in turn 
to change the rules of the game. Thus, since changes in the institutional dimensions usually 
result in institutional changes and since these changes shape the manner societies evolve, they 
can be of assistance in our understanding of historical changes that occur over time. Path 
dependency is increasingly becoming important in studies of institutions, because it facilitates 
the carriage of history. Consequently, path dependency has become a “short hand to indicate 
that the past shapes the future – in short “history matters” (Ebbinghaus, 2005:5); thus the course 
and scope of institutional changes cannot be separated from its early course of past history. For 
example, the non-inclusion of ordinary consumer advocacy in the Nigerian Communications 
Act 2003 (Act) is traceable to the non-existent/sparse history of civil societies in Nigeria. In 
addition, the culture of impunity and non-transparent transactions, which prevail in the socio-
political environment in Nigeria, are traceable to thirty years of military dictatorship. 
However, in the perception of North (1990) the differences between informal and formal 
institutions (rules of the game) tend to blur over time, becoming more of degree than of kind 
such that in course of time, some informal institutions gradually transform into formal 
institutions, in their own rights. Yet there are fundamental differences between the formal and 
the informal institutions. The way they are sourced, their rates of change and the fact that 
changes in the informal institution cannot be sufficiently explained from only the economic 
perspective (Eggertsson, 1990). For instance, whilst formal institutions are premeditated and 
developed through deliberations of the stakeholders or consultation process, the informal 
institutions, generally, are outcomes of societal interactions; they are derived from culture that 
governs societal behaviour (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; North, 1990). These cultural traits, 
according to North, are very important concerning information processing in choice making.  
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2.5.2.5 Applying NIE to this Study 
NIE is useful for this study because it takes into consideration how in the real world, the 
prevailing economic, political and the extra-institutional factors e.g. culture, level of 
information, bounded rationality and expertise influence the institutional structure, which in 
turn, shapes the institutional environment and the outcome of choices in daily human 
interactions (North, 1990). In the context, this study, the communication institution – “the rule 
of the game” (North, 2005:59) consists of the formal rule, such as the rule on quality of service, 
and the informal constraints, such the codes of behaviour. These rules together with the 
enforcement characteristics shape the nature of the organisation and the governance of the 
telecommunications sector, consequent upon the full liberalisation of the digital mobile market 
in 2001. The rules of the game also provide for rule enforcement as well as penalties for rule 
violation, which provide some measure of incentives to discourage rule violations. Hence, the 
rules, with the appropriate penalties, facilitate to shape the behaviour of the mobile service 
providers and offer backup mechanisms set up to ensure resolution of ordinary consumer 
disputes, which operators are unable to resolve privately. This is crucial in telecommunications 
and other regulated industries.  
Institutions and organisations can be conceptually differentiated since, unilaterally, they 
provide a structure to human interaction. According to North (1990:4):  
“[w]hat must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The purpose of the 
rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of the team within the 
set of rules is to win the game – by combination of skills, strategy, and coordination; by 
fair means and sometimes by foul means”.  
Thus, the mobile organisation – as defined above are ‘the players’ in the Nigerian mobile 
market (North, 1990, 2005) – includes the Nigerian Communications Commission 
(Commission), the mobile services providers, the consumers and the different consumer interest 
groups who focus on the ordinary mobile consumers. The institutional endowment includes the 
ministry of communications, the judiciary system, the government, and the legislature who have 
interests in the outcomes of the Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector.  By implementing 
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or “altering the rules or altering the kind and effectiveness of enforcement” (North, 2005:60) 
they influence the economic outcomes of the mobile market and the interests of the ordinary 
consumers. As will be expected, the institutional quality of the regulatory structure is exposed 
during the interactions between the institutions (rules) and the organisations (players) and this 
tends to influence the market efficiency and the economic performance of the 
telecommunications sector as well as the country in general (Spiller, 2012). 
The development of effective and appropriate policies and strategies are achieved through 
negotiation involving mutually dependent organisations Therefore, it is important to ensure that 
ordinary consumer interests are accommodated during deliberations and negotiations that go 
on during the decision-making processes in which industry players make compromises. 
(Hulsink, 1999). Hence, consumer influential participation in the negotiations is crucial.   
Arguably, one wonders why the same rules, which are in most cases imported to developing 
countries by consultants from developed countries at the beginning of telecommunications 
reform, did not produce similar performance outcomes. As if attempting to answer, North 
acknowledges, “Although the rules are the same, the enforcement mechanisms, the way 
enforcement occurs, the norms of behaviour, and the subjective models of the actors are not, 
hence, both the real incentive structures and the perceived consequences of policies will differ 
as well” (North, 1990: 101). In short, best practice examples are sometimes unusable because 
they ignore country specifics. In other words, different independent sector-specific regulators 
will demonstrate different behaviours in different institutional environments (Coren, 2005). 
Hence, the socio-political environment is an important factor in the evaluation of regulatory 
performance (see chapter 3). 
Consequently, this study seeks to evaluate the extent to which the Nigerian mobile 
communications institution influences the ordinary consumer representation in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector.  For instance, with reference to mobile consumer codes 
development  the study proposes to confirm from the enabling act  and other relevant policy 
documents if there are adequate provisions in both the law and regulations, to ensure effective 
participation of the ordinary mobile consumers,  during the development or review of the  
consumer codes of practice; to verify to what extent the service providers, in practice, actually 
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carried along their ordinary consumers during the development of the consumer codes of 
practice, as expected if the codes are to address the ordinary consumers’ interests; to confirm if 
the regulatory agency has put in place a provision/ indicator  to actually confirm if the ordinary 
mobile consumers, (through their representative bodies) have effectively participated in the 
development and review of the consumer codes before attempting to register the new consumer 
codes of practice; and  to verify if there is a sector pre-agreed remedial action, which is also 
supposed to be time bound, with the application of heavy sanctions attached to it, to encourage 
industry compliance.  
The above discussion portrays NIE as suitable for this study because it takes into consideration 
the significant influence of both the institution and the prevailing extra-institutional factors e.g. 
culture, level of information impact on the institutional environment and the outcome of choices 
in daily human interactions (North, 1990). It identifies NIE as a well-known approach for policy 
studies because it makes institutions key in policy studies: it broadens the economic analysis of 
regulatory institutions to include the role of political and administrative institutions as well as 
procedures for policy governance (Bickenbach, Kumkar and Soltwedel, 1999). The institutional 
environment as defined by North (1990) is the regulatory framework used to reduce uncertainty, 
shape the interactions, negotiations and behaviour of the players or stakeholders in the market. 
 However, it has been suggested that the analysis of specific regulatory rules, apart from being 
complex, may not yield useful results because of the dynamic nature of the problems for 
analysis. Hence, Bickenbach, Kumkar, & Soltwedel (1999:50) recommend, “that future 
analysis should focus on institutional aspects within the process of regulation”. Consequently, 
this strategy is realised in this thesis by seeking to adapt the Saleth and Dinar (1999) analytical 
framework, in the following sections, to decompose the Nigerian mobile telecommunications 
institution into its institutional aspects to facilitate this study.  
2.6. Communications Institution Decomposition framework: How to study institutions  
The previous section attempted to explore the NIE approach to economic analysis of regulatory 
institutions and its emphasis on the importance of institutions and extra-institutional factors, 
which differentiates it from the neoclassical approach. Then the three major analytical tools of 
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NIE that guide this study namely - transaction costs, property rights and agency - were 
discussed and finally the NIE concepts were applied to this study.  
This section seeks to develop an analytical framework for this study; how we can study the 
mobile institution. Firstly, by developing a conceptual basis for Institution Decomposition 
Analysis (IDA), and secondly, by presenting the features of the Saleth and Dinar’s IDA Model 
(1999, 2004), which makes it a suitable methodological framework to be adapted for this study, 
and finally by elucidating the process of evaluation of the mobile institution in the empirical 
part of the study.  
2.6.1 Conceptual Basis: Mobile telecommunications sector, Mobile institution and 
Institution performance 
This section specifies three key elements that facilitate to delineate the scope and context of the 
analytical framework. These are specifications of how the study conceives: 1) the mobile 
telecommunications sector, 2) the mobile (telecommunications) institution, and 3) the sector 
and/or institutional performance. These three entities are discussed individually below. 
2.6.1.1 The Mobile Telecommunications Sector  
The mobile sector, in the context of this study, covers the Nigerian telecommunications network 
consisting of various networks of different technologies, which have been integrated in such a 
manner to provide seamless interconnections of the entire networks across the thirty-six states 
of the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja. These networks include the 
analogue fixed and cellular networks, fixed wireless and CDMA networks, packet switched 
networks, Inmarsat networks, and the GSM networks. All the networks, unilaterally, are 
licenced for a nationwide deployment of their service infrastructure across Nigeria. The 
analogue fixed & cellular networks, fixed wireless and CDMA networks were liberalised in the 
first phase of the telecommunications reform exercise, which occurred in 1992. The second 
phase of the reform that took place in 2001, involved the opening up of the mobile market only, 
with the auctioning of four digital mobile licenses, powered by the GSM technology.  
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These four digital mobile licences – GSM, dated August 2001, were issued to four service 
providers, namely: MTN, AIRTEL, GLOBACOM and ETISALAT. The four service providers 
are licensed to provide fully open, fully competitive and integrated networks that enable 
consumers, to seamlessly, choose between ranges of services and networks. These conditions 
are crucial because without them the competitive mobile market may be impeded in achieving 
the necessary innovations as well as ensure that the benefits derived, from the reform are 
significant and widespread (Tambini, 2012).   
However, this study in its context covers only the digital mobile competitive market (GSM 
market), which was opened up to competition, in 2001. The study interests, therefore, include: 
1) the nation-wide telecommunications infrastructure deployment covering the entire country 
as stipulated in the mobile licences; 2) focus on the regulatory structures and processes existing 
in the competitive digital mobile market, which have enabled or otherwise the welfare and 
protection of the ordinary consumer; 3) industry adoption of relevant policies covering the 
major issues the ordinary consumer face, as a result of their interactions, in this competitive 
market, such as absence of statutory independent consumer bodies, the  presence of incomplete 
information, quality of service complaints, ordinary consumers’ interests protection and 
security issues.  
Thus a microanalysis of the incomplete communications institution is necessary, to capture the 
details of the major issues ordinary consumers face in the competitive mobile market, such as 
incomplete information. Henceforth, in the context of this study, the term mobile institution 
represents Nigerian digital mobile telecommunications institution. 
2.6.1.2 The Mobile Institution: Defining it for the Study 
The mobile institution is conceptualised to be uniform across the entire country and it 
encompasses all the dimensions and characteristics of the complete Nigerian communications 
institution, with focus on the welfare and protection of the ordinary consumer in the mobile 
market. Therefore, in line with academic literature, the mobile institution is conceived in a 
broad sense and covers: the legal framework, organisational (or administrative) framework and 
enforcement framework. In this study context, it consists of mobile policy, mobile law, mobile 
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administration and mobile enforcement (or Telecommunications Policy, 2000; the Nigerian 
Communications Act, 2003; the administrative organs like the Commission and the 
enforcement structures). This conceptual separation of institution facilitates the study of the 
interactions between the four components within the institution (North, 1990).  Since, in 
practice, the mobile administration consisting of the Commission and the mobile service 
providers serve as the executing and the implementing arms, created for the translation, 
realisation and enforcement of the policy and the legal provisions.  
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions in a specific manner. 
Thus, Nigerian mobile telecommunications is conceived as an institution because it embodies 
policies, laws, and regulations with penalties and enforcement mechanisms that govern the 
operations of the different competing mobile networks and their interactions with consumers, 
to encourage market efficiency. While the Nigerian telecommunications regulatory agency, the 
Nigerian Communications Commission (Commission), is visualised as an integral part of the 
institution because the objectives of the Commission working within the mobile institution are 
to facilitate the adoptions of the provisions of policies, regulations, and enforcement with which 
to enable and shape the interactions of the different players in the market.  
Organisations, on the other hand, are defined as “purposive entities designed by their creators 
to maximise wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the 
institutional structure of the society” (North 1990:73). The basic feature that distinguishes 
institutions from organisations, from the above discussion, is that institutions are the rules that 
serve to constrain and shape the behaviour and interactions within the organisations (the 
players); in other words, they provide the structure within which the interactions of humans, in 
the organisation, take place.   
This study, therefore, defines the mobile institution as an integrated system consisting of legal 
framework (formal rules, informal constraints), organisational framework (or administrative) 
and enforcement mechanism. 
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2.6.1.3 Institutional Performance: By Themselves, Institutions Cannot Perform 
The institutional framework (defining the rules of the game) usually brings about the setting up 
and development of an organisation (the players). As soon as the formal organisation is 
established, it in turn endeavours to influence the development of the institutional framework, 
which originally was instrumental to setting it up. Hence, the two components, institutions and 
organisations, are inherently interwoven to create an environment that is suitable for the various 
interactions that take place in a market environment, as established above. According to North, 
the key role of the institutional framework, in any societal setting, is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable structure to human interactions. This might imply that institutions which 
serve as rules, norms and roles structure for organisations cannot perform nor by themselves 
influence performance rather it is the administration of an organisation that implement the rules 
and effect performance. However, there are linkages between institutions and administrative 
performance such that “the institutional framework serves as a necessary condition but not as a 
sufficient condition for management performance” (Bandaragoda, 2000:8). In view of this, 
North (1990) suggests that the need to separate, conceptually, the rules from the players is 
inevitable in institutional analysis.  
In the context of this study, the Nigerian Communications Commission endeavours to 
implement the consumer mandate by operating within the communications institution 
framework to protect the interests of the ordinary mobile consumers and by putting into use a 
combination of administrative tools and extra-institutional factors such as: strategy, expertise, 
technical capability, commitment, transparency (or the lack of these) and management of the 
resources available to the Commission. These extra-institutional factors, which account for 
effectiveness, influence performance to a greater degree than the institutions (Bandaragoda: 
2000). The regulations by themselves are incapable to elicit performance; the desired outcomes 
would be achieved only when the set rules are effectively enforced. 
The next sections discuss the Institution Decomposition Analytical model by Saleth and Dinar 
(1999). Their model facilitates the decomposition of mobile institution into its major 
institutional components and institutional aspects. The components and their constituent 
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aspects, capture the rules or their configurations as well as their features and performance 
implications.  
2.6.2 Overview of an Institution Analytical Decomposition Approach  
As noted, in the previous chapter and also in the view of the new institutional economics, 
institutions do matter and that the institutional matrix consists of formal rules, informal norms 
and the enforcement characteristics which govern the operations in the market North (1990). 
The implication is that an institution is conceived in a much broader sense than an organisation 
and it is based on this argument that the rules of the game are set by institutions, thereby, 
enabling what individual players can do and at the same time what individuals cannot do by 
describing constrains in a given setting. Thus, institutions facilitate to shape the actions of 
individuals as well as the decision-making processes (North, 1990; Saleth and Dinar, 1999). 
Proceeding with this broader perspective of institutions, Saleth and Dinar (1999:95) say that, 
“institutions are considered to cover the legal framework, the policy regime and the 
administrative or organisational arrangement”. They employ this generalised concept in the 
water sector, to determine the performance of the water management institution using the 
decomposition approach, in two levels. In the first level water institution is decomposed to 
water law, water policy and water administration; and in their second level, each of the three 
institutional components of institution is further decomposed into their constituent institutional 
aspects identified in literature and policy debates; “as key factors for institutional and sectorial 
performance” (Saleth and Dinar, 2004:97).  
The Saleth and Dinar (1999)’s Institutional Decomposition Model is suitable for evaluating the 
effectiveness and performance of institutions. Sequel to this, this study seeks to adapt the IDA 
model by Saleth and Dinar (1999) to evaluate how the Nigerian communications institution has 
enabled or not enabled the representation of the ordinary mobile consumers. Consequently, the 
adapted framework is perceived from a micro perspective of a national telecommunications 
market, consisting of seamlessly interconnected mobile networks and the focus of the study is 
on consumer representation in the Nigerian telecommunications institution that governs these 
integrated mobile networks, in the Nigerian telecommunications sector.  The advantage of this 
micro perspective is to facilitate the capture of the performance of the telecommunications 
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mobile market, which depends largely on the individual and interactive actions of the 
stakeholders, including intervening influences at the regulatory level (Saleth and Dinar, 1999) 
with reference to ordinary consumer interests since the regulator is charged with the legal 
mandate of consumer protection.   
Thus, the proposed framework offers necessary insights to assess if the regulatory reform in the 
sector is supported by appropriate institutional arrangements, such as policy, law, regulations 
and effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the interests of the ordinary consumers 
are adequately protected in the Nigerian mobile telecommunications sector. 
2.6.3 Decomposition of the Nigerian communications institution  
In this study, the conceptualisation to decompose the Nigerian communications institution into 
its first and second levels is in line with the Saleth and Dinar, (1999:104; 2004:104) institutional 
decomposition analytical approach. In addition, this study, seeks to extend the Saleth and Dinar 
(1999, 2004)’s conceptual analytical model, by introducing the enforcement component into 
the first and second decomposition levels. In this way, this study aligns with North (1990; 
2005), to emphasise that application of responsive enforcement mechanisms is inevitable for 
institution decomposition analysis in the telecommunications sector, in contrast to the water 
institution which Saleth and Dinar (1999, 2004) have broadly decomposed into the three major 
components of the institution, namely: policy, law, and administration (their level one).  
Therefore, situating the above decomposition approach, adapted from Saleth and Dinar (1999) 
in the context of this study, the analytical decomposition of the mobile institution is performed 
in two levels. In the first level, the mobile institution is decomposed into four broad components 
of institution, namely: mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile 
enforcement. In the second level of the institution decomposition approach, each of the four 
broad components of the mobile institution is further decomposed into its essential institutional 
aspects; key features, which are relevant to the representation of ordinary mobile 
telecommunications consumers in the Nigerian context. These two levels will be examined in 
turn below. 
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2.6.3.1 Decomposition of Mobile Institution: First Level - Policy, Law, Administration, 
and Enforcement 
In the previous section, it was stated that the aim of separating the mobile institution into its 
main components is to facilitate the analysis of each component’s contribution towards the 
representation of ordinary mobile telecommunications consumers. In this section, the mobile 
telecommunications institution has been decomposed into its main four components: mobile 
Policy, mobile Law, and mobile Enforcement. The attributes of the components are examined 
below. 
Mobile policy 
Policy gives the overall direction and the key objectives of the development of the envisaged 
telecommunications industry. In the context of this study, the mobile policy consists of the 
National Telecommunications policy 2000, the ICT Policy 2012, and pro-consumer policies. 
The mobile policy in reality initiates the process of enacting the mobile law while the mobile 
law facilitates implementation of the mobile policy. Thus, mobile law and guidelines mirror the 
mobile policy with respect to the ordinary mobile consumers’ representation. 
Mobile law  
 There exists a strong linkage between the mobile law and the mobile policy at source and 
implementation levels. The mobile legal framework consists of legislative statements or 
definitions that relate to the ordinary mobile consumer such as, the provisions in the Act 2003, 
regulations, guidelines, procedures and rights, norms and practices that directly affect or are 
related to the promotion of consumer interests in the mobile telecoms sector in Nigeria. 
Mobile administration 
Mobile administration is treated as part of the rules of the game as opposed to being part of the 
industry players. Hence, in the context of this study, administration consists of all the 
mechanisms, procedures and processes, necessary for the ordinary consumers’ representation, 
which are established to facilitate the implementation of the mobile policy, mobile law, and 
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mobile enforcement. Examples include complaint-handling procedure of individual service 
providers, redress mechanisms, public inquiries, research, alternate dispute resolution, 
application of mobile consumer rights, data collection and processing for compliance 
monitoring purposes, minimum quality of service standards, accountability, project selection 
and comparative industry statistics etc. Administration also includes regulatory decision-
making process and the internal rules of the services providers’ consumer code of practice. 
Mobile enforcement  
Similarly, as mentioned above, the mobile enforcement component of the institution is linked 
with the policy, law and administrative components of the institution at source and 
implementation levels and includes monitoring, information gathering and enforcement 
procedures/mechanisms. According to North (1990), proper functioning of institutions, with 
reference to transaction cost theory, depends on the costliness of enforcement. Thus, this study 
conceptually separates the enforcement component from the mobile communications 
institution, for analysis purposes. Firstly, to evaluate how the enforcement component of the 
Nigerian communications institution influenced the representation of ordinary consumer in the 
telecommunications sector. Secondly, to emphasise the importance of enforcement of existing 
formal rules in the mobile telecommunications sector in line with the notion of North (2005) 
which states that the stakeholders’ response to the rules depend on the efficiency of the 
enforcement of the rules.  
2.6.3.2 Second Level Decomposition of Mobile Institution – Aspects  
In the second level of the institution decomposition approach, each of the four main components 
of the mobile telecommunications institution is further decomposed into its essential 
institutional aspects, which are relevant to the representation of ordinary mobile 
telecommunications consumers. The constituent aspects, which are derived from literature and 
topical debates on consumer representation, form the basis for developing the analytical 
framework presented in Table 2 below. 
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TABLE 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: LINKAGES BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENTS 
 
The above analytical framework was systematically derived from the four major components 
of the mobile telecommunications institution, namely, mobile policy, mobile law, mobile 
administration and mobile enforcement and their constituent aspects. It provides the basis for 
assessing the extent the ordinary consumer has been represented in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector.  
The key aspects of Mobile Policy dealing with representation of ordinary consumer include the 
objective of provisioning of good quality modern telephone service to ordinary consumers at 
affordable price. Others are affording consumers the opportunity, for instance through 
conducting consumer research, to submit opinion in support of their interest and to resolve 
consumer complaints.  
Mobile Law in synergy with the mobile policy gives legal effect to the relevant institutional 
aspects to buttress consumer representation including the establishment of an independent and 
transparent regulator, legal definition of the consumer and consumer interest, structures and 
processes for consumer influential representation in regulatory process, complaints 
management, monitoring and enforcement procedures.  
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Mobile Administration, as was stated above, includes all the mechanisms, procedures and 
processes, necessary for the ordinary consumers’ representation, which are established to 
facilitate the implementation of the mobile policy, mobile law, and mobile enforcement such 
as regulatory interventions, individual consumer codes of practice, provision of information, 
research and public forums, pricing and accountability mechanism, consumer engagement and 
complaints management mechanisms. Similarly, Mobile enforcement institutional aspects are 
the mechanisms for monitoring compliance, performance assessment and enforcement of 
license conditions, consumer codes of practice and consumer rights and redress. 
In line with the discussions of linkages within the mobile institution, the overall effectiveness 
of the mobile institution depends on the individual as well as the interactive effects of its four 
institutional components. Similarly, the overall effectiveness of each of the four components of 
institution depends on the effectiveness of its constituent aspects as well as the strength of their 
linkages with the other components and their constituent aspects. Thus, the overall performance 
of the mobile policy, with focus on the ordinary consumer representation is not only linked to 
both the individual and joint effects of the four institutional components and their underlying 
institutional aspects but also on the extent of integration among them. In addition, the 
performance of the mobile institution is also influenced by the exogenous effects, which 
emanate from the political, economic and general social-cultural and resource related 
environment in which it is embedded (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; North, 1990). 
Figure 1, below, gives firstly a conceptual illustration of the components of the mobile 
institution, which the author seeks to represent with a frame model of four sides supported by 
the four components of the mobile institution on which the ordinary consumer representation 
rests.  
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FIGURE 1.  FRAME OF MOBILE INSTITUTION 
Source: Author 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, the ‘Partnership’ in the frame depicts the need for the regulator to enable a conducive 
environment that facilitates the working together with the ordinary consumers and the service 
providers to ensure that the collective decisions taken reflect the public interests, as opposed to 
the service providers’ interests hence do not tilt the interest box to the consumer’s detriment. It 
involves the use of institutional incentives such as independent consumer representation and 
enforcement mechanisms to correct the imbalances prevalent between the services providers 
and the consumers (Take, 2012).  
The frameworks – theoretical and analytical – established in this chapter will serve as guide for 
conducting the policy document analysis in the empirical part of this study. The analysis, using 
these essential aspects underlying the four components of the mobile institution as benchmarks, 
also focuses on institutional change – the possibilities of improvements or otherwise occurring 
in the mobile institution, since 2001, by comparing them with the actual consumer 
representation, in practice, in the competitive mobile market (Bandaragoda, 2000). 
Finally, these essential institutional aspects create the necessary insights for assessing the extent 
to which the Mobile institution (rules of the game) and the organisations (the Commission, the 
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mobile service providers and the legislators) contributed or otherwise, to the representation of 
the ordinary consumers within the mobile institution. The institutional aspects also facilitate to 
answer the three overarching research questions.   
The next section highlights the key discussions in the various sections above to conclude this 
chapter. 
2.7 Conclusion  
The aim of Chapter 2 has been to establish a theoretical basis and an analytical framework to 
guide this study in its objective to evaluate the ordinary consumer representation in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector. The chapter also served to place the study in the broader perspective 
of public interest.  
Consequently, this chapter attempts to come up with a clear definition of the public interest in 
telecommunications because the notion of the public interest appears ubiquitous, but rarely 
defined or visible in practice. This chapter therefore defines the public interest, in the context 
of this study, as ordinary consumer ubiquitous access to modern mobile telecommunications 
service, offered at affordable prices and good quality. This implies that the extent, to which the 
ordinary consumers have representation, in the Nigerian telecommunications sector, will also 
be assessed in the broader framework of public interest. The relevant query is, how satisfied 
are the ordinary consumers, with the services they are receiving in the competitive mobile 
market and not how many active subscriber lines have the mobile service providers connected? 
The chapter argues that the definition of the public interest as conceived by the study holds 
when consumers’ influential participation in policy-implementation is ensured by robust and 
independent consumer representation. 
This chapter further examines the traditional approaches to regulation and the limitations that 
make them unsuitable as analytical tools for this study. It recognised the usefulness of the 
Economic Theory (ET) of regulation in communications policy studies, because it brings to 
fore the notion that regulatory agency, if captured by service providers, leaves the benefits of 
liberalisation with providers instead of ordinary consumers.  However, ET’s main challenge is 
to explain when one regulatory action tends towards public or private interests. In addition, this 
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study discussed and rejected the fallacies of Neoclassical Economic Theory in the light of the 
challenges consumers encounter in the mobile market due to their limited capacity and bounded 
rationality, information asymmetries and imperfect markets. 
The comparison of the weaknesses and strengths of the five major institutional approaches to 
regulatory analysis informed the adoption of the New Institutional Economic (NIE) approach, 
as a theoretical framework, which provides guidance, for this study. The three major analytical 
tools of the NIE approach – transaction cost, property rights and agency concept- that influence 
this study were explored and their usefulness to the study was equally illustrated. Of particular 
interest is the principal-agent relationship in competitive mobile market with consumers 
through the legislators acting as the principal and the regulator and the service providers acting 
as agents. Agency problems like conflict of interest are prevalent in a socio-political 
environment characterised by corruption and weak institutions and it portends grave 
implications for consumer welfare. This study argues for a robust and independent statutory 
ordinary consumer representation to ensure ordinary consumers act as industry watchdogs, in 
protection of their interests and welfare. 
Finally, the study adapts the Saleth and Dinar (1996) Institution Decomposition Analytical 
framework, and seeks to extend it by separating the enforcement mechanisms as the fourth 
component of institution to facilitate both institutional analysis and evaluation of how the 
Nigerian communications institution has enabled or not the representation of the ordinary 
mobile consumers. Hence, the mobile communications institution was decomposed into its four 
main components: mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement, 
which were further, decomposed into key institutional aspects. This conceptual separation is 
necessary because the enforcement function is vital for the regulatory agency to secure mobile 
sector compliance to existing regulations and thus enhances protection of consumers’ interests. 
The adapted and extended framework is useful in assessing if the institutional reform, in the 
Nigerian telecommunications sector, is supported by appropriate institutional arrangements, 
such as effective administrative mechanisms and responsive enforcement to ensure ordinary 
consumers influential participation in policy-adoption and thereby safeguard the interests of 
ordinary mobile consumers.  
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CHAPTER 3 Evolution of Telecommunications in Nigeria 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of some of the events that shaped the political and socio-
economic environment of Nigeria, which formed the setting for the development and operation 
of the institutional and organisational structures of the Nigerian telecommunications sector.  
First, it flaunts the county’s natural and human endowments, which qualified Nigeria as the 
largest economy in Africa with a vibrant telecommunications industry, which is one of the 
fastest growing in the world. In a brief overview of the socio-political history it reveals how the 
three years of civil war (1967-1970) and 30 years of authoritarian rule, left as a legacy a culture 
of corruption and impunity which in 16 years of democratic rule has become the ‘tools of the 
trade’ in the hands of the political elites. This has turned the natural endowments into an 
albatross and the result is weak institutions, lack of infrastructural development and poverty. It 
provides an insight on how the social-economic history of the country which is marked by non-
transparent transactions and bureaucratic corruption has impacted on the regulatory function as 
it relates to the promotion of the ordinary consumer interest and representation and why the 
impressive economic growth in the sector has not translated to equivalent improvement in the 
realisation of consumer interests.  
This chapter argues that the telecommunications regulatory framework cannot be detached from 
the country’s past history – the historic events preceding the liberalisation of the sector. The 
regulatory framework is not insulated from the socio-political environment but is rather highly 
susceptible to political interference, clientleism and that the regulatory organisation is imbued 
with the associated agency problem and conflict of interest, which has led to the subordination 
of consumer interests to other interests. This explains the regulator’s strategy of ignoring the 
violation of the provisions of the mobile institution (set rules) (Otubu 2013; Ndibe, 2013). 
Secondly, the principal (legislators) is inherently unable to monitor the agent (Regulator and 
Licensees) because of the corruption and cronyism prevalent in the socio-political environment 
in Nigeria. These issues are exposed in the empirical Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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In subsequent sections of this chapter, the study highlights the factors that led to the failures 
that characterised the evolution of the Nigerian telecommunications through the early years 
until 2001, the supressed demand and the subsequent exponential growth in subscribers’ 
numbers in the years following the liberalisation of the sector. It puts the evolution of the 
Nigeria telecommunications in a comparative context with other countries. It presents an 
overview of the challenges the socio-political and economic environment presents to businesses 
and to the telecommunications industry in particular. Finally, it highlights the vulnerability of 
the ordinary consumers and the different challenges they encounter in the liberalised, complex 
and fast changing mobile market and advocates for more commitment towards pro-consumer 
regulatory interventions. 
 The main argument of this chapter is that the regulator is not entirely independent and 
consequently it is not consumer focused and that accounts for the reason why the growth in the 
sector is not reflected in the promotion and protection of consumer interests.  
3.2. Socio-Economic and Political Overview of Nigeria: From authoritarian rule to non-
transparent democracy 
Nigeria, located in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa is Africa’s largest republic with a 
population of 170 million people and growing at about 3% per annum (GSMA, 2015). Nigeria’s 
GDP stands at US$568.5 billion (World Bank, 2015) and it is the largest economy in Africa. 
Nigeria has a relatively young population: the under-15-years accounts for about 42% of the 
population while 54.6% is between 15 – 65years. Nigeria’s population profile is at the same 
time the target and the driver of a vibrant telecommunication market, which is one of the fastest 
growing in the world (NCC Annual Report, 2013). Prior to 1970, over 80% of the Nigerian 
population lived in the rural area while in 2005 the percentage of the population living in rural 
area decreased to 55% of the population (NCC, 2005). This has grave implication for provision 
of public services, for example in the telecommunications sector, the concentration of 
infrastructure in the urban areas leads to the exclusion and marginalisation of a large portion of 
the population (ordinary consumers).  
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The discovery of oil in Nigeria and its rise in national importance in the 1970s brought huge 
revenue to the country. Nigeria is sixth largest exporter of oil in the world and oil contributes 
about 80% of government revenue. However, the oil revenue had become a political and social 
albatross for the country. It had a negative effect on good governance because apart from 
occasioning the neglect of the country’s other endowments like solid minerals and agriculture 
it fuelled corruption and the struggle for political power. 
Nigeria obtained her independence from the British government in 1960. Six years later in 
1966, the military intervened with a coup d’état that overthrew the civilian government and 
precipitated a three-year civil war from 1967 to 1970.  This marked the beginning and 
successions of almost 30 years of military governments in Nigerian political history with civil 
rule interrupting only in the period: 1979-1983. The 30 years of military dictatorship witnessed 
six military coups and two failed coup attempts. Hence, the political terrain was very unstable 
with adverse effects on the economy. The period was characterised by arbitrariness, policy 
inconsistency, uncoordinated developmental plans and lack of transparency, which engendered 
massive corruption. Civil Society activities were completely suppressed. Although the civil war 
caused extensive damages to the nation’s utilities’ infrastructure and undue set back to the 
nation’s telecommunications developmental plans, greater damages was done to the nation’s 
institutions and moral heritage as corruption took the centre stage in the post war era under the 
military rule.  
In 1999, Nigeria returned to a democratically elected civilian government and has been 
nurturing her democracy in a somewhat stable political atmosphere. Nigeria runs a federal 
presidential government comprising the federal, 36 states and 774 local government areas. 
Power is shared between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.   In May 2015, a new 
government, under President Mohammed Buhari was sworn in after a peaceful and credible 
general election marking the beginning of the third 8-year successful succession of democratic 
rule.  
The civilian regimes did not only inherit a political system and social order that was thoroughly 
imbued with corruption, they appear to have raised the art of corruption to a higher level. Since 
the return of democracy in 1999, corruption has continued to ravage the country and the 
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resources of the nation have been carted away through embezzlement of public fund. Hence 
throughout the thirty years of military rule and the sixteen odd years of democracy, corruption 
in the institutions of government have crippled the development of the country and the delivery 
of basic services to the people (Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013). The 
developmental failure of the country is evidenced in the fact that in spite of being the sixth 
largest producer of oil, Nigeria spends billions of dollars each year subsidising imported refined 
petroleum products because of the country’s lack of capacity for refining crude oil. Nigerian 
power generation capacity, which stands at 4000MW, is 10% of South Africa’s output of 
42,000MW. Incessant failure of electricity supply is one of the major problems affecting the 
growth of the industrial sector.  Furthermore, the country’s dependence on oil and lack of 
development in other sectors led to the crippling of the informal sector and high level of 
unemployment (Martini, 2014; Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013). The level of 
unemployment is reflected in the teeming numbers of ‘umbrella sellers’ and street hawkers all 
over the country. 
 Consequently, poverty level is very high in Nigeria; the current minimum monthly wage is N 
18, 000 per month, i.e. N600 per day (US$ 3 per day). This has implications for the affordability 
of telecommunications services by the ordinary consumer. One major outcome of the level of 
poverty is that over 90% of consumers are on the pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) platform because 
they are unable to afford the monetary layout required on the post-paid platform. According to 
the ITU, people earning N864 to N8640 per day (US$ 4 to 40) are unlikely to afford regular 
monthly bills (ITU, 2007). In this poverty, the ordinary Nigerian consumers face intimidating 
challenges (Transaction costs) in their encounter with services providers with regards to seeking 
redress, particularly via the existing Alternate Dispute Resolution scheme as discussed in 
Chapter 7.   
The socio-political environment in Nigeria, where those in powerful positions literally buy and 
maintain the support and loyalty of some individuals by granting those cronies favours from 
the resources of the state, qualifies Nigeria as a neo-patrimonial state marked by weak public 
administration and culture of impunity (Martini, 2014). This situation coupled by grand scale 
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looting of public funds has been the bane of development in Nigeria since the return to 
democratic rule in1999. 
Numerous literatures assert the high level of corruption in Nigeria. Nigeria was rated the most 
corrupt country in the world in 1996 and the second most corrupt country in1999, when the 
military handed power to a democratically elected government. In the past sixteen years of 
democratic rule, Nigeria made insignificant progress in the fight to curb corruption.  Nigeria 
was rated second most corrupt country in 2001, seventh in 2005, 13th in 2010 and 32nd in 2015. 
In the Sub-Saharan region, Nigeria’s position on the corruption table was 31 out of 47 countries 
in 2014 (Transparency International, 2014, 2015). There are evidences that all forms of 
corruption abound in Nigeria: embezzlement of public funds, bribery, cronyism, nepotism, rent 
seeking and conflict of interest, including judicial and electoral corruption (Martini, 2014). 
Corruption is manifested in all aspects of the economy including the regulatory agencies and 
the regulated industries (Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013). 
The frameworks of regulatory agencies in Nigeria are susceptible to political corruption and 
interference such that the independence and impartiality of the regulatory bodies are 
compromised from onset with grave implications for the efficiency of the market and the 
interest of the consumer. According to existing statutes, the leadership and Members of the 
Board of regulatory bodies, for example the governing board of the Nigerian 
Telecommunications Commission (Commission) and the Consumer Protection Council (CPC) 
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the legislature (Act, 2003, section 5(2), 8; 
CPC Act Sections 2a; 22(1)). In these political appointments, it is common knowledge that 
political leaders favour their supporters and cronies by appointing them to positions of authority 
in government agencies (Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013). The favoured heads 
of government agencies routinely abuse the authority and unhindered access to information 
inherent in their office by creating lucrative opportunities and channelling illicit benefits to their 
benefactors and cronies. They often bend the rules to favour certain groups or individuals to the 
detriment of the larger society (Kayode, Sunday, Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, 2013). In this 
environment, the Public Interest is thrown overboard and this often led to the subordinating of 
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the ordinary consumer interest to other interests as will be highlighted in the empirical chapters 
of this study. 
Conflict of interest and corruption arise ab initio in instances where an official is appointed to 
a powerful position in the regulatory agency of the sector in which he/she has financial interest 
or other significant relationship. For example, in 2012, an Executive Commissioner of the 
Nigerian Communications Commission blew the whistle on the immediate past Executive Vice 
Chairman (EVC) of the Commission, who allegedly had shares in, and was an Executive 
Director of MTS First Wireless, a mobile services provider, prior to his appointment as EVC.  
The Executive Commissioner also alleged non-transparent deals in frequencies allocations by 
the leadership of the Commission. Although the EVC admitted that, he was a director and had 
‘sweat shares’ in MTS, nothing more was heard about the issue (Technology.Times, 2012). A 
similar allegation of conflict of interest was made against the first EVC of the Commission who 
allegedly was the president of Association of Telecommunications Company of Nigeria 
(ATCON) before his appointment as EVC (Ogundele, 2010). In Nigeria due to weak and 
corrupt judiciary, it is unusual that corruption allegations against the powerful elites are brought 
to a logical conclusion (Martini, 2014). 
Further allegations of conflict of interest and non-transparent transaction is trailing the recent 
acquisition of VISAFONE Communications, the only surviving CDMA network operator by 
MTN the dominant operator in Nigeria. ETISALAT, a mobile operator, has sued MTN over 
the acquisition, alleging that MTN is been accorded preferential treatment and that the process 
was not open (Adepetun, 2015). 
When the prevailing socio-political environment infiltrates the regulatory organisations (human 
actors) through their institutional frameworks as discussed above it spreads through the 
organisation because the favoured agents creates their own internal clientele network by 
extending similar favours, like job positions, to cronies. This has far-reaching negative impact 
on the regulatory institutions and the commitment of the regulator towards the attainment of 
policy objectives. The telecommunications sector is also affected. In practice, the Commission 
is not consumer focused because it suffers from acute agency problem and conflict of interest. 
The services providers in turn exploit the compromised regulatory institution and organisation 
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to violate consumer interests with impunity. The implications of all these on promotion of 
consumer interests, the representation of the ordinary consumer and the handling of ordinary 
consumers’ complaints are the focus of Chapters 5, 6, and 7 respectively. 
FIGURE 2.  POLITICAL MAP OF WEST AFRICA 
 
Source: Nations Online Project (2016) 
3.2.1 Business in Nigeria: Opportunities masked by harsh environment  
The business landscape in Nigeria presents peculiar challenges. It is characterised by weak 
institutional capacity, acute infrastructural deficiency and a bureaucracy marked by non-
transparent transactions, which are part of the legacy from decades of military dictatorship and 
a nascent democracy run by opportunistic politicians as was discussed earlier. The discovery 
of oil in the 1970s and the subsequent boom led to the neglect of the huge untapped potential 
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in other natural endowment in the agricultural and solid mineral sectors. Oil revenue fuelled 
corruption and the struggle for political power for the control of the national wealth. In this 
unwholesome struggle infrastructural development stagnated. For example, inadequate energy 
and electric power supply is a major challenge for businesses both in the formal and informal 
sector. All businesses including public organisation like hospitals, schools, airports and 
telecommunications base stations run on generators for several hours daily or are shut down 
awaiting the erratic electricity supply from the national gird. This challenge has adverse 
implication for the provision of telecommunication services and other basic services. 
Companies whose businesses span over a number of states face the additional challenge of 
multiple taxations by the Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDA) of the three tiers of 
government: Federal, State, and local governments.  Associated with the issue of multiple 
taxations is the issue of ‘Right of way. Businesses whose operations involve the laying of pipes 
and cable are required to obtain approval and pay stipulated fees and levies to the government.  
The charges are repeated across various MDAs in the federal, state and local government levels 
without due regards to the Taxes and Levies (Approved rates for collection) Act 1998 (NCC 
Annual Report, 2013). 
The insurgency and terrorist activities in the North East and militant groups in the Delta regions 
pose severe challenges to businesses as these groups often resort to vandalising existing 
infrastructural facilities, like oil and gas pipelines and telecommunications masts and base 
stations.  
These challenges affect all sectors of the economy and inflate the cost of doing business in 
Nigeria. The result is lost opportunities for a diversified and robust economy, high level of 
unemployment and higher prices for consumers. In the telecommunications sector it militates 
against consumers’ interest in the availability and affordability of services. 
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3.3. Evolution of the Nigerian Telecommunications Network 
3.3.1. The Colonial and P&T era (1886 – 1985): 100 years of an inert 
telecommunications network  
The development of telecoms infrastructure started in Nigeria in 1886 with the installation of 
the first telegraphic submarine cable by a British firm known as Cable and Wireless Ltd, to link 
Lagos through Accra in Ghana, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and the Gambia to London for the 
purposes of connecting the British colonial administrators with the Home office and in some 
friendly locations in Nigeria where trade has begun (Ukodie, 2006). Thus, the 
telecommunications’ needs during the colonial era were triggered by the British colonial 
exigencies rather than to provide access to telecommunications for ordinary citizens. However, 
it established the foundation for the development of present mobile telecommunications in 
Nigeria. 
When Nigeria gained her independence from the British administration in 1960, the telephone 
network had 116 manual exchanges and only 5 automatic exchanges (NTP, 2000), with 18, 724 
telephone lines, for a population of about 40 million people. This represented a telephone 
penetration of 0.04 telephones per 100 inhabitants (about one telephone line per 2,500 people) 
which is well below the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) minimum standard of 
one telephone line to 100 inhabitants for developing countries.  
The Nigerian telecommunications network, between 1960 and 1985 (nicknamed the P&T era) 
under the indigenous government consisted of: the internal network managed by the 
Department of the Post and Telecommunications and the international network managed by the 
Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET). NET was a limited liability company also 100% 
owned by Government.  
From 1962 to 1985, the indigenous Government conceived and implemented five National 
Telecommunications Development Plans (NTDPs). The overall objective of the plans was to 
expand, modernise and provide reliable and efficient telecommunications services (Ukadie, 
2006). The first development plan spanned from 1962 to 1968 during which expansion of some 
existing exchanges resulted into 10, 000 additional lines and only 2% of projections made for 
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Subscriber Trunk Dialling (STD) facility in major cities were realised. The Nigerian civil war 
(1967-1970) had its toll on this plan period and the second plan period, 1970-1974 which was 
partially devoted to the completion of the first plan targets and the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the damages caused to the telecommunications infrastructure because of the 
civil war. 
These plan periods were not successful for various reasons including: political instability; 
which resulted in three years of civil war leading to 30 years of military government and 
government bureaucracy characterised by lack of transparency, corruption and weak 
institutional capacity as discussed in 3.2 above. This was compounded by the dearth of 
indigenous technology and technical expertise in that period. It is significant to note that in this 
era, telephone service was a public interest obligation and was subsidised by the government. 
Hence, telecommunications projects during this P&T era were exclusively funded from the 
Nigerian government’s subventions much of which was diverted to political loyalist as personal 
favours under the prevailing neo-patrimonial environment discussed above. In this scenario, 
“what was available for telecommunications was what the political class were willing to give 
out.” (Ukadie, 2006:12). The political elite and their cronies focussed more on personal gains 
rather than the development of viable telecommunications industry. This explains why some 
telephone exchanges were sited in unviable locations or viable locations with no External Line 
Plant (ELP) for example poles and cables required for the connection of subscribers to the 
exchanges, merely to serve a political elites’ clientele and close circle to the exclusion of the 
potential ordinary consumers. In addition, poor urban planning and inadequate infrastructural 
development particularly in the transport and power sectors also constituted a challenge to 
proper network development.  
At the end of 1985, after one century of telephony business, Nigeria could only boast of 
achieving a switching capacity of about 200,000 lines out of planned target of about 460,000 
lines resulting into a telephone penetration of 0.22 telephones per 100 inhabitants which was 
still well far below the African average telephone penetration of 0.66 telephones line to 100 
inhabitants in the 80s (Aloo, 1998).  
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Because of inadequate infrastructure, the telephone service was characterised by serious system 
congestion resulting into unusual dial tone delay for consumers trying to make calls. Sometimes 
it was impossible to get dial tones when offices were open. It was common for the telephone 
operators to advise the callers to try again the following day after making several abortive trails. 
Consequently, ‘All trunks are busy, please try again later’- one of the feedbacks from the 
telecommunications’ announcement machine became a recognised/prevalent jingle in this era.  
3.3.2 The Nigerian Telecoms Reform Era (1985-1998): Monopoly dies hard 
In line with the global trend in digitalisation and privatisation and enabled by the companies’ 
decree of 1968, the Federal government in 1984 approved the merger of the 
telecommunications arm of the Department of the Post and Telecommunications (P&T) and the 
Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) to form a new limited company – the Nigerian 
Telecommunications Limited (NITEL). This merger was achieved in January 1985. The main 
objective of creating NITEL then was: to harmonise the management of the internal and 
external telecommunications services; rationalise telecommunications development 
investments as well as provide services that are accessible, efficient and affordable (NTP, 
2000). NITEL also had the objective to achieve the ITU recommendation of a minimum of one 
telephone to 100 inhabitants. 
In the plan period 1986-1991, efforts were made towards infrastructural development and 
improvement in managerial capacity. For example, NITEL upgraded the national network by 
the addition of modern automatic telephone exchanges, digital satellite communication 
facilities, digital radio and optical fibre optic cable system in order to increase the network 
capacity and improve quality of service. NITEL also introduced some management strategies 
to address consumer complaints and billing issues. In spite of these initiatives, NITEL’s 
transition from a government monopoly that lived on government largesse to a vibrant 
commercial entity fell far short of the mark. Thus, the National Telecommunications Policy 
(2000) comments that:  
“Telecommunications development during this period was characterised by serious 
short falls between planned targets and their realisation, principally because of poor 
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management, lack of accountability and transparency and low level of executive 
capacity’’ (National Telecommunications Policy, 2000:12; Okonjo – Iweala, 2012). 
The lack of accountability and transparency was a reflection of the prevailing socio-political 
environment. 
Experiences from developed countries especially the USA and UK have proved that the best 
way to run a telecommunications network is to privatise it and thus operate it as an independent 
entity free from interferences by the Government.  Thus in 1992 NITEL was commercialised 
by the Federal Government Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation 
(TCPC) as the initial step towards its privatisation. This process required NITEL new Board to 
sign a performance bond to achieve the goals of commercialisation in May 1992, with the 
Federal government. The implication of this was that NITEL had to fend for itself and no longer 
received subvention from government. After a tariff rebalancing exercise, a proper tariff regime 
was put in place for NITEL to make her viable and financially autonomous. Tariff rebalancing, 
one of key outcome of the reforms, involves the process of bringing down the above-cost long 
distance /international tariffs and raising the subsidised local tariffs. The policy translated into 
the generation of huge new revenue but did not translate into proportional increase in network 
expansion.  
NITEL also embarked on joint ventures with other foreign companies to facilitate the 
deployment of new technologies. For instance, in June 1992 NITEL entered into a joint venture 
with Digital Telecommunications of the USA to form Mobile Telecommunications Services 
(MTS), which provided mobile voice services and paging from three analogue E-TACS 
switches installed in Lagos, Enugu and Abuja. The maximum number of connected lines 
realised from this venture was 25,000. The lines were unduly expensive and beyond the reach 
of an ordinary consumer; the cost of a mobile set and connection from MTS was about N100, 
000 (over US$2,000).  
Subsequently, in line with the global trends in deregulations and privatisation and backed up 
with the British example in deregulation (DTI, 2001) the government enacted Decree 75 of 
106 
 
1992 which partially liberalised the telecoms sector and opened it up to competition in the 
following eight areas: 
1. Installation of terminal and other equipment and provision and operation of: 
2. Public pay phones; 
3. Private network links; 
4. Public mobile communications; 
5. Community telecommunications; 
6. Value added network services (VANS); 
7. Repair and maintenance of equipment; 
8. Cabling.  
Although the Nigerian Communications Commission [Commission] was established in 1992 
and the Commission’s Board inaugurated in 1993, it took until 1996 for Decree 75 to become 
active and for the Commission to license the first set of National Fixed and Fixed Wireless 
Private Telecommunications Operators (PTOs). Furthermore, Decree 75 did not revoke 
NITEL’s monopoly in the provision of public voice telephony services and international traffic. 
Monopoly dies hard. Consequently, several interconnection issues were encountered between 
NITEL and the licensed PTOs (Wellenius, 1993). These difficulties confirmed the weaknesses 
in the provisions of the Decree 75 of 1992. According to Melody (1997), interconnection is a 
cornerstone of competition, essential to network development and to the achievement of 
telecoms policy objectives. The most fundamental regulatory objective is the provision of equal 
access to telecoms services at affordable prices to all consumers. This point was completely 
missed by Decree 75 of 1992. Showing that the political elites were reluctant to let go of what 
had been a money-spinning resource for granting benefits to their loyalists and cronies. 
However, the political elites will eventually recapture the sector through the regulatory 
framework provision for the appointment of the Governing Board as discussed in Section 3.2 
above. 
Hence, the impact of opening up the Nigerian telecoms market in 1992 was minimal due to 
insufficient infrastructure, inefficient operations and lack of visible competition in the market. 
The Commission assesses the situation as follows: 
107 
 
“In spite of its long history, the telecommunications sector in Nigeria until the late 1990s 
was one of the most undeveloped in Africa and indeed, in the world. Several factors 
accounted for the low development of telecommunications infrastructure in Nigeria. 
The most prominent factor being the dominance of the sector, by the state-run 
monopoly, the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL)” (NCCSMP, 2014:5).  
The frustrating experiences of the ordinary consumer at this period of the telecommunications 
development in Nigeria were duly captured by the National Telecommunications Policy: “The 
quality of service was largely unsatisfactory. The telephone was unreliable, congested, 
expensive and customer unfriendly” (NTP, 2000:12). 
Therefore, in spite of commercialisation, NITEL’s network remained congested with low call 
completion rates due to inadequate capacity, uneconomic investment pattern and poor 
maintenance culture and management. Its operations were grossly inefficient with a very long 
list of unmet consumer demand for basic telephone services and a penetration rate of about four 
telephone lines for 100 inhabitants. The suppressed demand was estimated at 90%, (Okonjo-
Iweala, 2012). Ironically, this bottled up demand was to become the driver of the exponential 
growth in subscribers’ numbers in the liberalised telecommunications market. 
3.3.3 Full liberalisation and the digital mobile services (1999-2015): We are connected   
The new democratic Government elected in 1999 under President Obasanjo was cognisant of 
the ITU’s 1994 declaration which accords telecommunications a priority role in member state’s 
development programme (ITU, 1994) and the need to reposition the sector as one of vital 
economic importance (Michalis, 2007).  
Hence based on the outcome of a four-day public hearing on policy directions organised by the 
House of Representative Committee on Communications, the government amended the Decree 
75 of 1992. Thus the full liberalisation of the Telecommunications sector was achieved in 1999 
when the government: “first opened the sector for licensing of new mobile network providers” 
(Okonji-Iweala, 2012:37). In a quick follow up in April 2000, subsequent upon the Ministry of 
Communications’ wide consultation of local and international bodies the existing National 
Telecoms Policy was revised and published in October 2000. 
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In January 2001, the Commission offered digital mobile licenses to the four winners of the 
auction: Mobile Telephone Networks Communications Nigeria (MTN), M-Tel (the mobile arm 
of NITEL), Econet Wireless (now Airtel), and Communications Investments Nigeria Limited 
(CIL). Three of the service providers met the 14-day deadline for the payment of the US$285 
million licence fee. The failure of CIL to meet the time limit and subsequent forfeiture the 
fourth mobile licence generated a lot of controversy. The Nigerian businessman Mike Adenuga, 
who had won a slot in the auction via CIL, contested the alleged failure to meet the deadline. 
Mike Adenuga wholly owned Global Communications Limited (GLO) was later issued a 
license in 2003 for the same fee and became the second wholly Nigerian Operator. There is 
very little information about the ownership of these GSM companies; their ownership is mask 
by nominee companies and proxies. For example, Communication Investment own 4% 
holdings in MTN. It has been reported that Communication Investment is owned by some six 
top Nigerian bankers and politicians (Sutherland, 2016).  
These four mobile service providers were granted a five-year exclusivity period (2001 to 2006) 
to deploy a national network to provide the second-generation GSM digital mobile 
Radiotelephony in the frequency bands of 900MHZ and 1800MHZ. Although the GSM licence 
includes potential to upgrade to the General Packet Radio Switching (GPRS) it excludes the 
Third Generation (3G) networks. In addition, each of the issued GSM license includes the 
establishment and operation of an international gateway. M-Tel rolling out a GSM network was 
unsuccessful largely due to the aborted planned attempts to privatise M-Tel’s mother company 
NITEL (Okonji-Iweala, 2012). Subsequently, Etisalat joined the mobile market in 2008 
bringing the total number of active mobile operators to four.  
The Commission established the Universal Service Fund [USO], which is funded from a 40% 
of 2.5% levy on the turnover of both the fixed and mobile dominant industry players. The 
universal service obligation in a regulated competitive telecoms market is a regulatory 
intervention scheme aimed at achieving a specific public service goal, which would have been 
neglected by the market operators. In the UK, OFTEL described universal service in 1984 as 
“affordable access to basic voice telephony or its equivalent for all those reasonably requesting 
it, regardless of where they live” (Garnham, 1997:207). The notion of universal service covers 
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both availability and affordability of the service to the ordinary consumer. In Nigeria a 
substantial part of the country approximately 20% is not covered by the roll out of mobile 
networks and therefore do not have access to even basic telephone services [ICT Policy, 2012]. 
This issue highlights the need of the Universal services obligation.  
It was envisaged, that investment in the GSM mobile segment would contribute 95% of the 
total investment made in the telecommunications industry in the period 2001-2003, which was 
estimated at US$1.2bn. The Commission further estimates: “investments of about US$37.5 
billion in the years 2003-2007, creating about 100,000 direct jobs and about 5 million indirect 
jobs” (NCC, 2005). Although these figure were not realised, the actual volume of investment 
remained impressive at US$ 32 billion in 2014 (NCC.Communicator, 2014). 
The growth in investment has been stimulated by several incentives put in place by the 
government for the qualified GSM investors. For instance, government granted each mobile 
operator ‘pioneer status’ with the following benefits: Tax holiday with respect to income and 
education taxes; Capital expenditure on qualifying assets and losses incurred during the tax 
relief period are treated as having been incurred on the first day following the tax relief period; 
and is available for carrying forward subject to the 4-year limitation period (NCC, 2005:12). In 
addition, the government gave the investors some non-fiscal incentives such as simplification 
of procedures and requirements for the importation of telecommunications equipment. 
The Nigerian telecommunication sector has come a long way. Through a 15-years period of 
reformation and 15years of post-liberalisation and roll out of mobile telecommunications 
services, it has become the largest mobile network in Africa and one of the fastest growing in 
the world with a subscriber’s base of over 149 million in 2015 (NCC.Communicator, 2015). 
However, the Commission reflects the characteristics of the prevailing socio-political 
environment.  It is highly susceptible to regulatory capture by the political elites and the 
regulated industries. In practice, it is not entirely independent and is plagued by acute agency 
problem. Consequently, the Commission is not attentive to issues affecting the interest and 
representation of the ordinary consumer. As a result, the impressive growth of the sector (see 
Figure 3) has not produced equivalent improvement in the realisation of consumer interests as 
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FIGURE 3.  TREND OF ACTIVE VOICE SUBSCRIPTIONS 2003-2014 
 
Source: Adapted from 2014 Yearend Subscriber/Network Data Report for operating 
Telecommunications Companies in Nigeria (NCCStat, 2014) 
the mobile networks have consistently failed to meet pre-set key performance indicators and 
the criteria of reliable and affordable telecommunication services. This issues form the high 
points in the empirical Chapters 6, and 7 of this study.  
3.3.4 Regulatory framework 2000-2015: Independent or politicised regulator?  
The Cable and Wireless Act of 1962 positioned the Ministry of Communications as the 
Nigerian telecommunications regulator. Hence, the Ministry supervised NITEL, the incumbent, 
from 1985 until 1992. In 1992, Decree 75 established the Nigerian Communications 
Commission (Commission), thereby removing the regulatory responsibility from the Ministry 
and transferred the responsibility to the Commission (Ukadie, 2006). Finally, the Nigerian 
Communications Act of July 2003 gave full organisational and financial autonomy to the 
Nigerian Communications Commission as an independent regulator with exclusive powers for 
all matters as it relates to the Nigerian communications market (Act, section 90). The 
Commission has a Governing Board and an annual operating budget of N 40 billion (US$ 200 
million) in 2013. The key provisions of the Act include the separation of the functions of the 
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Commission vis-à-vis that of the Ministry, the establishment of the National Frequency 
Management Council (NFMC) and the establishment of the Universal Service Fund to promote 
the widespread availability and usage of network services throughout Nigeria (NCC, 2005). 
The Governing Board of the Commission consists of nine Commissioners including a chief 
executive, the Executive Vice-Chairman (EVC), all of whom are to be appointed by the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria subject to the confirmation by the Senate (Act, 
section 8). 
The existing regulatory regime is a major contributor to the impressive growth of the telecoms 
sector, which has placed Nigeria in leadership position in regional and international 
organisations, including the Commonwealth Telecommunication Organisation (CTO) 
(Adepetun, 2015). However, the institutional framework is vulnerable to political manipulation 
as regards the appointment of the Governing Board. This exposes the Commission to conflict 
of interest and increases the prospect of regulatory capture by the industry, which distracts the 
Commission from effectively executing its mandate concerning the promotion of consumer 
interests.  
3.3.5 Market structure: GSM takes the lead    
The Nigerian telecoms industry, for the purpose of this study, can be segmented into two broad 
categories: the digital mobile segment consisting of the mobile GSM and the mobile CDMA, 
and the fixed telephony segment consisting of the fixed wired and fixed wireless.  
The Nigerian telecommunications market has recorded an unprecedented growth in both the 
overall volume of business and contribution to the national GDP (0.62% in 2001, 6.9% in 2012 
and 8.9% in 2014). The number of total active telephone lines at the end of August 2015, 
fourteen years after full liberalisation has risen to 149.14 million lines and teledensity of 108 
from about 400,000 lines and teledensity of 0.04 in 2001. The Commission has issued many 
licenses as indicated in Table 3. The number of licenses is an indication of the level of investors’ 
interest in that segment.  
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TABLE 3.  CURRENT ACTIVE LICENCES ISSUED BY THE COMMISSION 
S/N Category Number 
1 Internet service 195 
2 Unified Access Service licence 16 
3 Mobile GSM 4 
 CDMA
6 No data on 
NCC website 
4 National Long Distance operators 10 
5 International Data Access 22 
6 Interconnect Exchange  9 
7 National Carrier 2 
8 International Gateway 3 
9 Metropolitan Fibre Cable Network 11 
                                                 
6 Interviewee-CAB 2, in response to the researcher’s question, said: “the CDMA operators except VISAFONE 
are virtually no longer operational.  There was an attempt by a particular Consortium to buy all of them up, and 
set up one consolidated service provider unit with the acquisitions, but that has not materialised meaningfully. 
Therefore, the above adverse development on the CDMA operators may have been the reason for their non-
listing on our web site. This scenario has played out. VISAFONE has been bought by MTN and AIRTEL is 
challenging the acquisition in court.  
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10 Value Added Service 187 
11 Electronic Directory Information service 2 
12 International Submarine cable infrastructure and landing stations services 
3 
13 Infrastructure Sharing and Collocation Services 37 
Source: Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC, n.d.-a)) 
a) The Mobile (GSM) Segment: the ‘GSM Revolution’ 
The telecoms industry is primarily driven by the mobile (GSM) market segment as seen in 
Table: 4, and Table 5. In 2014 this segment accounts for 98.30% of active voice subscription 
lines of the entire telecoms market while the mobile (CDMA) and the Fixed wired/wireless 
segments account for 1.57% and 0.31% respectively. The penetration rate grew from about 
0.04% in 2001 to 99.39% in 2014 (NCCStat, 2015:5). This exponential growth referred to in 
Nigeria as the ‘GSM Revolution’ has been facilitated and sustained by progressive opening up 
of the mobile sector to competition. It is indeed a direct indication that liberalisation reform that 
took place in the Nigerian telecoms mobile sector despite its attendant competition problems 
did positively influence higher network penetration (Petrazzini, 1996). This is similar to the 
experience of other developing countries like Ghana. Frempong and Atubra (2001: 209) report 
that, “Liberalisation has facilitated telecoms penetration and has given the subscribers the 
ability to choose between operators”. Mobile telephony remains the dominant and preferred 
means of communication in Nigeria (refer to Tables 3 and 5 above).  
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TABLE 4.  SUBSCRIBER STATISTICS: TOTAL ACTIVE SUBSCRIPTIONS (2010 – 2015) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total active 
subscription 
88,348,026 95,886,714 113,195,951 127,606,6
29 
139,143,610 151.017.244 
Teledensity 63.11 68.49 80.85 91.15 99.39 107.87 
Source: Adapted from Total Voice Subscriptions 2009 – 2013 (NCCStat, 2014:5) and Total 
Active Voice Subscriptions 2010 – 2015 (NCCStat, 2015:5) 
b) Fixed and Fixed Wireless Telephony Segment: Going down with the Incumbent  
The fixed telephony segment comprises of all licensees operating a Private Network Link 
(Microwave Radio) licence or a Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) licence. The licensees called 
Private Telecoms Operators (PTOs) use fixed wireless technology (as opposed to mobile 
wireless technology and traditional fixed wireline technology) to deploy their services because 
of the inherent advantages of wireless technology over the wired in terms of flexibility, rapid 
deployment and lower cost. Although the Commission had anticipated that increase in fixed 
lines from the PTOs, FWAs and NITEL will have positive impact on competition, Table 4 
above shows that on the contrary growth in the fixed wired/wireless telephony segment has 
been on the decline from 4000 lines in 2001 to 182,395 in June 2015. The Commission 
confirmed that: “Fixed wired/wireless are disappointedly sliding to extinction, a scenario 
compelling intervention by the Commission to safeguard this sector” (NCC Annual Report, 
2012:4). The reason is perhaps due more to regulatory and market failures rather than 
inadequate infrastructure and insufficient number of licenced service providers. For instance, 
Government has made four fruitless attempts to privatise NITEL (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). 
Finally, the privatisation of NITEL and its mobile arm M-Tel was completed in December 2014 
through the guided liquidation strategy following a single financial bid, which was opened in 
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October 2014 by the Administration of the immediate past government (Andrew, 2014; Okeke 
& Isaac, 2015). 
NITEL, the incumbent owned the fixed wired segment and the demise of NITEL meant the 
demise of the fixed wired segment. The collapse of NITEL, six years after the liberalisation of 
the sector has also been attributed to regulatory failure (Ogudele, 2010). However, this study 
did not find further literature on this issue. Similarly, the acquisition of VISAFONE 
Communications, the only surviving CDMA, by MTN is being challenged in court by Etisalat 
alleging complicity and non-transparent transaction by the Commission (Adepetun, 2016). 
TABLE 5.  PERCENTAGE MARKET SHARE OF SERVICE DEPLOYMENT BY TECHNOLOGY 
(2013- 2016) 
Year Mobile (GSM) Mobile (CDMA) Fixed Wired/Wireless 
2013 97.83% 1.88% 0.29% 
2014 98.30% 1.57% 0.13% 
Jan 2016 98.47% 1.41% 0.12% (NCC website) 
Source: 2014 Year-end Subscriber/Network Data Report for Telecommunications Services 
Providers in Nigeria (NCCStat, 2014; NCCStat, 2015:7) 
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has engendered an exponential growth of 
the mobile segment. This impressive growth is counter balanced by the demise of NITEL, the 
incumbent, the Fixed Wired/Wireless and CDMA segments. The recent sale of these segments 
is not without controversies.  
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3.4. Trends in Consumer Benefits and Challenges in the Mobile Market 
The liberalised telecoms industry has benefited from rapidly changing technological 
developments and innovative products and services resulting in impressive growth of the sector. 
It was also envisaged that liberalising the telecoms market will lead to easier access to basic 
telephony for all and wider choice at affordable prices for the consumers (OFCOM, 2010). The 
trend in the last two decades in Nigeria and many countries has shown bright prospects of 
achieving these goals. However, the telecommunications market is complex and loaded with 
innovative and fast changing options. Consumers face daunting challenges while operating in 
this market.  
In this section, the study reviews the trend in the mobile telecommunication sector concerning 
the benefits and challenges to the ordinary consumer. 
3.4.1 Consumer Benefits: Now we are talking due to mobile technology 
In 2008, global mobile subscription reached 4.6 billion, approximately 63% of the world 
population, and in 2012, global mobile penetration stood at 96%: 128% in developed countries 
(indicating that there are more mobile phones than are people) and 89% in developing countries 
(ITU 2009; ITU, 2013). Since the first mobile phone call in the UK in 1985, the penetration of 
mobile telephone in UK households has grown to about 92%, contributing 40% of total voice 
minutes and 51% of the UK telecoms sector in 2007 and its share is growing around 10% per 
year (OFCOM, 2009). In Australia mobile penetration is approximately 95%, ranging from 
100% for those aged 18 – 24 to 83% for the 65 and above (ACMA, 2015). In Nigeria, household 
ownership of mobile telephones in 2009 was 59% (representing 70.6% of those with access) 
and individual access to mobile telephone was 63% (ITC Policy, 2012). The country achieved 
a teledensity of 99.39 in 2014. 
The impressive growth in mobile telephone penetration is attributable mainly to the extremely 
low penetration of the pre-existing fixed infrastructure and the consequent huge unmet demand, 
as well as to liberalisation and the techno-economic characteristics of mobile networks, which 
has driven the extension of networks to rural and underserved areas. The result is that 
consumers globally have benefited from increased access to telephone facilities. 
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Given the poor state of fixed-line infrastructure, in most developing countries and in Africa in 
particular, mobiles are often the preferred (or only) means of communication. For example, 
Nigeria and other developing countries started from a significantly low fixed line penetration 
rates of 4% (Pyramid Research, 2010). Over the past 10 years, the number of mobile 
connections in Africa has grown on an average of 30% per year and is forecast to reach 735 
million by the end of 2012 (GSMA, 2013). Africa has overtaken Latin America to become the 
second largest mobile market in the world, after Asia. In 2012, nearly 76% of the Sub-Sahara 
African population is covered by mobile services, up from 65% in 2009. In Nigeria mobile 
GSM share of the telecoms market increased from 94% in 20011 to 97% in 2012 and to 98.30% 
in 2014 (NCCStat, 2014; NCCStat, 2015). 
Nigeria recorded the fastest growth rate of 10 million mobile telephone lines per annum 
between 2000 and 2010, becoming the fastest growing and largest telecommunications market 
in Africa with over 135 million connected telephone lines and a population of 160 million. This 
growth has continued unabated in 2012 with a growth rate of 18%. Nigeria is still the leading 
telecommunication market in Africa and one of the fastest growing in the world. Since the 
liberalisation of the industry in 2001, it has attracted USD37.5 billion in capital investment 
(Pyramid Research, 2010; NCC Annual report, 2012). 
Mobile operators’ contribution to global GDP stands at 1.4% and it is expected to grow at 2.3% 
per annum. Africa’s mobile connection was over 620 million lines in 2011, contributing USD 
56 billion to the regional economy, equivalent to 3.5% of total GDP. In Nigeria 
telecommunications services contribute USD 44.3billion (8.6%) of the USD 510.1billion GDP 
(Arowolo & Folarin, 2014). 
One of the key growth drivers for mobile penetration in Africa has been the increasing 
availability of low-cost pre-paid services.  Pre-paid pricing offers ordinary consumers cost 
effective options, to access mobile telephone and other innovative services by purchasing low 
value mobile credits as and when they can afford to and without the commitment to strenuous 
regular monthly payments. The pre-paid option is very popular in Africa accounting for 96% 
of all connections compared to 52% in Europe and 82% in Latin America (GSMA, 2012). In 
Nigeria prepaid accounts for 97% of total mobile subscription (NCC.CSS, 2012). 
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Mobile telecom is becoming increasingly more affordable as prices keep dropping every year 
and consumers globally are enjoying falling prices. Between 2009 and 2010, price per minute 
fell, on average, by 10% in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Namibia, Ghana, Niger, Senegal 
and South Africa, with the largest decreases occurring in Kenya, (GSMA, 2012). Consumers in 
Africa witnessed an average of 18% reduction in prices between 2010 and 2011 (GSMA, 2013) 
and in Europe consumers are enjoying significantly lower prices with mobile charges falling 
by 50% over the last five years (OFCOM, 2010). The rapid decrease in prices resulting from 
innovative technology and the economy of scales combined with the broad availability of pre-
paid services means that mobile services are accessible to all income groups except those who 
are geographically handicapped like those rural communities living far from the urban areas 
where mobile services are yet to be rolled out. 
Consumers all over the world are increasingly using the mobile phone to access the internet. 
For example, in Zimbabwe 58.1% of web traffic is mobile-based, and is 57.9% in Nigeria and 
44% in Zambia, compared to a global average of 10%. Mobile networks are leading the 
expansion of broadband internet access across Africa, although faster broadband access is 
largely confined to a small minority of the more developed African countries (GSMA, 2013). 
In the UK, mobile networks offer a very viable option for achieving universal access to 
broadband (OFCOM, 2009). In 2013, the result of OFCOM (2013) survey showed that 53% of 
participants use their mobile phones to access the internet, up from 42% in 2012. 
3.4.2 The Positive Impact of Mobile Telecommunications: Bridging the urban-rural 
divide 
In the last decade, mobile telecom has changed the ordinary consumers’ way of life in a 
profound way. In the UK, “mobile has become central to UK citizens and consumers” 
(OFCOM, 2009:2) and it has engendered closer ties between peoples (Tambini, 2011) as it is 
also providing fast link to all corners of the world. It now serves as a primary tool for 
communication and information dissemination between persons across the globe. Across 
Africa, mobile telephony has not only changed the way consumers relate to each other and their 
communities, it has also influenced the way they work by rapidly changing their knowledge 
base and culture. In Africa, where the rural population is about 61% (52% in Nigeria) mobile 
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telecoms services is bridging the gap between the urban and rural dwellers particularly in the 
area of communications, banking, information dissemination and entertainment. With mobile 
phones rural dwellers can access information about commodities prices and availability of 
agricultural inputs; receive and transfer money; enjoy their favourite music while at work or on 
the go. Mobile telecommunications create new opportunities for economic and social 
engagements and has a positive impact on the consumer lifestyle and quality of life. The global 
mobile industry supports 8.5 million jobs and an additional 1.3 million jobs is expected in 
emerging markets by 2017. In Nigeria, the mobile telecoms services provide about 8,000 direct 
employments and 3 million indirectly. The indirect employment includes, street vendors 
(umbrella people), those engaged in equipment sales and servicing, infrastructure deployment 
and maintenance, advertising and security related jobs (Pyramid Research, 2010).   
With mobile telephony, consumers access the internet engage in mobile-commerce; m-learning 
and a host of other internet- enabled activities. Across Africa mobile value- added services 
support banking, education, farming, healthcare and gender equality (GSMA, 2013). In Nigeria, 
the mobile phone is a major instrument for the government’s cashless policy and the innovative 
‘mobile money’ and on-line retail platforms.  ‘Mobile Money’ – a regulated financial and 
payment services performed with the use of mobile phone and without the need of a bank 
account – has proved very effective in achieving financial inclusion for the unbanked 
population in developing countries particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where 16% of adult 
population use their mobile phones to pay bills, send or receive money (ITU-T, 2013). 
 In the UK, mobile services have become “a tremendous success story for consumers and 
citizens” as it continues to play a central role in consumers’ use of communication services 
(OFCOM, 2009:12). Moreover, the positive impact on consumers’ knowledge base is triggering 
consumers’ demand for improved access to information and services that cater for public 
interest such as education and research, health, environment and transport, culture and religion 
(OECD, 2008).  
Mobile telephony has also been found useful in enhancing security by facilitating early 
warning. In Nigeria, the mobile phone is used in traffic monitoring and reporting of accidents. 
Consumers using their mobile phones report traffic situation in their location to their favourite 
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radio stations’ live broadcast. Similarly, in the UK, the introduction of ‘Emergency 999/112 
mobile roaming’ in 2009 has proved useful in mitigating emergencies and support for the 
handicapped. This service enables mobile phones to switch automatically to alternative 
networks enabling users to make emergency calls when they are outside their service area 
(OFCOM, 2010).  
In some African countries including Nigeria and South Africa, mobile operators are providing 
“Please Call Me” text messages free of charge after they noticed that the networks were being 
inundated by millions of beeps/flashes a day. These are calls made only to attract the attention 
of the called party by a caller who do not have sufficient funds to place a full call; hence, the 
caller aborts the call after a few rings.  Studies estimate that 20 to 30 per cent of all calls made 
each day in Africa are beeps/flashes.  The “Please Call Me” service is a free alternative method 
for the low-incomes to reach out to their contacts when they are low on airtime. This has been 
found very useful in emergencies and social relations. In Ghana and Nigeria, systems have also 
been deployed to allow users to check the authenticity of pharmaceuticals.  Counterfeit drugs 
are a major issue in Africa and the scheme, endorsed by the West Africa Health Organisation, 
is being promoted by a number of drug companies.  GlaxoSmithKline and other pharmaceutical 
firms have signed up to the initiative; which enable users to send a code printed on the drug 
packet via SMS and receive a reply, either verifying the authenticity of the drugs or giving a 
warning that the product may be fake and providing a helpline number to call for advice 
(GSMA, 2013).  
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has engendered increase in access to Mobile 
telecommunications services, thereby creating new opportunity for economic and social 
engagements and has affected positively on the ordinary consumer lifestyle and quality of life 
in Nigeria. However, these benefits have a price tag. Access to mobile telephone is useful in 
enhancing national security but in the hands of terrorists, it has had a devastating impact on the 
citizens. The challenges ordinary consumers encounter in the mobile market, which is the 
subject of the next section highlights the need for pro-consumer interventions to protect the 
interest of the ordinary consumers. 
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3.4.3 The Challenges of the Telecommunications Market: New harm emerge every day  
In spite of the laudable benefits accruing from the liberalisation of mobile telecommunications, 
consumers encounter numerous challenges in the market that stress their capacity to act in their 
best interest and “new forms of harm continue to develop” (OFCOM, 2010:2). The challenges 
consumers encounter in the liberalised market includes industry related issues, information 
asymmetry and complex marketing (often-deceitful) strategies of services providers. Industry 
related issues include fast changing and complex innovative services and products options. 
Information in telecommunications by its nature tends to be complex, and its form – content, 
context, framing, quantity and quality - stretches the ordinary consumer’s cognitive capacity 
and ability to assess, correctly the benefits and risks of what is on offer. This reality confirms 
the NIE notion of bounded rationality (North, 1993). In Nigeria, the structure of the regulator 
and the subsequent conflict of interest the emanated at the inception of the liberalisation of the 
mobile sector created additional challenges for the consumers. 
This section reviews the various challenges consumers encounter in the telecommunications 
market and argues that consumer protection policies and regulatory intervention are essential 
in ensuring that the market works well and the envisaged benefits are fully realised.  
3.4.3.1 Dearth of Experts: Consumers are on their own as The Regulatory Institution is 
Compromised  
Since the full liberalisation of the Nigerian telecommunications industry in 2001, one of the 
challenges, which have persistent adverse impact on the operation of the market, is the dearth 
of experts in the liberalised mobile sector (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012). At the inception of 
liberalisation, the only pool of professionals (top, middle and bottom cadre) in the industry was 
with NITEL, the incumbent operator. The telecommunications industry witnessed poaching of 
staff from the incumbent network and from one mobile network to the other. Re-poaching of 
the same staff back to the previous/original network was common as the networks hustle for 
the available expertise. The Commission was not spared. Technical and legal staffs of the 
Commission were poached to the detriment of the Commission’s functions; for example, the 
current Managing Director of MTN and head of the Legal Department in AIRTEL were 
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poached from the Commission. Thus, highly placed staffs in the GSM mobile networks have 
their colleagues in the Commission most of who are also in highly placed positions. 
Consequently, the four mobile networks and the Commission have in each of their work force: 
friends, senior/junior colleagues and former bosses from the previous places of work.  
The situation had implications for the newly liberalised industry. On the positive side, it 
engendered the redistribution/transfer of expertise, information and facilitated corporation in 
the industry. On the other hand, it had the potential to lead to conflict of interests and facilitate 
the networks to work in a cartel-like manner (Ubochioma, 2013). More important, it had 
adverse smothering effects on the monitoring and enforcement institution (Otubu, 2013).  For 
instance, the Commission has sometimes been criticised for reacting indifferently to consumer 
issues: for example, not regulating tariff after the liberalisation when competition has not been 
fully developed and for not enforcing the Quality of Services Regulations in the face of 
persistent failure of services providers to meeting the Key Performance Indicators (KIP) 
(Ndibe, 2013). These lapses in the Mobile Administration resulting from conflict of interest 
were to set the stage for the prevailing routine contravention of consumer interest rules by 
licensees discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this study. 
There was also an acute shortage of adequately trained and experienced middle level and front 
desk staff at the services providers’ customer service centres to attend to the complaints of the 
large numbers of consumers who visited the centres. Often consumer after waiting for hours 
leave the customer care centres without any solution to their complaints. These frustrating 
experiences at the inception of the mobile networks contributed to the growth of consumers’ 
apathy towards complaints procedures. 
3.4.3.2 Inadequate Geographical Coverage: Are Rural Areas Being Excluded? 
The GSM licence which the Commission offered the four winners of the auction in 2001 set 
obligations for a minimum roll out target of 2.35million telephone lines to be achieved by all 
the four service providers by August 2004. The service providers achieved 8.3m telephone lines 
by December 2004, which exceeded their roll out obligations in terms of number of lines by 
253% but all failed to meet the geographical coverage obligation. The requirement on 
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geographical spread, enjoined the services providers to ensure that at least 5% of their 
customers shall be domiciled in each of the six geopolitical zones. The Commission however 
lacked the capability to measure compliance with this provision (NCC, 2005:13).  
The licenced fixed and mobile service providers concentrated their roll out in the urban and 
wealthy Lagos zone/Abuja while using NITEL long distance infrastructure to access the other 
zones in Nigeria instead of rolling out to the zones as stipulated in their licence obligations. The 
implication was that some areas of the country remain uncovered and existing consumers lose 
contact and are unable to make or receive calls when they travel to those areas.  
The Commission usually rates the performance of the mobile telecommunications industry by 
the number of active subscriber lines and the teledensity.  This is evident in all annual reports 
and other publications. Thus, it would appear that the Commission is continuously placing 
undue emphasis on rate of growth of subscriber lines, while losing sight of vast rural areas of 
the nation that are neglected and consequently the ordinary citizens in these areas do not have 
access to basic telephone service; situation which tends to favour the service providers as it 
translates into higher Average Revenue earning Per User (ARPU) for the services providers. 
The failure of the Commission to monitor and enforce compliance of the geographical spread 
obligation was also a fall out of the conflict of interest discussed earlier. 
3.4.3.3 Tariff Issues: Regulations are not Focussed to Protect Lower-Spending 
Consumers 
Nigerians who were initially enthusiastic about the mobile services perhaps because of 
deficiency in the provision of telecommunications services under the monopoly regime soon 
discovered that they had to pay a high tariff for the services. In 2001 average tariff was N50 
($0.5) per minute and N4, 000 ($35.96) for a SIM card. Although prices have dropped in recent 
times (US$ 0.2 per minute and US$ 1 per SIM card in 2015) the cost of running a mobile in 
Nigeria is still high at about 5% of personal income, which is significantly above the threshold 
of 2-3% of personal income (GSMA, 2015).  
This level of tariff is clearly more than what the low income consumer could afford with a 
national minimum monthly wage of N 18,000 (US$ 83.33 p.m. i.e. less than US$ 3 per day). 
124 
 
One minute of international call at the current rate of N 60 per minute (US$ 0.3 per minute) is 
10% of the daily minimum wage. According to GSMA (2015), a large proportion of the 
unconnected people in Nigeria fall within the low-income bracket, classified by World Bank as 
the poverty line for developing countries. Hence, it was common for ordinary consumers to 
resort to ‘beeping/flashing’ because they could not afford airtime. Besides the exploitative 
pricing, the other contentious issues in the mobile market were the per-minute-billing strategy 
and billing of silent calls – when one party cannot be heard. GLO mobile introduced per second 
billing in 2003 with its entry into the market but billing for silent calls persisted. The consumers 
bemoaned the predatory pricing by the mobile services providers who appeared to be colluding 
to set tariffs. Government and the regulator on the one hand argued that tariffs would be 
addressed by market forces while the service providers advanced reasons for the need to recoup 
the high cost of the license fee and cost to supplement the existing inadequate telecoms 
infrastructure. Nigeria does not have a competition regulator rather the Commission have 
exclusive competence with competition laws and regulations in all matters relating to 
telecommunications (NCA, 2003, Section 90). 
The Commission employed asymmetric Price Cap Regulation (PCR) pricing strategy in her 
mobile regulation. The PCR was loosely fixed at the commencement of roll out in 2991.  In 
2009, the Commission adopted the Glide Path Asymmetric Interconnection Rates, which 
specified different rates for new entrants and small operators. A review in 2013 was aimed at 
ending the Asymmetric Interconnection Rates by 2015 (NCC Annual Report 2012). This form 
of regulation is seen to be problematic and does not promote efficient market operations. 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) confirm that price cap allows a company make extra profits by 
degrading service quality. PCR has further been criticised for, its inability to tackle price 
leadership, limit entry pricing and tie-in sales and most other strategies employed by 
oligopolistic rivals (Trebing, 1997).  
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TABLE 6.  TARIFF COMPARISON ACROSS LEADING AFRICAN MARKETS 
  Nigeria Algeria S. 
Africa 
Egypt Africa 
Average 
Prepaid Tariff–Mobile Voice (US $)      
- Peak 0.41 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.25 
-Off Peak 0.33 0.25 0.15 0.33 0.2 
-Connection fee 49.76 62.74 14.14 87.78 28.32 
Mobile SMS (US$) 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.07 
Average Mobile Tariff Voice 
Tariff* 
0.39 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.24 
Source: ITU-BDT (2004: A8 – A10) (cited in NCC, 2005:40) 
*Average tariff computed based on assumption that peak period calls constitute 70% of calls 
while off-peak account for 30%.  
Table 6 shows that tariffs in the Nigerian mobile market are significantly higher than the tariffs 
in the other leading markets in Africa and much higher than the African average (US$0.24) 
which is about 62% of the Nigeria’s average mobile tariff (US$ 0.39). 
3.4.3.4 Quality Issues: ‘I Can’t Hear You’ - Poor Quality Persists in The Four Mobile 
Networks 
Besides the exploitative pricing, the other contentious issue in the mobile market was poor 
quality service delivery. Poor quality of service delivery with excessive network congestion 
peaked in 2003 as operators embarked on massive campaign to enrol additional consumers into 
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their network. Concerning this situation, the Commission agreed that, “the technical quality has 
been a major source of concern for customers. Since inception, complaints have risen steadily 
on the quality of calls. Most cited complaint was dropped calls, inability to load credit as at 
when due” (NCC, 2005:17).  
The implication of this might be that effective competition is yet to be achieved in the fully 
liberalised Nigerian telecoms market. The GSM digital mobile operators have an oligopolistic 
market structure, due to limited availability of radio spectrum for mobile communications 
(Michalis, 2007). They appear to exhibit cartel-like behaviour and have little or no 
differentiation amongst them in terms of the pricing and quality of services they offer their 
consumers. The consumers, who appear to be in a locked up state, resort to having more than 
one mobile phone or dual SIM cards enabled phones. In 2003, 2008 and 2012 the industry 
witnessed extreme poor network performance as it continued to grapple with the hydra-headed 
challenge of poor quality of service (NCC Annual Report, 2012:12).  The Press was bombarded 
with so much consumer lamentations that both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
jointly called for Public hearing on the poor telecoms network performance. In 2008, NCC had 
to impose sanctions on the culpable mobile networks and operators made token refunds to 
consumers for the period of extreme service degradation. In addition, in 2012 the commission 
imposed a fine of N1.17 billion on telecoms operators for failure to meet key performance 
indicators. These fines were below the amounts specified in the schedule of fines, and 
consequently failed to serve as deterrents to the operators as will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
3.4.3.5 Coping with The Tools of the Trade 
In consumer purchase decisions the most important factors are, the prices of the product or 
services, the quality of the products or services and the terms and conditions of the trade. The 
consumer’s limited capacity to access, correctly assess and promptly act on the information 
concerning these three factors determine largely the level of harm the consumer may incur. The 
likelihood of harm increases significantly when suppliers provide misleading information or 
employ high-pressure sales tactics, which negatively affects the outcome of the information 
accessing and processing effort. Network and services providers may exploit the ordinary 
consumer by indulging in unfair trade practices. These challenges are often compounded by 
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consumers’ sparse knowledge level and behavioural constrains (Cseres, 2008; OFCOM, 2010). 
There is abundant evidence from research that these difficulties acting separately or in 
combination result in consumer stress and frustration, confusion, anxiety, and poor decisions, 
and detriment (OFCOM, 2009; Xavier, 2008; Cseres, 2008). North, 1993 asserts that 
consumers’ decisions are often not rational, but are forced on them by necessity and other 
constrains. Consequently, consumers are not only unable to derive the full benefit of the 
liberalised telecoms market; they are also exposed to financial and emotional harm due to their 
limited capacity to access and assess information and the asymmetric relationship between the 
ordinary consumer and services provides which competition alone is unable to address. 
a. Mis-selling 
One of the main sources of harm for consumers in the mobile telecoms market is the issue of 
mis-selling. Mis-selling is one of the ways service providers exploit the state of information 
asymmetry that exists in the mobile market. Mis-selling is a generic term that includes a range 
of unfair and dishonest marketing and selling activities that harm the consumer and undermine 
both competition and consumers’ confidence in the industry.  
Slamming is a very dubious form of mis-selling where a new contract for a service is imposed 
on a consumer without their consent or knowledge. For example, a consumer may be assigned 
a caller tune, without her/his consent and the charges included in his/her bill or deducted 
whenever his/her account is recharged. A caller tune is a special ringing tone, to be heard by 
the called party (e.g. music, greetings); that identifies a caller. Caller tunes are very popular 
among the youths.  Illegal charging of consumers for value added services (VAS) like health 
tips and news clips, without their consent or authorisation is also prevalent in Nigeria as was 
reported in the commission’s Monitoring and Enforcement Activities 2013/2014 (refer Chapter 
6). This situation has prompted the Commission to engage VAS providers/stakeholders to 
develop a framework for VAS operation. Another form of slamming is the automatic renewal 
of contract/subscription when the provider has set the opt-in option as the default option. In 
such a situation, if the consumers fail to opt-out – for whatever reason – their contract is 
renewed without their explicit consent or knowledge. This type of slamming involving 
automatic renewal of ‘caller ring tones’, ‘information tips’ are also prevalent in Nigeria.   
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b. Misleading advertising and promotions 
Consumers are also challenged by the various ways information is presented to them. 
Advertising and promotions are major sources of misleading/inaccurate information to 
consumers. Nigerian Telecommunications services providers often employ the use of vague 
and misleading terms (such as absolutely free, best deal ever, unlimited, no hidden charges, no 
exclusion) to lure consumers into unfair transactions. In addition, these attractive claims are 
often shrouded with the slogan “terms and conditions apply” even when these are not 
immediately visible to the consumers. 
Data download speed and duration of bonus airtime are some examples of inaccurate and 
misleading claim. Apart from the fact that data download speed is incomprehensible to many 
consumers, stating a theoretical/average speed, which is dependent on several factors beyond 
the control of consumer, is mischievous. For instance, the mobile service providers (MTN, 
AIRTEL and GLO) have been sanctioned for breach of Advertising and Promotion Guidelines 
as reported in the Commission’s 2013/2014 monitoring and enforcement activities (refer 
Chapter 6). 
 c. Pricing and Billing: The iceberg strategy 
The mobile phone has become an essential tool not only for voice communication but also for 
a host of internet-enabled activities, thus making mobile telecommunications a significant 
expense factor. This partly explains why pricing and billing complaints account for over 30% 
of telecoms complaints (ITU, 2009). Due to the adoption of complex pricing and billing 
strategies by the providers, consumers have trouble assessing the total cost of the services, 
understanding their bills or comparing different pricing and billing plans. Network providers 
exploit this weakness by obfuscating their prices (Xavier, 2008). Various pricing strategies, 
which work against consumers, include cap plans, excess charges, discrimination (differing) 
rates, bundling and packages. In addition, certain price promotions and misleading price-
framing strategies distract consumers and induce faulty decision-making. One of the commonly 
applied strategies by the Nigerian mobile service providers is the ‘Time-limited offers’ which 
usually involves special prices and are available for a limited time period usually one week or 
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at midnight of same day. The promotion runs continuously for the period without stating the 
start or end time. Consumers who may be conscious of this fact are put under tremendous 
pressure to use up their credits in a hurry as they are not sure when the time limit of the deal 
runs out. 
 
d. Unfair billing practices. 
In 2012, the ITU-D Study Group 1, survey among its 193 member states, on consumer 
protection policies, showed that one of the most commonly cited type of complaints, which all 
the respondents reported, was about pricing and billing. Consumer pricing and billing 
complaints include: inaccurate charges complaints arising from overcharging consumers for 
instance where a service operator has programmed one minute to be equivalent to 40 seconds 
instead of 60 seconds; service charges complaints arise due to amount/type of charges levied 
on consumers for services; billing complaints arise when no charging information or 
insufficient charging information are revealed to the consumer and when consumers are billed 
for services they have not subscribed to, this is also known as cramming. Other examples 
include, consumers are surcharged monthly rental fees, even when the telecoms infrastructure 
serving the consumer has been out of service for the billing period and every so often, 
consumers are billed for silent call - when there was no both way conversation (ITU, 2013). 
The ordinary consumer complaints appear to cut across these unfair billing practices. 
3.5 Consumer Protection and Advocacy in Nigeria: Many laws but little action 
There are numerous laws on consumer protection in Nigeria. The Research Report on the State 
of Consumer Protection in Nigeria, 2014, included an impressive list of thirty-seven (37) laws 
relating to consumer protection. These laws are listed in Appendix 3. Most of the laws were 
enacted following the liberalisation of the various sectors of the economy. In addition, in 2004, 
the Federal Government launched SERVICOM, a service contract with the citizens. This 
initiative, which is aimed at improving the quality of services delivery by all government 
ministries and agencies to consumers, also includes complaints redress mechanisms.  
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 The Consumer Protection Council (CPC), established by the Federal Government decree 66 of 
1992, is the apex statutory consumer body in Nigeria. In the exercise of its function to 
“encourage the formation of voluntary consumer groups or associations for consumer 
wellbeing” (CPC Act, Section 2h), the CPC has registered twenty-eight consumer organisations 
which are listed in Appendix 5. In contrast, there is no provision in the Nigerian 
Communications Act (NCA, 2003), for the recognition or support for voluntary consumer 
bodies.  
In spite of the numerous laws and consumer bodies, consumerism remains at a low level in 
Nigeria (Ijewere & Obeki, 2011). This is traceable to the country’s little history of civil societies 
and voluntary consumer advocacy groups. During the period 1967- 1999, there was very little 
Civil Society activities due to the 3 years of civil war and the almost 30 years of military rule. 
Available literature indicates that consumer advocacy began in the early 1970s, with the 
introduction of consumer rights and complaints section in some local Newspapers and 
magazines and a few radio programmes on consumer related issues (Ogechukwu, 2013: 51). 
These initiatives spurred the formation of a few consumer bodies in the 1970s including the 
Consumer Protection Organisation of Nigeria (CPON) in 1970 whose aims included consumer 
education and advocacy. CPON represents consumers in the Standard Organisation of Nigeria 
(SON) and the Advertising Practitioners council of Nigeria (APCON) and publishes The 
Consumer, a quarterly magazine devoted to consumer issues. Other consumer bodies include 
National Consumers of Nigeria (NCON) formed in 1971; Consumer Organisation of Nigeria 
(CON), 1992; Consumer Rights association of Nigeria (CRAN), 1993; Public Interest Law 
Organisation (PILO), 1996; Consumer Awareness organisation (CAO), 1999. CAO engages in 
the review of consumer protection laws, research on consumer issues and creation of consumer 
awareness (Monye, 2003). 
Voluntary consumer bodies in Nigeria are not actively engaged in consumer advocacy and their 
impact is yet to be felt by consumers. Their activities “have remained rudimentary … they are 
yet to make any appreciable impact on the country.” (Monye, 2003:10). The regulators do not 
take them into reckoning, neither are they consulted nor informed of regulatory decisions. This 
is because they are perceived not to have any significant level of expertise in any specific sector. 
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Apart from not being effectively engaged in consumer advocacy in any specific sector, their 
area of operations is localised and “they have not embarked on or received adequate publicity” 
(Ijewere & Obeki, 2011:190). This is confirmed by the data on consumer awareness of 
consumer associations, which showed that 86% of consumers are unaware of the existence of 
consumer associations (Nkamnebe, Idoko & Kalu, 2009).  Most of the consumer groups are 
further disadvantaged because they do not benefit from public funding and consequently are 
characterised by poor staffing (in numbers and expertise), inadequate resources and 
uncoordinated activities. The little attention accorded civil societies traces the pattern of path 
dependency to the military era when civil society’s activities were suppressed.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Nigeria is Africa’s largest republic and economy with a population of 160million and a GDP 
of USD 568.5 billion in 2015. Nigeria’s socio-political environment has been adversely 
impacted by civil war, 30 years of military dictatorship and sixteen years of democratic rule 
characterised by non-transparent transactions. Nigeria has been described as neo-patrimonial 
state imbued with clienteism, and culture of impunity (Transparency International, 2014; 
Martini, 2014). This situation coupled by grand scale looting of public funds has been the bane 
of development in Nigeria since the return to democratic rule in1999. The economy is 
undermined by endemic corruption which has led to weak institutions (North, 2005), severe 
underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty. For example, Nigeria is the sixth largest 
exporter of oil but depends on imported refined petroleum products, and generates only 
4000MW of electricity (10% of South Africa’s output). Corruption is manifested in all aspects 
of the economy including the regulatory agencies and the regulated companies. 
As at 1999, the 50-year-old Nigerian government monopoly of telecommunications was able 
to provide the entire Nigerian population of over 100 million people only 450,000 landlines and 
25,000 analogue mobile phone lines, resulting in a teledensity of about 0.47 lines per 100 
inhabitants, which was among the lowest in the world. In contrast, the full liberalisation of the 
Nigerian telecoms sector in 1999 and the roll out of GSM service in 2001 have progressively 
led to an exponential growth of the sector. At the end of December 2015, fourteen years after 
the liberalisation, active subscriptions stood at over 151 million lines with a teledensity of over 
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99.39 (NCCStat, 2015:3); an average of about ten million lines per year. Mobile GSM accounts 
for 98.3% of total telecommunications and contributed 8.6% (USD 44.3billion) of the national 
GDP in 2014 (Arowolo & Folarin, 2014). However, in Nigeria, the benefits of liberalisation are 
not evenly distributed: a substantial part of the country, approximately 20%, is not covered, 
therefore do not have access to even basic telephone services [ICT Policy, 2012]. This 
notwithstanding, Nigeria is still the leading telecommunications market in Africa and one of 
the fastest growing in the world. 
The Nigerian telecommunications regulatory framework is highly susceptible to political 
interference, conflict of interest and regulatory capture. The appointment of the governing 
Board of the Commission by the President of Nigeria creates room for political interference 
and clienteism. Furthermore, in the early years of liberalisation, the dearth of expertise and the 
resultant poaching of personnel from the Commission to the regulated companies gave room to 
agency problems and spurred further conflict of interest and cronyism.  
This study has argued that the Commission is not entirely independent and consequently it is 
not fully consumer focused. It looks the other way as ordinary consumer interest rules are 
violated with impunity. This situation, which is still prevailing, creates a compromising effect 
on the enforcement institution, which is exploited by the services providers to the detriment of 
consumer interest (Ubochioma, 2013).  
The review of empirical literature reveals that liberalisation of the mobile telecommunications 
has resulted in significant benefits to the consumer. Global mobile penetration stands at 97% 
as at 2013, indicating that access to basic telephone has been achieved largely. Consumers are 
also enjoying lower prices as prices have dropped by about 50% in the past two decades 
following liberalisation. Nigeria shares in this success story. Mobile telecommunications have 
had a positive impact on the life of ordinary Nigerian consumers in the areas of social relations, 
work, employment, banking, education and security. It is now considered, as a utility and an 
extension of the consumers feel incomplete with it. The story is the same in many African 
countries and all over the world. 
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In spite of the laudable benefits of mobile telecoms, academic literature further reveals that the 
ordinary consumer is paying too high a price for these benefits as they contend with various 
challenges harm in the market (OFCOM, 2009; Xavier, 2008). In the neo-patrimonial 
environment prevailing in Nigeria, ordinary consumers are also grappling with the ineptness of 
the politicised regulator, high tariff, poor quality services and inadequate geographical 
coverage. The mobile telephone network “is unreliable and congested, expensive and customer 
unfriendly” (NTP, 2000:12).  
 The asymmetric relationship that prevails in the telecoms industry is exploited by the mobile 
services providers through unfair trade practices including mis-selling, deceitful promotion, 
advertisement and complex pricing strategies that compromise the interest of consumers and 
competition. As a result, ordinary consumers’ decision-making in the market is a difficult task 
that calls their rationality into question, as it does not often lead to their best interest (North, 
1993; Menard and Shirley, 2005). This is further compounded by the low literacy level 
prevalent in a developing country like Nigeria. Consequently, consumers are unable to derive 
the full benefit of the liberalised telecoms market; they are also exposed to financial and 
emotional harm including confusion and frustration.  
Addressing the challenges consumers encounter in the liberalised telecoms market place 
through regulatory initiative or intervention is crucial for the protection of consumer interest. 
The next chapter explores the role of consumer representation in influencing the regulatory 
decision process in the pursuit of consumer interests.  
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CHAPTER 4 Representing the Ordinary Consumer: Trends in institutional 
arrangements and processes 
4.1 Introduction  
The structure of the liberalised telecommunication market is characterised by competition in 
markets regulated by agencies independent from government. This structure makes it expedient 
for the regulator and services providers to engage with the ordinary consumers frequently. The 
nature of these engagements is usually defined by the Communications Act and regulation. 
However, due to consumer heterogeneity, different institutional arrangements have been 
deployed in various countries to achieve effective engagement of the ordinary consumer.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the current trend in ordinary consumer representation and 
complaints management. These issues, in the Nigerian context, are the focus of the empirical 
Chapters 6 and 7 of this study. The chapter starts by discussing the inevitable need for regulation 
in liberalised competitive markets. It asserts that the ultimate goal of regulation is the attainment 
of policy objectives, which include the promotion of consumer interest. It reviews and affirms 
the crucial role of consumer representation bodies in facilitating consumers’ influential 
participation in the regulatory process, which also tend towards the achievement of policy 
objectives. In assessing the current trend in institutional arrangements for consumer 
representation and the dimensions of consumer representation, the chapter argues that the 
effectiveness of the various options depends on the prevailing socio-political environment and 
advocates a mixed approach for developing countries. Finally, the chapter looked at consumer 
complaints management processes, which are, at the same time, a potential cause of consumer 
complaints and an important dimension of consumer representation.  
The considerations in this chapter will form part of the benchmark to be used in the empirical 
chapters 6 and 7of this study in evaluating the representation of the ordinary consumer and the 
management of ordinary consumer complaints respectively. 
4.2 The Role of Regulation: Achieving Policy Objective 
 Prior to the telecommunications reform, in most countries, State ownership, as prevalent then 
in developing countries, for example, Nigeria and monopoly by powerful investors, for 
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example, AT&T in the United States of America, determined the structure of the sector and 
safeguarded public and consumer interests (Majone, 1990). However, in the last two decades 
of telecommunications liberalisation the sector has witnessed two major structural changes. The 
first major change was the transformation of the traditional “monopoly structures into 
competitive ones” with multiple networks and service providers deploying various technologies 
(Blackman and Srivastava, 2011:3). On the consumer level, the rapid changes in technologies 
(like GSM and WiMAX/Wi-Fi) and subsequent innovations have resulted in astronomical 
increase in global access not only to basic mobile telephone but also to the internet and growing 
adoption of broadband. The impact of these developments on the ordinary consumer is 
discussed in Chapters 3. As these developments unfold, they raise new concerns about 
consumer interest, protection and privacy; pricing, content and copyrights issues; market entry 
requirement, spectrum utilisation, mergers, anti-trust competition and security. These concerns 
create the need for institutions that are adequately empowered to regulate the activity of the 
sector and to ensure that the new telecoms landscape is working properly and that the ordinary 
consumers and other stakeholders’ interests are catered for equitably (Blackman and Srivastava, 
2011). Governments’ reaction to the above situation has engendered the second major fallout 
of the liberalisation of the telecoms sector: the transition from the traditional mode of regulation 
via public ownership and government intervention to “statutory regulation administered by 
expert agencies which are in theory independent of direct political control” (Majone, 2003:2). 
Hence, the new telecommunications industry structure is characterised by competition in 
liberalised markets regulated by agencies independent from government.  
To regulate   is to lay down rules aimed at directing the activities of private and public 
enterprises. It is the use of legal instruments for the achievement of socio-economic policy 
objectives (Majone, 2003; Hertog, 2010).  In addition, Blackman and Srivastava (2011:30) 
affirm that: “regulation attempts to prevent socially undesirable outcomes and to direct market 
activity towards desirable outcomes” by intervening to remedy shortfalls in competition and 
ensuring compliance by enforcing the rules of the game. This is because in the absence of 
effective regulation, anti-competitive tactics will abound.  Hence, as depicted in Table 7, the 
goals of regulation stated in the ICT Regulation Toolkit, cited in (Blackman and Srivastava, 
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2011:10) are, and that businesses are directed towards achieving those outcomes through 
regulatory intervention. 
- To promote and protect consumer interest by facilitating universal, affordable and 
innovative telecommunications services.  
- To mitigate the challenges and harm consumers encounter in the market.  
- To further and sustain competition by tackling anti-competition practices and through 
the control and management of scarce resources (for example spectrum) in a non-
discriminating manner. 
- To increase access to technology/services.  
TABLE 7.  GOALS OF REGULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ITU-ICT Regulation Toolkit, (2010) cited in Blackman and Srivastava (2011:10)  
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in conditions of perfect 
competition there is no need for regulation [ITU, 2009]. However, in practice regulation is 
always needed because competition is present only to a limited degree due to ‘economies of 
scale’ 7  and ‘market failure’ 8  (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Moreover, even under perfect 
                                                 
7 Economy of scale gives rise to natural monopoly, which occurs when one service provider most cheaply served 
the (Baldwin and Cave, 2012). 
8 Market failure can serve to justify the rationale for regulating such as provision of asymmetrical information to 
the consumers, which affect their switching service providers or natural monopoly that hinders competition in 
the market. 
Why regulate? 
(Regulation not being an end) 
itself) 
To avoid 
market 
failure 
To foster 
effective 
competition
 
  
To protect 
consumer 
interests 
To increase access 
to technology and 
services 
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competition there may be need for ex-post regulation if only to set technical standards and 
address infringements in the ever changing telecoms market landscape. It is therefore implied 
that regulation is always necessary to sustain competition at a high level and thereby improve 
market efficiency (Gaffikin, 2005; Michalis, 2007). Markets are not judged efficient based on 
the quantum of transactions (volume of sales); rather markets are efficient to the extent to which 
they tend towards the pre-set objectives of the stakeholders who set up the market. Hence, the 
fundamental justification for regulation is to ensure that the market is moving towards the 
achievement of policy objectives. 
An effective regulatory framework facilitates higher telecommunications penetration, 
improved quality and innovative services, lower prices for the ordinary consumer and economic 
growth (Blackman and Srivastava, 2011). Optimum regulation exists where the regulator, 
consumers and operators are adequately informed and the regulator acts in the public interest 
and protection of the consumers. In practice, however, consumers are often disadvantaged and 
unable to seize the benefits made possible by effective competition as a result of “information 
asymmetries, unfair trade practices, unfair standard contract terms, search and switching costs 
or imperfect decision-making processes” (Cseres, 2008: 78). In this regard, both the developed 
and developing countries face similar policy and regulatory issues. The difference lies in the 
circumstances some of which are unique to the developing countries (Melody, 1997), for 
example, inadequately resourced consumer groups, low level consumer education/awareness 
and a non-transparent socio-political environment. In spite of the varying circumstances, these 
issues, which have socio-economic dimensions, highlight the need for regulatory intervention. 
4.3 Rationale for Consumer Representation: Complementary efforts towards the 
achievement of policy objectives 
As the issue of the promotion of the interest of consumers is receiving increasing attention 
globally due to governments’ concern that market forces alone may not achieve policy goals 
particularly about the promotion of consumer interest and welfare, the need for a strong 
consumer voice is also being highlighted (DTI, 2004) as a means of achieving inclusiveness.  
It can be argued that as a matter of ‘natural justice’ and in line with democratic principles, it is 
fitting that consumers should have input into decisions that affect their welfare. This is because 
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effective development and implementation of policies and strategies are “the outcome of 
bargaining within and in between mutually dependent organisations” (Hulsink, 1999: 22; 
North, 1993). However, because of the diverse nature of consumers, direct involvement of 
individual consumers in the decision making process is not feasible. To achieve influential 
consumer participation necessarily involves consumer representation (Cannock, 2002). 
Representation is an established mechanism for enlisting the participation of a discrete and 
diverse population and in telecommunication, the one avenue through which consumers may 
participate in the decision-making process and hold regulators and service providers 
accountable for exercising their mandate with fairness. It is only well resourced consumer 
representative bodies that will have the capacity to contribute in the decision making process 
and effectively pursue the interest of the consumer (Simmonds, 2003; ITU, 2006).  This in turn 
presupposes an active and vibrant civil society to form the enabling social setting. For example, 
the prevailing social environment in Nigeria, which lacks these basic requirements as was 
highlighted in Chapter 3, portends grave implication for consumer representation. Consumer 
representation has as its main objective the provision of a wide range of views to decision 
makers from across the spectrum of consumers in support of the interest of consumers. On their 
own, consumers’ voices are weak due to their limited knowledge and resources and disparate 
nature. Consumer representation bodies collect and amplify the discrete and therefore naturally 
weak voice of the ordinary consumer, so that it is heard loud and clear in the decision making 
process to balance the strong voice of the services providers in the telecommunications market. 
This guarantees that the regulators decisions will be “more robust and more likely to be 
accepted by all stakeholders” (CCAAC, 2005: ix; BIS, 2011). 
The restructuring of the telecommunications market and the rapid deployment of innovative 
services and products have resulted in enormous challenges for both the operator and the 
consumer (EU, 2007) and is stretching the consumer’s limited capacity to deal with 
contemporary economic problems. There is abundant evidence in literature that consumers in 
general inclusive of the disadvantaged and vulnerable are not always able to make the right 
choices (BIS, 2011; Muzzini, 2005; Xavier, 2008). This situation, which grows in direct 
proportion to the complexities of telecommunications services on offer, reinforces the necessity 
of a consumer representative body. Even the industry, its more robust capacity notwithstanding, 
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still: “lobbies the regulators hard in pursuit of their interest. That is to be expected but it should 
be balanced by proper and full representation of consumers” to achieve balance of interest (DTI, 
2000: para.7.5.3 cited in Harker, Mathieu & Price, 2006: 218).  
Promoting consumers interest implies taking consumer issues into policy and regulatory 
decisions. However: “without independent well informed and properly resourced consumer 
input into complex regulatory policy and decision making, regulators will find it difficult to 
achieve this in the face of vigorous and well-resourced industry representations” (Consumer 
focus, 2011: 3). Moreover, designing a policy framework that will adequately provide for the 
interest of consumers requires that the real interest of consumers is properly articulated and 
understood. The consumer representation body, by virtue of being close to the consumer and 
able to feel the pulse of the consumer, is in a better position to understand the interest of the 
consumer and focus more on promoting it than the regulator who is separated from the 
consumer by official barriers and other duties. Therefore, although it is part of the mandate of 
the regulators to anticipate and protect the interest of the consumer, anticipating the interest of 
the consumer is a task that is best handled by a dedicated consumer body who understands the 
consumer and who can persuasively present the consumer’s views to balance the views of the 
services providers. 
Many developed countries, for example USA, UK and Australia, have highly advanced 
regulatory frameworks and considerable experience in consumer affairs. In the UK for instance, 
its specialist consumer organisation, like the Advisory Committees on Telecommunications 
(ACT), established during the privatisation of the utility sectors, has well over 35 years’ 
experience in representing and promoting the consumer interest. In addition, in the EU there is 
in every member state at least one ministerial department responsible for consumer protection 
(Harker, Mathieu and Price, 2006). In these countries the governments and regulators “find it 
easier to notice and respond to the interest of highly organised interest groups rather than those 
which are diverse and disparate and this may well be the justification for government 
intervention in the form of statutory bodies charged with representing such consumer interest” 
(Howell, 2000:298 cited in Harker, Mathieu and Price, 2006:219). This strategy is also 
noticeable in Africa. For instance, the Kenya Consumer Protection Bill, (2011), provides that: 
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“An accredited consumer interest group may direct a general stated concern or 
complaint to the advisory committee in respect of any matter within the purpose 
of this Act” (KCC, 2011: 66(b)). 
This confirms government and regulators’ preference dealing with organised consumer interest 
groups and that a separate consumer ‘voice’ was compatible with regulation and could engender 
useful cooperation (Harker, Mathieu and Price, 2006). It is also a confirmation of the consumer 
representative groups’ invaluable role in the promotion of consumers’ interest and welfare.  
Consumer representative body play a complementary role to the regulatory body in assuaging 
the negative effect of unchecked market force on the realisation of policy objectives as it relates 
to the promotion and protection of consumer interest. Moreover, the inclusion of consumers 
requires a vibrant and knowledgeable consumer representative body to engage formally with 
the regulator and to advocate for consumers’ interests. The implication is that without a well-
resourced consumer body the promotion and protection of consumer interest will be jeopardised 
and regulatory performance will fall far short of achieving the policy objectives. This, it would 
appear is a major factor in the Nigerian setting. 
4.4 Institutional Requirements for Promoting Consumers Interest 
In a liberalised telecommunications industry where the essence of regulation is the protection 
of citizens and consumers, the primary duty of the regulator is to proactively promote and 
protect the interest of consumers. The extent to which the regulator is able to execute this 
mandate depends proportionately on two factors: independence of the regulator and an effective 
institutional framework for consumer representation (Muzzini, 2005; CI, 2011). The structural 
and financial independence of the regulator has significant impact on the regulators 
accountability, transparency and predictability and subsequently on consumer outcomes 
(Blackman and Srivastava, 2011). The susceptibility of the Nigerian regulatory framework to 
political influence was discussed in Chapter 3.  Its implication on the procedural definition of 
consumer interest will be discussed in chapter 5.    
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4.4.1 Institutional Framework for Consumer Representation: Conflict of interest is a 
major threat 
In recent times, a growing number of civil society groups, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and consumer associations have had cause to make input and intervene in consumer 
related issues that it has become necessary to distinguish between these groups by defining 
what constitutes a consumer representation group. For the purpose of this study and in the 
context of authentic promotion and protection of consumer interest, I adopt the definition set 
down by the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (CCAAC), which states that 
a group qualifies as a consumer body if: 
- “The group’s main objective is to genuinely advance the interest of consumers; Is 
independent of industry and government in its decision making; Due to its activities, 
membership and other relevant factors is publicly recognised as playing a legitimate 
role in advancing the interest of the consumer and; It is registered under the relevant 
corporation law” (CCAAC, 2005:6).  
This classification is important for consumers because it is only authentic (responsible and 
without a hidden agenda) consumer agencies that can distil their interest and pursue it with 
vigour.  
The institutional framework is a key determinant of the effectiveness of consumer 
representation. Consumer representation agencies are broadly classified as statutory and non-
statutory agencies, as depicted in Figure 4. Statutory consumer representation structures 
comprise the integrated model and independent model. The integrated model includes in-house 
consumer department in the regulator’s office and regulatory board membership, while the 
independent model comprises the external advisory agencies and consumer councils 
(Southwood, 2006; Simmonds, 2003). Non-statutory agencies are made up of Civil Society 
Groups (CSG) and non-governmental organisations (NGO). Many countries have a 
combination of both types, with varying degrees of influence.  
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FIGURE 4.  CONSUMER REPRESENTATION FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: Author  
These different types of consumer representation framework will be examined in turn in the 
following sections to highlight their strengths and weaknesses. 
4.4.2 In-house Consumer Affairs Bureau 
 Many regulatory agencies establish a department or section within the regulator’s 
establishment, which looks after consumer interest. These bureaus also serve as interface 
between consumer groups and the regulator. The in-house bureaus benefit from direct access 
to consumer information and are able to advocate on behalf of the consumer on a continuous 
basis. Although the in-house consumer department can make useful input on behalf of 
consumers to influence decisions, they lack the power to challenge regulatory decisions. In-
house consumer representation is a viable option in countries with little history of civil society 
action, like Nigeria, but in playing the double role of regulator and advocate there could arise, 
not only, conflicts of interest but also the risk of capture by the more powerful service providers 
(CI, 2011).  
In 2001, the Nigerian regulator (Commission) established an in-house Consumer Affairs 
Bureau (CAB) a department of the Commission, barely one month after the GSM licensing 
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auction that ushered in the second-generation GSM service providers. CAB is staffed by regular 
employees in Commission and headed by an executive director who is also an employee of the 
Commission.  The CAB is charged with what the Commission termed the ‘PIE’ mandate, which 
is to: 
• Protect consumer against unfair practices, 
• Inform the consumer through multi-channel means of communication and advocacy, 
and 
• Empower the consumer by educating on rights and obligations. 
The main activities of CAB are the organising of consumer outreach programmes and the 
monitoring of service providers’ customer contact centres. The personnel of CAB being regular 
employees of the Commission carry out only the duties assigned to them. They do not have the 
capacity to challenge the decision of the Commission. Apart from being individually 
susceptible to conflict of interest and subsequent capture by the services providers, the 
department CAB is also at risk of capture by the industry.  
4.4.3 Consumer representative as member of regulatory board 
This structure is adopted in some African countries including Ghana, Burundi, Senegal and 
Kenya, and Papua New Guinea and Latin America. The ITU asserts, “Membership on 
regulatory board is not inconsistent with independence if there is full access to information and 
no duty of confidentiality about matters discussed” (Southwood, 2006:19). The main advantage 
of this model is that the consumer input is fed directly into the decision-making process. It gives 
the consumer representative access to information on services providers which can be used to 
push the consumer case. This structure is effective when the consumer board member is a 
committed pro-consumer advocate and has the authority to 1) initiate independent research so 
a well-resourced regulator is important and 2) consult with consumer advocacy groups and able 
to make independent input into the board’s decisions. Otherwise, the scheme will be equivalent 
to admitting an in-house consumer department into the boardroom. The big challenge of this 
arrangement is that it is also prone to conflict of interest, where the consumer representative 
board member is torn between serving two masters: the regulator and the consumer. Further 
difficulty may arise from the method of appointing the consumer representative board member. 
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She/he may be loyal to the appointing body, which usually is the case rather than the consumer. 
In either case, the interest of the consumer will be marginalised. This structure is also highly 
susceptible to capture by the industry (Muzzini, 2005). 
 In considering the merits of the two institutional frameworks discussed above, it has been 
stated that the framework that integrates the job of protecting the consumer and regulating the 
industry would benefit from “stronger public support” and “deliver significant synergies and 
economy of scale” (Muzzini, 2005:9.) Opposed to this view are those who hold that for 
consumer advocates, a separate voice distinct from the regulatory agency will be more focused 
in representing the consumer because the regulator’s attention may be diverted by other 
statutory duties (DTI, 2004).  In support of this view the Consumer International9 (CI) cautions, 
“entrusting one entity with the dual mandate could cause confusion and possible conflict of 
interest” (CI, 2011:20) and further argues that it is expedient to ensure the integrity and 
independence of the consumer protection agency. This view is generally accepted in the EU. 
Although the above two frameworks are adopted in a number of countries like Ghana and India, 
the review of literature did not reveal any particular success story. It would appear that their 
effectiveness is largely influenced by the broader regulatory environment and socio-political 
characteristics of the country concerned for instance, the presence of an active and vibrant civil 
society. 
In the appointment of consumer representative to the board of the regulatory body or the 
advisory council, it is of utmost importance the consumer representative is independent of the 
government and the industry. This can be achieved if the appointment is based on merit through 
an open and transparent process. This is critical for consumer confidence and for elimination 
of the threat of conflict of interest. Basing the appointment on merit guarantees that the 
consumer representative has expert knowledge of consumer affairs and a strong link with active 
consumer groups. It is also important that the consumer representative have the authority for 
                                                 
9 Consumer International (CI) is the world federation of 220 consumer groups that serve as an independent and 
authoritative global voice for consumers. It is based in the United Kingdom (UK). 
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independent consultation and research in order to effectively represent diverse consumer 
groups, (CCAAC, 2005). 
4.4.4 Independent Consumer Council and Advisory Body 
In the EU and in particular in the UK statutory sector specific consumer councils, after 
undergoing a number of reforms, have proved very successful in championing the consumer 
interest (e.g. Energy Watch, Communication consumer panel). They benefit from a long 
tradition of effective civil society organisation. The councils are independent and wield a wide 
range of statutory powers that enable the challenge of regulatory decisions. Through research 
and consultation, the councils endeavour to influence regulation and policy and to promote 
consumer interest effectively in close collaboration with the regulator and other general 
consumer agencies. 
In Nigeria, the eighteen-member Industry Consumer Advisory Forum (ICAF) is appointed by 
the Executive Vice Chairman of the Nigeria Communications Commission (Commission): 
three members (16%) from consumer/NGO bodies; two members (11%) from telecoms 
industry associations; nine members (50%) from professional bodies; and four members (23%) 
from governmental organisations. It would appear that very few slots are allotted to consumer 
bodies. The implication is that they will be easily be overshadowed by members of the forum. 
They are also susceptible to the influence of the regulator who appointed them. The 
effectiveness of ICAF is limited because it has no statutory powers to challenge regulatory 
decisions. 
ICAF is mandated to hold at least one meeting per every quarter of the year, one of which shall 
be an open forum. The meetings are coordinated by the in-house Consumer Affairs Bureau 
(CAB) and all activities of the Forum are funded by the Commission. 
The Kenya model is notably different from the Nigeria model particularly in the appointment 
of the members of the Advisory Committee. In Kenya the Consumers Protection Advisory 
Committee has four (31%) of its members nominated by the consumer representation groups, 
three (23%) from professional associations and one member from civil society organisation. 
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The input from these members, from accredited consumer representation groups, has had 
significant impact on policy and regulation (KCC, 2011).  
4.4.5 Non - statutory Consumer Bodies 
Consumer interest is also being promoted by public interest groups and NGOs. These consumer 
interest groups, however, are usually non-sector specific. Their activities are more noticeable 
in goods rather than in services. Of the over 120 consumer groups in Africa, only few are 
involved in telecoms issues. These are found in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal and South 
Africa, (Southwood, 2006). Non-statutory consumer agencies are active in many developed 
countries of the EU, USA and Australia complementing the activities of the statutory agencies 
like Ofcom, FCC and ACCA. In these developed countries, consumer bodies have the 
opportunity to actively participate and make significant input to policy issues. In the UK is 
found the best international practice in the collaboration of statutory consumer agencies with 
non – statutory consumer agencies to deliver excellent consumer protection. In Belgium, 
Austria and Denmark, some non – statutory consumer organisations are incorporated within the 
regulatory system and are active in market monitoring and other consumer related activities 
(Harker, Mathieu and Price, 2006:221). 
Non-Statutory consumer bodies by virtue of their diverse structure and special areas of interest 
are well suited to pursue the interest of particular groups of consumers: the poor, the elderly, 
the geographically marginalised and other disadvantaged groups. Having no statutory mandate 
to challenge regulatory decisions they rely mainly on making representations and submissions 
at public forum and lobbying the regulators and legislators. They occasionally resort to legal 
action to protect the interest of aggrieved consumers by providing evidence of infringement, 
negotiating redress and generally being there for and on behalf of the consumers. For example, 
in Nigeria, two consumer bodies – Consumer Empowerment Organisation of Nigeria (CEON) 
and United Consumer Association of Nigeria (UCAN) in January 2014 resorted to legal action 
to obtain compensation for telecom consumers for poor quality of service. After the initial 
report of this move by these consumer bodies, nothing else has been reported on the progress 
or outcome of the litigations. There is no evidence of any other action in telecommunications 
by any other consumer body. Consumerism in Nigeria is discussed in chapter 3 of this study. 
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TABLE 8.  MECHANISMS FOR CONSUMER REPRESENTATION: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Pros Cons 
In-house Consumer Bureau  
-Easy access to reliable consumer 
information on the regulatory process that 
can be used to inform the representative 
function. 
 
-Inability to challenge regulatory decisions 
due to lack of independence from the 
regulatory agency itself; 
-Risk of capture by powerful interest groups. 
Representative as Member of Regulatory 
Board 
-Powerful channel of information for 
consumer groups (if there is no duty of 
confidentiality). 
-Inadequacy of representation if 
representative is captured by special interest 
groups and/or they are not fully accountable 
to the consumer constituency; 
-Conflicting interests within the regulatory 
body may result in stalemate of the 
regulatory process. 
Consumer Panel/Advisory Committee 
-Provides independent and expert advice; 
-Repeated interaction with regulator makes 
for deep understanding of complex sector 
issues; 
-Possibility of sharing sensitive data with 
panel than external group; 
 
-There may be difficulty recruiting non-
remunerated panel, require secretarial 
resources; 
-Inadequacy of representation if the advisory 
body is captured by the most influential 
consumer groups; 
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-Capacity to challenge regulatory decisions 
due to the body’s independence from the 
regulatory agency itself. 
 
-Panel may not be truly representative in its 
make-up of consumer population. 
 
Non statutory Consumer Bodies 
-Consumer bodies have developed and 
coherent policy stance; 
-Often proactively engage regulator on issue 
important to them; 
-Sometimes conduct their own research at no 
cost to regulator; 
-They provide access to consumers and assist 
in market research. 
 
-Consumer bodies may not have adequate 
policy resource and expertise; 
-Require regulators support e.g. specialist 
staff and free resource such as seconded 
staff; 
-Any data provided is likely to be skewed to 
bodies client base rather than consumer 
population as a whole; 
-Inviting consumer groups to roundtables is 
resource intensive for such bodies. 
Source: Adapted from Muzzini (2005:10) and Coppack, Jacson & Tallack (2014) 
Consumerism in the EU, USA and Australia have a long history, unlike in Africa where most 
consumer bodies are relatively young, having been established in the 1980s. However, in the 
last couple of decades there has been a significant growth in the number of consumer 
associations in Africa. ITU reports that by 2000 there were 120 consumer groups in 45 out of 
53 countries in Africa. Most of these consumer groups do not benefit from public funding and 
consequently are characterised by poor staffing (in numbers and expertise), inadequate 
resources and uncoordinated activities. They are further disadvantaged by not being taken into 
reckoning by their national regulatory agencies, neither are they consulted nor informed of the 
regulators’ decisions. This is because they are perceived not to have any significant level of 
expertise in any specific sector. Their voices are heard mainly in minor consumer complaints 
issues. It is only in five African countries – Senegal, Kenya, Botswana, South Africa and 
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Nigeria – that consumer bodies are involved in consultation on policy issues. Even in these 
countries, Southwood, (2006) remarks that it is not evident that their input has any impact on 
policy or regulation. 
From the review of literature, it would appear that the various options for consumer 
representation that has been implemented in different countries in spite of their merits and 
shortcomings have achieved reasonable degree of success. The level of success achieved is 
largely influenced by the broader regulatory environment and socio-political characteristics of 
the country concerned for instance, the presence of an active and vibrant civil society and the 
level of transparency in the regulatory framework. In this regards, it has been suggested that 
greater benefits could be derived by adopting an inclusive framework for consumer 
representation by combining the statutory and non-statutory models, as in the UK, “while 
ensuring that the weaknesses of each of these forms of engagement do not distort the decision 
making process” (Coppack, Jacson & Tallack, 2014:15). This arrangement may be of great 
benefit to Nigeria and other developing countries with little history of civil society/advocacy 
groups. 
4.5. Process of Representation 
In carrying out their mandate to protect the interest of consumers, regulators and consumer 
advocacy groups seek to engage consumers in three main areas: provision of information, 
consultation and compliant resolution (Muzzini, 2005). The ITU (2006) extends the coverage 
to include provision of choice and efficient framework for consumer representation. Often 
consumers are engaged simultaneously in more than one area, in the effort to achieve maximum 
encounter with the consumer. In all these five areas (summarise them in brackets, as they are 
not clearly numbered) the consumer representation agencies working in close collaboration 
with the regulator can reach out to various consumer groups particularly the disadvantaged. 
4.5.1 Provision of Choice 
The regulator is obliged to provide the consumer with multiple affordable choices to cater for 
the diversity of consumer needs. This is achieved through the mechanism of pro-competition 
laws and regulations that prevent market dominance and anti-competitive practices. Engaging 
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consumers may also be facilitated through research and workshops to find out what the 
consumers really need. Along with the provision of choices, the consumer agencies are obliged 
to make consumers aware that their choices are not static but should be reviewed to take 
advantage of improvement in service quality and tariff structure. 
4.5.2 Provision of Information  
Providing consumers with the relevant information they require in order to make informed 
choices is a critical and invaluable service to consumers. Without information, consumers 
cannot implement their preferences neither can they effectively contribute to the decision-
making process. The market is unlikely to function efficiently if a major player - the consumer- 
is unaware or ill-informed about the benefits to be derived and the role he is expected to play. 
Hence “understanding the information needs of the consumer is an essential part of making the 
market work” (Tambini, 2012:12). For instance, providing the consumer with independently 
verified networks’ comparable performance statistics and tariff structure of various providers 
will enable the consumer to choose and switch service providers. Other relevant information 
required by consumers includes consumer rights as usually provided in consumer codes and 
complaint resolution procedures. In Nigeria, and other developing countries, a significant 
volume of information for consumers comes from the network and services providers, in form 
of articles and promotional advertisements in the print and electronic media. This type of 
information is advertisement and therefore it offers little or no information to empower the 
consumer and facilitate informed choices is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
4.5.3 Improving Awareness 
Consumer awareness is defined, as “consumer’s understanding of the role of the regulating 
entity as well as their rights and obligations under the regulatory regime” (Muzzini, 2005:16). 
The researcher thinks there is need to expand this definition of consumer awareness to include 
understanding of consumer role vis-à-vis the role and obligations of the telecoms service 
providers. This knowledge about the goings-on in the telecoms market is the key to prompting 
consumers to exercise their right to choose and switch providers; right to complain and seek 
redress; right to participate and influence policy and right to be informed. Hence, the level of 
151 
 
awareness of consumers determines the extent the consumer is willing and able to work in 
partnership with the regulator and service providers to prevent market failures.  
Raising the awareness of consumers requires strategies designed to target the various groups of 
consumers including the poor and the disadvantaged consumers for example those with little 
education and the rural dwellers. The methods include but are not limited to public forums, 
consultation, workshops, consumer research and interactive sessions like the Nigerian 
acclaimed Telecommunication Consumer Parliament – an interactive complaint resolution 
forum, which is part of the Commissions outreach programme (see chapter 6). The transparent 
complaint resolution procedure and feedback into the regulatory process is a very effective way 
to raise consumer awareness because it exposes the extent and limit of the rights of both the 
consumer and service providers. Regulatory bodies in developed countries make extensive use 
of their web sites to reach out to consumers. This medium is popular with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the USA regulator, UK’s OFCOM and Hong Kong’s 
OFTA. In Africa, town hall forums are more suited to the resources and literacy level of 
consumers in the rural areas. The television and radio are also more accessible and hence 
popular than the internet and are useful in raising consumers’ awareness Furthermore these 
media have good impact on less literate consumers. 
4.6. Regional Organisations and Consumer Protection: Reinforcing consumer protection 
In 2005, the ITU conducted a survey of 132 member countries, and the findings revealed that:  
55, mostly transition and developing countries, (41%) have no consumer protection 
regulation/legislation; about half of the countries in the Americas (13 out of 27) and in the Asia 
Pacific region (12 out of 22) have no consumer legislation (Southwood, 2006). Since then, a 
growing number of countries in Africa have been establishing consumer protection legislation 
and by 2009, 13 countries in Africa have developed specific regulation/legislation in telecoms 
(Stevens, 2009).  
 The telecommunications regulators of most countries in West Africa, with the exception of 
Equatorial Guinea, have direct responsibilities for the protection of consumer rights. In 2008, 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) integrated consumer rights, at 
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its regional level with a regulation named - the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 
(ECOWA, 2008). So far, ECOWAS has enacted competition law, which by itself is considered 
insufficient for consumer protection, notwithstanding ECOWAS still encourages her 16 
member states to set up similar laws with redress mechanisms to check anti-competitive 
practices of operators and to protect their consumers. ECOWAS works, hand in hand, with the 
West African Telecommunications Regulators Assembly, (WATRA) for the regionalisation of 
consumer polices and regulation. Nigeria is a member of both organisations. 
Similarly, according to Southwood (2006), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) has operational regional competition law that covers the interest and welfare 
of consumers. Some of the COMESA 19 member countries, example Kenya and Malawi, have 
established their competition laws with strong public interest and consumer protection bills. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) through its Telecommunications 
Regulatory Association of South Africa (TRASA) also creates regional integration in the 
telecommunications area. In 2004, TRASA released her guidelines, on consumer protection, to 
her members. Some of the TRASA members including Botswana and South Africa also have 
competition Acts with strong public interest and consumer protection. However, even in some 
of these countries, the consumer laws may not be operative or are yet to be tested out for several 
reasons, including scant resources, weak legal systems, social and environmental 
circumstances. 
The most important and noticeable factor in all this is the absence of a well-defined and 
resourced consumer representation mechanism to initiate and drive the process. In line with 
this, Southwood (2006:10) says, “unlike the European Union, none of these regional bodies has 
in place the means for enforcing community-wide standards or indeed mounting an individual 
challenge to a country on an issue”. The OECD, the EU and in particular the United Kingdom, 
have robust competition laws and consumer policies. Strong judiciary backs these, well-
resourced and active statutory and non-statutory consumer representation bodies to protect the 
interest of citizens and consumers, on national and regional levels. The advantage of 
harmonisation of policies and regional integration is best observed in the EU where regulatory 
resources are pooled to the benefit of less resourced countries. The situation is different in 
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developing countries particularly in Africa, where regional development and implementation 
of competition laws and consumer protection policies are yet in their infancy. The foundation 
however has been laid. These regional bodies will eventually develop the expertise and 
wherewithal to impose the rules that will engender efficient consumer representation in their 
regions. 
4.7 Ordinary Consumer Complaint Management: A potential cause of complaints 
In many countries, the telecommunications sector records the highest number on complaints 
when compared to other sectors (Cannock, 2002). Consequently, every telecommunications 
authority has its fair share of different types of consumer complaints that have a bearing on the 
authority’s consumer protection framework. The ITU confirms that: “consumer complaints 
have an important role to play in regulation as they provide a useful barometer on consumer 
detriment and unfair practice” (Stevens, 2009:16).  
The ITU lays prominence to complaint handling, categorically stating that: “access to a fair and 
transparent complaint process is an essential part of an effective consumer protection 
framework” (ITU, 2013:15). Hence, complaints filing and resolution procedure is usually listed 
in the consumer codes of practice. Most telecommunications regulatory frameworks include 
some requirement for operators to establish and publish procedures to handle complaints.  
Regulators, sometimes, prescribe the minimum requirements for consumer complaints handling 
which may include, but not limited to, the establishment of a mechanism that enables consumers 
to track, in real time, the status of their complaint and the time limits, for processing of 
consumer complaints. 
A common approach of regulators for complaint handling is to impose the responsibility of 
resolving the complaint on both the service operator and the consumer. The parties can seek 
regulatory intervention, only after they have exhausted all possible options to resolve the 
complaint without success (Cannock, 2002). In Nigeria, the telecoms regulator, enjoins 
consumers to first initiate formal complaints with their service providers and wait for the 
providers to exhaust all possible means of resolving the complaints, before presenting the 
complaints to the Commission for redress. On the other hand, the Federal Communication 
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Commission (FCC), the US telecommunications regulator employs a different strategic dispute 
resolution. The FCC operates an informal process, which allows the consumer to report the 
complaint informally to the FCC. In follow up, the FCC, requests the service providers for 
written response. The FCC reviews this response to verify that the service provider does not 
breach FCC laws before taking decisions on appropriate actions, sanctions and compensations 
to resolve the complaint (Bruce & Macmillan, 2004).  It is notable that the licenses issued to 
the South African mobile services providers require them to develop, publish and enforce 
guidelines that prepare and motivate their personnel to handle consumer complaints. 
Furthermore, each consumer is to receive a copy of the guidelines when signing onto services 
while the service providers are mandated to provide biannual complaints statistics, to the post 
master general (Bruce & Macmillan, 2004).  
Imposing consumer code of conducts on telecommunications operators does not guarantee that 
consumers’ complaints will be resolved, not only because of the difficulties associated with 
enforcing the code but also because consumer codes usually designate the regulator as the last 
‘port of call’, after all other avenues for resolution have been exhausted. In spite of whatever 
merits it may have, it “limits the effectiveness of any code of conduct as it ‘raises the bar’ in 
terms of the resources and capacity required by the individual complainant” (Southwood, 
2006:11). 
4.7.1. Dispute Resolution: Needs strong Judiciary for protection of the ordinary 
consumer  
Resolving consumer complaints and disputes arising with service providers in a timely manner 
is another important aspect of the fulfilment of the mandate to promote consumer protection 
(ITU, 2013). It has been highlighted in previous section that consumer complaints serve useful 
purpose for regulators to identify areas of concerns and gaps in existing legislation/regulation 
that may require regulatory intervention. This implies that dispute resolution can be viewed as 
central to consumer protection. Consequently, the mechanisms regulators put in place to 
achieve consumer redress can be used to assess the level of regulatory commitment to her 
consumer policy objectives (CI, 2011). 
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In line with this, Southwood (2006:9) asserts, “there are four elements that safeguard consumer 
rights in the telecommunication/ICT sector: consumer rights law, competition law, telecoms 
and internet law, and self-regulatory frameworks”. Telecoms law usually enables the setting up 
of a separate regulatory authority and self-regulatory frameworks within the industry. The 
consumer rights law or consumer protection bill and competition law are the products of 
legislation and regulation while self-regulation can either be part of the licence conditions for 
an operator or are self-imposed. Without these four elements, dealing with consumer 
complaints or disputes with operators would have no legal basis and consumers would be left 
at the mercy of operators when they encounter any harm in the competitive market. However, 
it is necessary to add that these four elements are not sufficient, by themselves, to safeguard the 
rights of the consumer because there is always a difference between how things ought to work 
and how they actually work (Southwood, 2006). Without a strong judiciary, the commitment 
of an independent consumer representation body to champion the interests and welfare of the 
consumers, the transparency of the actors in observing set rules and the resolve of the regulator 
to enforce rules, dispute resolution and by implication consumer protection, will not yield the 
desired outcome for consumers. An example is the case in Nigeria cited in Section 4.3.5 above, 
in which legal action by two consumer bodies disappeared into thin air. 
4.7.2 Dispute Resolution Procedures 
Redress mechanisms are usually based on a country’s licensing regime, which may provide for 
regulatory enforcement with sanctions and Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR usually 
involves “recourse of the injured party against the responsible party in front of a tribunal” (CI, 
2011:17). Hence, when the operator fails to resolve the complaint, consumer and consumer 
representation bodies may have recourse to the three accessible options: mediation, arbitration 
and litigation. Mediation provides consumers with a viable alternative way to resolve consumer 
complaints. It involves negotiation and reconciliation without applying rules and setting up 
procedures that impose costs on the consumer. Mediation is a useful low cost but non-binding 
way of resolving consumer complaints with an operator. Its major shortcoming is “even if the 
consumer wins its case, a satisfactory outcome may still depend on the goodwill of the operator” 
(Stevens, 2009:17). Individual ordinary consumers are unlikely to proceed to litigation not only 
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because of the delay they may encounter but also more importantly because of the substantial 
cost (are usually high) usually associated with courts cases and the small value of the claims 
involved. According to Stevens (2009), arbitration is binding like litigation but involves a 
quicker procedure and it is regulator’s first choice of ADR. However, it presents daunting 
challenges for the consumer. Arbitration, apart from the cost implications, requires the 
consumers to present their evidence and state their cases – something that not all consumers 
may be able or willing to do.  
In some countries, depending on their national policies, certain types of consumer complaints 
may activate other governmental consumer protection agencies to intervene in the telecoms 
consumer complaint handling process. For instance, if the dispute concerns a matter under 
competition or consumer protection legislation, the agency responsible for the enforcement of 
such legislation may become directly involved at an early stage in the dispute.   
For example: “the Federal Privacy Commissioner of Canada held a number of hearings 
in 2002 on complaints he received about the misuse of personal information by telecoms 
service providers. In a number of cases, the Privacy Commissioner held that consumer 
complaints were well-founded, and he recommended measures that service providers 
should take to come into compliance with the Canadian Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Disclosure Act” (Bruce & Macmillan, 2004: 42).  
On the contrary, in Nigeria, the Communications Act (section 90) states: "Notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other written law” the Commission has exclusive powers with regards to all 
issues pertaining to telecommunication. Hence, intervention by any other agency is to no avail. 
In 2004, the Nigerian Communications Commission issued guidelines for arbitration in disputes 
involving small claims. The objective is to provide a forum for consumers to resolve disputes 
with their service provider in an inexpensive, fair, impartial and effective arbitration. The short 
form arbitration procedure is for claims not exceeding N 1,000,000 (GBP 3850) and which does 
not involve complicated issues of law. It also requires that the consumer has exhausted all 
dispute resolution procedures established by the service provider without resolution of the 
complaint. The guideline provides for a sixty days’ limit for the arbitration proceeding. The 
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Nigerian arbitration guidelines make no distinction between ordinary consumer and corporate 
consumers. The practical implication of this strategy is discussed in Chapter 7.  
In Saudi Arabia, the regulator, the Communication and Information Technology Commission 
(CITC), requires service providers to establish a separate division to handle consumer 
complaints and approves the procedures that are put in place. If the consumer and provider are 
unable to resolve their dispute amicably, the customer may refer the dispute to CITC in writing, 
for resolution. The CITC has a period of 10 days to consider the complaint and to dismiss it if 
it decides it is vexatious or frivolous (Stevens, 2009). If it decides the complaint merits 
investigation, a copy is sent to the service provider who has five days to respond, after which 
the complainant has a further five days in which to reply. The CITC then has a period of 30 
days to consider the complaint and reach its conclusions. During this time, the provider is not 
allowed to disconnect the customer’s service without the prior permission of the CITC. If the 
CITC concludes that the provider has breached the Telecommunications Act, it will refer the 
provider to the Violation Committee that can impose financial sanctions on the operator. The 
Committee may impose a penalty (subject to a minimum threshold) which it considers 
appropriate for the gravity of the violation (Stevens, 2009). 
EU member states are governed by a package of directives revised in 2009. The dispute 
resolution mechanism for consumers is highlighted in Article 34 of the EC Universal Service 
and User Rights Directive and Article 8 (4) of the Framework Directive which provide that: 
“transparent, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedure” must be available for reaching a 
broad range of consumer (i.e. non-business user) dispute” (Brisby, 2005:5).                 
The UK communications providers, subject to the terms of general authorisation implemented 
by the regulator OFCOM, are mandated to set up complaint handling and dispute resolution 
procedures. The procedures, as established by OFCOM, require that all communications 
providers that provide services to individual consumers and small businesses with not more 
than 10 employees must belong to one of the two OFCOM approved ADR schemes, the Office 
of the Telecoms Ombudsman (OTELO) and the Communications and Internet Services 
Adjudication Scheme (CISAS). Both OTELO and CISAS require that a complainant must first 
exhaust its communications provider’s internal dispute mechanism before turning to either of 
158 
 
the two disputes mechanism schemes. OTELO members include fixed telephony companies 
and two of the four mobile operators while CISAS members include ISP companies and two of 
the four major mobile operators. OTELO was established by industry working group, originally 
sponsored by the UK telecommunications regulator - Oftel and currently industry funded. For 
the OTELO scheme, the member companies do not have rights to appeal and have no veto over 
the ombudsman decisions while a complainant can take up the dispute with the court, if 
unsatisfied with the decision of the ombudsman. On the other hand, CISAS is run by the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Brisby, 2005). 
4.8. Conclusion  
This chapter in assessing the new telecommunications industry structure, which is characterised 
by competition in liberalised markets regulated by agencies independent from government, 
attributes the need for regulation to imperfect competition. The ultimate aim of regulation is 
the attainment of national telecommunication policy objectives, which includes the promotion 
and protection of interest of consumers. It is therefore expedient that regulators should facilitate 
effective consumer participation in the regulatory process, which will complement the 
regulatory effort towards engendering a competitive structure that leads to improved market 
efficiency while promoting the interest of consumers. However, the discrete and diverse nature 
of consumers pose a difficult challenge, but this researcher holds that that in itself underscores 
the critical role of consumer representation in regulatory decision-making.  
Effective representation of the ordinary consumers involves engaging the consumers through 
the mechanism of consultation and provision of information. Another important aspect of the 
fulfilment of the mandate to protect ordinary consumer interest involves maintaining an 
effective and timely mechanism for resolution of consumer complaints and disputes arising 
with the operators (ITU, 2013) because delay in the resolution of complaints lead to consumers’ 
frustration and dissatisfaction. One option, that proves to be both optimistic and viable 
particularly in the UK, is the use of ADR and Consumer Representation (CR) bodies to 
vigilantly oversee and ensure that consumer disputes are properly investigated and that 
adequate compensations are awarded to consumers. Consumer representation bodies, 
independent of government and regulators, are also useful in monitoring the regulator and 
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services providers with regard to how they discharge their duties towards consumer interest and 
protection and their license conditions respectively.  
To achieve the goal of ordinary consumer influential participation in the regulatory process, 
various institutional arrangements have been implemented in different countries. The 
effectiveness of each model is largely determined by the socio-political characteristics the 
regulatory environment. It has therefore been suggested that greater benefits could be derived 
by adopting an inclusive framework for consumer representation by combining the statutory 
and non-statutory models, as in the UK, by harnessing the strengths of the models and 
safeguarding against their weaknesses so that the ordinary consumer influential participation in 
the regulatory process in enhanced. This arrangement may be of great benefit to Nigeria and 
other developing countries with little history of civil society/advocacy groups.  
In the first part of this thesis, having established 1) The NIE approach’ as a theoretical basis 
and  Institutional Decomposition Analysis as the framework to guide this thesis 2) that the 
prevailing socio-political setting in Nigeria which is characterised by non-transparent 
transactions and weak institutions and which forms the background of the telecommunications 
market,  and  regulatory environment has implications for regulatory activities 3) that the 
ultimate aim of regulation is to implement policy objectives which include promoting the 
interest of the ordinary consumer, and that the global  trend in institutional arrangements for 
consumer representation favours mixed models in Part One, the empirical part that now follows 
will look into how the industry key players defined the ordinary consumers’ interests and rights; 
examine the structures and processes that have been deployed to engage the ordinary Nigerian 
mobile consumers to effectively participate in regulatory decision-making process; and 
evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of the ordinary consumer complaints management processes 
of the market players and the regulator.  
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CHAPTER 5 Institutional Definition of Ordinary Mobile Consumer Interest in Nigeria 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter undertakes an analysis of policy, legal documents and other secondary sources, 
which specifically deal with the study’s first research question: if and how have the legislators, 
regulator and market players in Nigeria defined the ordinary consumer interest in the field of 
mobile communications. 
To address the above question, this study will apply the extended Institutional Decomposition 
Model in analysing the relevant documents in an attempt to answer the research question.  First, 
the Nigerian communications institution is decomposed into its four main components– mobile 
policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement. The analysis will be based 
on these four main components and their aspects and internal linkages. The study will also take 
notice of the extra-institutional factors like the prevailing regulatory environment in drawing 
conclusions.  
With regards to the first research question stated above, this study will seek to find if the mobile 
policy, National Telecommunications Policy of 2000, in setting out the strategic policy 
direction for the development of telecommunications in Nigeria, has defined the consumer and 
consumer interest; what kind of regulatory framework, regulator and market structure was 
envisioned by the policy and how do these relate to consumer interests. In addition, are there 
provisions for economic regulation (e.g. tariff rules) to protect ordinary consumer from 
predatory licensees?  
In the second section, this study will focus on mobile law (The Act) to ascertain how the 
provisions of the mobile law aligns with the mobile policy and if the mobile law has explicit 
definition of who the consumer is and what constitutes the consumer interest. Still focusing on 
the research question, this section will look at corporate values, powers and functions assigned 
to the regulator to facilitate its mandate to promote consumer interest. It will determine if there 
are legal provisions for the establishment or support of independent consumer representation 
bodies. Specifically, it will ascertain if there are adequate provisions for ordinary consumer to 
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participate in the development or review of industry codes that define how the services 
providers engage with ordinary consumers.  
Mobile administration encompasses mechanisms, processes, procedures and quality of service 
standards, research and public forums, pricing and accountability mechanisms established to 
facilitate the implementation of the mobile policy, mobile law, and mobile enforcement. The 
third section will investigate how these provisions have been deployed for the realisation of the 
ordinary consumer interest. It will also ascertain if the definition of consumer interest is 
consistent across the mobile organisation (Commission– the actors) and if the industry players 
in the mobile market are consistent in their practice to uphold the consumer interest at a level 
consistent with the policy and law. 
The Institutional Decomposition Model of Saleth and Dinar (1999) was extended by 
conceptualising mobile enforcement as the fourth component of the mobile institution. In this 
way, this study emphasises the importance of the application of responsive enforcement 
mechanisms towards the realisation of policy objectives because how the operators’ response 
to the rules depend on the efficiency of the enforcement of the rules North (2005). Therefore, 
the fourth section will examine the adequacy and effectiveness of the mechanisms for 
monitoring, assessment and enforcement of mobile law and consumer codes of practice. In 
addition, it assesses the level of industry compliance with the provisions of the Act and if the 
level of sanctions and fines are adequate to deter errant operators. 
Finally, the findings and main argument resulting from this investigation will be presented in 
the concluding section. 
5.2 Mobile Policy: National Telecommunication Policy 2000  
In 2000, the Ministry of Communications launched the National Telecommunication Policy. 
The NTP was developed by a 22-member Telecommunications Sector Reform Implementation 
Committee (TSRIC) under the leadership of the Minister of Communications, Alhaji 
Mohammed Arzika and was approved by Olusegun Obasanjo, the then President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. TSRIC membership included all stakeholders in the sector, organised 
Labour, the Consumer Protection Council and the Nigeria Communications Commission. 
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The National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) 2000 recognised the challenges of setting long 
time objectives in the face of rapidly changing technology and evolving market and thus 
restricted its objectives only to short term (3 years) and medium term (5 years) use. However, 
despite the expressed time limits the NTP is still in use fifteen years after its publication thus 
raising the question of its relevance in the current state of the market.  
5.2.1 National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) on Consumer Interest and Corporate 
Values  
The National Telecommunications Policy, (NTP), in setting out the policy direction for the 
development of telecommunications did not define who the telecommunications consumer is, 
nor did it make any categorical statement about the interest of consumers. However, consumers’ 
interest issues could be discerned under the interest of the public, the objectives of NTP, the 
powers, functions and corporate values assigned to the Nigerian Communications Commission 
(Commission) and the provisions for economic regulation. The overriding objective of the NTP 
is “to achieve the modernisation and rapid expansion of the telecommunications network and 
services, with the ultimate aim of making it efficient, affordable, reliable and available to the 
general public” (NTP, 2000: section 2.0). These issues have strong bearing on consumer 
interests as will be discussed in the next section. Hence, the NTP in its principal objectives 
identifies with the interest of consumers.  
One medium term objective, which is particularly important in enhancing consumer interest, is 
to ensure that public telecommunications facilities are accessible to all communities in the 
country (NTP, Section 2.2). The Universal Service Provision (USP) catered for under Sections 
112 and 113 of the Act addresses this objective. Other objectives of the NTP are expanded in 
the functions it assigns to the Commission. The policy specifies nine functions for the 
Commission; five of these functions allude to the interest of consumers, which are also 
deducible from similar provisions of the Act signifying a strong synergy between the mobile 
policy and the mobile law. 
From the provisions in the NTP, the following characteristic of the envisioned communication 
services, which relate to the interest of consumers, can be deduced: affordable, efficient and 
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reliable communications services, easy and universal access to communication services, 
availability of services, approved technical and operational standards, fair trade practices, and 
safety/security of citizens (NTP, Sections 2.0, 2.2 and 3.1.4.2).  
The NTP also deals with the independence and corporate values of the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (Commission). It directs that the Commission in making its 
decisions should be guided by the overriding objectives of the NTP in an impartial and 
independent manner and considerations of fairness, equity and transparency and “such rulings 
shall not be directly influenced by Government or private industry” (NTP, 2000: section 
3.1.4.1). 
Thus, the NTP established the framework for an independent regulator with full legal mandate 
to regulate the telecommunications industry. The implication of this provision for the promotion 
and protection of the ordinary consumer is discussed in the section on mobile law. 
5.2.2 Policy on Economic Regulation: Focusing on the consumer 
In its directive on economic regulation of the telecoms industry, the NTP upheld that 
competitive market forces would be the best determinant for appropriate and sustainable levels 
of prices in the telecommunications market. In other words, the NTP did not recommend any 
form of direct price control by the regulator. However, it recognised that in some interim period, 
before active competition is fully developed, the market might be inefficient due to the 
emergence of one or more dominant operators with power to control pricing. In such 
circumstances, the NTP enjoins the Commission to establish “tariff regulation requirements for 
such dominant operators, which will ensure that service prices are cost-oriented, that customers 
and competitors’ interests are protected and that the industry develops in the most efficient 
manner possible” (NTP, 2000: Section 6.0). This anticipated situation was manifested in 2012 
with the emergence of MTN as a dominant operator and subsequent imposition of regulatory 
obligations by the Commission. However, there is tension between ordinary consumers’ 
interest and competitors’ interest with regards to tariff levels as will be discussed in Section 
5.3.4.1. 
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Nigeria does not have a Competition Authority therefore; the mandate to the Commission to 
establish tariff regulation requirements serves the interest of consumers because it protects 
consumers from the harm associated with abuse of market power and unfair trade practices and 
consequently ensures that communications services are affordable. Hence, the NTP in defining 
the policy direction for the telecommunications sector had the interest of the consumer in view. 
These provisions are also amplified in the Act, Sections 1(e), 90-93, and 97 and in the 
Competition Practice Regulations 2007: Regulation 7, 8, 13, 18(d). 
5.3 Mobile Law: Legal definition of consumer interest 
This section looks at provisions in the Mobile Law, one of the main components from the 
decomposition of the Communications institution, concerning the definition of consumer 
interest. The concept of the consumer allows for wide variations in definition (CI, 2014). 
Therefore, in order to highlight the significant difference and thrust of the definition of the 
consumer in the Act, a comparison is made with the definition of the consumer in the Consumer 
Protection Council Act, 1992 (CPC Act, 1992), the definition by the Consumer Affairs Bureau, 
and the Nigerian Communications Act 2003. 
The CPC Act defines the consumer as: 
“An individual, who purchases, uses, maintains or disposes of products or services” 
(CPC Act, 1992: Part V, Section 32). 
The Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB), a department of the Nigerian Communications 
Commission in its ‘Consumer Web Portal’ has defined a telecommunication consumer as 
‘A person who subscribes to the services of telecommunications service provider’  
The Nigerian Communications Act 2003 in its definition of a consumer makes no distinction 
between the ‘consumer’, ‘customer’ and ‘subscriber’, all of which it defines as: 
“Any person who subscribes to and uses a communications service”: (NCA, 2003: 
section157). 
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The terms ‘subscribes’ and ‘uses’ are significant. The Registration of Telephone Subscribers 
Regulation, 2011, defines a subscriber as, “a person who subscribes to mobile 
telecommunications services by purchasing a subscription medium or entering into a 
subscription contract with a licensee” (Section 1(2)). The Regulations also interprets 
subscription medium to mean a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) smart card or any other 
phone subscriber medium, containing the telephone number of a subscriber, encoded network 
identification details, the personal identification number and other user data normally provided 
by a licensee for the provision of network services. This implies that the ordinary consumers 
on the prepaid platform (pay-as-you-go) also enjoy the full status of ‘subscriber’ even if they 
had not entered into any other formal subscription contract with a licensee. This is very 
important but it is often overlooked by services providers and will be referred to in section 
5.2.4.2 when discussing consumers’ right at the point of purchase of SIM pack. 
It is significant that in the CPC Act the purchase or use of, say, a mobile device is a sufficient 
condition for qualification as a consumer. Similarly, the CAB’s definition would imply that the 
purchase of a SIM card qualifies one as a consumer. Both definitions are incomplete; they differ 
significantly from the definition of consumer in the Communications Act.  In the Act, the dual 
condition – ‘subscribes to’ and ‘uses communications service’ – is necessary for qualification 
as a consumer. First, this implies that non-subscribers are excluded from the definition in the 
Act. In other words, with regard to the definition in the Act, it would appear that an individual 
who uses the mobile phone of another is not a ‘consumer’. For example, a child who uses the 
phone of the parent is not a ‘consumer’. Secondly and more importantly, the Act’s definition 
of consumer implies a contractual relationship between a user and the service provider and the 
term ‘and uses a communications service’ is part of that contract. The significance of the term 
‘and uses’ becomes clear in the rule for the disconnection and withdrawal of a pre-paid 
subscriber number.  
The Registration of Telephone Subscribers Regulation, section 14(2) stipulates that a SIM card 
that is not used for a revenue-generating event within 48 hours of registration will be 
disconnected. Thereafter a subscriber’s line “if it has not been used” within six months or 
twelve months for a revenue generating event, may be disconnected or withdrawn (Quality of 
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Services Regulations 2007, schedule 1, section 36). These conditions have grave implications 
for both consumers and network operators. For a network operator failure to abide by the first 
rule attracts a fine of N 200,000 (US$ 1000) per SIM card. For example, in 2015, the failure by 
MTN, (a network operator) to abide by the first rule has led to the imposition by the regulator, 
of what appears to be the heftiest fine in global telecommunications history (See Section 5). 
For the ordinary consumer, violating the first and second conditions would result in inability to 
use his/her number until he/she completes the reregistration procedures and the second 
condition implies forfeiture of the number.  
As stated above, the definition of the consumer by CAB does not align with the Act because it 
excludes the term ‘uses’ which is a necessary condition. This is an example of the lack of 
consistency in the definition of consumer and consumer interest, which prevails across the 
mobile organisation – the personnel (players) of the Commission. In this instance, it has led 
millions of subscribers to violate the SIM card registration rules with dire consequences. Later 
in Chapter 6, CAB’s misconception of consumer ‘right to be heard’ which portends grave 
implications for consumer representation will be highlighted. 
Therefore, in the context of this study, ordinary consumer is defined as a person – as distinct 
from a corporate body or partnership – who subscribes to and uses a mobile communications 
service. As was noted earlier, the Nigerian Communications Act 2003 is the primary source for 
the definition of consumer interest. Keeping in view the reasons for government delegation of 
power to regulators and that the nature of the regulator has implications for the interest of the 
ordinary consumers the next section reviews the regulatory framework instituted by the Act.  
5.3.1. Independent and Impartial Regulator: Consumers’ ally? 
The Nigerian Communications Act 2003 (Act) states as its primary object the creation and 
provision of a regulatory framework for the Nigerian communications industry and Section 1 
(b) extends this by specifying the creation of an effective, impartial and independent regulatory 
authority. This objective is realised with the establishment of the Nigerian Communications 
Commission (Commission) as an independent regulatory body for the communications sector 
with full legal mandate. The Act also established for the Commission a Governing Board, with 
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a completely independent organisational structure distinct from the civil service structure of the 
Ministry of Communications (Act, sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 12). This distinction is further emphasised 
by stating the Commission’s operational independence from the Ministry of Communications 
as follows: 
“In the execution of his function and relationship with the Commission the Minister 
shall at all times ensure that the independence of the Commission in regards to the 
discharge of its function and operations under this Act, is protected and not 
compromised in any matter whatsoever” (NCA, 2003: section 25 (1-2)). 
The financial independence of the Commission is equally provided for as the Act empowers 
the Commission to establish and maintain a fund from which to defray all expenditures incurred 
by the Commission. The main sources of funds include fees charged by the Commission under 
the Act or its regulation like Annual Operating Fees or under any license issued in pursuant to 
the Act (Act, Sections 17(1b-c), 18, 19). In 2013, the Commission’s fund amounted to N 39.6 
billion (USD 200 million) (Commission Annual Report, 2013). 
The Act confers expansive powers on the Commission for the economic regulation of the 
communications sector which state that the Commission shall have power to: 
“Do all such things as are necessary for or incidental to the carrying out of its functions 
and duties under this Act” (See section 5.3.4) and 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law, the Commission shall have 
exclusive competence to determine, pronounce upon, administer, monitor and enforce 
compliance of all persons with competition laws and regulations, whether of a general 
nature or specific nature, as it relates to the Nigerian communications market" (NCA, 
2003: Section 3(2c), 90). 
Hence, in the telecommunication sector the Act has precedent over other competition laws and 
therefore exclusive jurisdiction over all issues relating to the interest of the consumer in the 
telecommunications sector. Thus, the promotion and protection of the interests of the 
telecommunications consumer are safeguarded under the regulatory independence and 
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expansive powers of the Commission. However, in practice the Commission is burdened with 
acute agency problem and conflict of interest, which distract it from focusing on the ordinary 
consumer. Examples of the manifestation of these issues are discussed in Section 5.5.2 of this 
chapter.  
5.3.2. Organisational values are essential for effective consumer representation 
To complement its independence, the corporate values of the Commission, which the Act 
envisages in Section 1(b), are further expanded in Section 4(2). It states that the Commission 
shall always carry out its functions and duties in an efficient, effective, non-discriminatory and 
transparent manner. This is necessary for the Commission’s credibility, which is required to 
engender consumers and other stakeholders’ trust and confidence in the Commission.  
Two evident mechanisms established by the Act to foster the realisation of these corporate 
values and accountability are: 1) the power of the Commission to conduct public enquiry on 
any matter of a general nature which serves the objects of the Act and in all instances that 
mandatorily require that public inquiry be held under the Act or its regulation. This is to ensure 
transparency in the activities of the Commission while creating room for consumers’ influential 
participation in regulatory decision process; 2) the submission of the Commission’s annual 
report of activities to the National Assembly through the President not later than six months 
after the end of its financial year, including the Commission’s audited accounts and the 
auditor’s report for the year under review. The detailed guidelines for the preparation of this 
report are specified in section 89. These provisions facilitate the oversight function of the 
legislators (NCA, 2003: Sections 4(2), 21(1), 57(1-3)). These are important provisions. The 
implications of the Commission’s inability to abide by these provisions are discussed in later 
section of this chapter. 
The Act is wide-ranging in its provisions and amply meets the requirement of an independent 
regulatory framework. This is important and has implications for consumer interests. An 
effective regulatory framework, rooted in a firm legal base is essential for the creation of 
institutions, organisations and structures, for the administration of pro-consumer laws; 
institutions are crucial (North, 1993). Under the Act, the Commission’s legal mandate ensures 
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its organisational, financial and operational autonomy. These factors are fundamental for a 
sustained campaign for the promotion and protection of consumer interest because, as noted in 
Chapter 2, the performance of the mobile telecommunications market depends not only on the 
individual and interactive actions of stakeholders, but also on the intervening influences at the 
regulatory level (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). 
In practice, the regulatory framework of the Commission, like those of other regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria is susceptible to political corruption and interference such that the 
independence and impartiality of the regulatory are compromised from the onset with grave 
implications for the efficiency of the market and the interest of the consumer. The prevailing 
socio-political environment, which is heavily weighed down by cronyism and non-transparent 
transactions finds its way into the Commission through its institutional framework: the 
politicians appoint the leadership. It spreads through the organisation because the favoured 
agents create their own internal clientele network. This has far-reaching negative impact on the 
commitment of the regulator towards the attainment of policy objectives. 
5.3.3. How is ‘Consumer Interest’ Defined? 
The concept of consumer interest, like the term ‘consumer’, is open to various definitions 
because it embodies a wide range of variable concepts. In Britain, Ofcom’s Consumer Panel, 
in its Consumer Toolkit, upholds that “the consumer interest is implicitly the inverse of the 
consumer detriment” (Consumer.Panel, 2006:74). Therefore, in determining what constitutes 
ordinary consumer interest, this study considered the provisions in the Act that would ordinarily 
enhance or promote consumers’ quality of experience and serve the consumers welfare by 
eliminating or reducing the factors that are capable of giving rise to consumer detriment. Hence, 
two basic criteria were considered: 
1. Factors that enhance/promote the quality of experience of the consumer or 
reduce/eliminate consumer detriment. 
2. Factors that are specifically provided for in the Act and regulations. 
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5.3.4 Consumers Interest is Part of the Law 
The interests of the consumer which the Act undertakes to promote and protect are not explicitly 
defined and listed in the Act but are subsumed in, and are deducible from the objectives of the 
Act; the functions of the Commission; Consumer Affairs; General Consumer Code of Practice, 
2007; Registration of Telephone Subscribers Regulations, 2011; Quality of Service Regulations, 
2012; Number Portability Regulations, 2014; and other regulations/guidelines.  
Apart from its primary objective of creating a regulatory framework for the Nigerian 
communications sector, the Act in delineating the scope of activities of the Commission, defines 
nine objectives and twenty-three functions for the Commission. Five of these objectives and 
eight of the functions, have direct bearing on the promotion and protection of the interest of 
ordinary consumers and consequently define how the legislators, the regulator (Commission) 
and the market players construe the interest of the ordinary consumer. The main objectives 
include promoting the provision of affordable and easy to access communication services, 
ensuring fair competition and the protection of the interest of consumers and services providers.  
BOX 2.  NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS ACT 2003 (NCA, SECTION 1(1)) 
Pro-consumer objectives of the Act 
1(b) Establish a regulatory framework for the Nigerian  
communications industry and for this purpose to  
create an effective, impartial and independent regulatory  
authority. 
1(c) Promote the provision of modern, efficient,  
reliable, affordable and easily accessible communications  
services and the widest range thereof throughout Nigeria. 
1(e) Ensure fair competition in all sectors of the Nigerian  
communications industry. 
1(g) Protect the right and interest of service providers and 
consumers within Nigeria. 
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1(h)   Ensure the needs of the disabled and elderly persons 
 are taken into consideration in the provision of communications services 
Source: Nigerian Communication Act (NCA, 2003: A239) 
The pro-consumer objectives of the Act given in Box 2 are further reinforced in some of the 
functions of the Commission. Those functions stated in section 4(1) of the Act, designed to 
facilitate the realisation of the pro – consumer objectives through the promotion and protection 
of consumer interest are listed in Box 3 and include, promotion and protection of consumers’ 
interest against unfair practices, developing and monitoring quality of service and resolution of 
consumer complaints.  
BOX 3.  PRO–CONSUMER FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ACT SECTION 4(1) 
1) The protection and promotion of the interest of consumers against  unfair 
practices including but not limited to matters relating to tariff and charges for and 
the availability and quality of communications services, equipment and facilities; 
2) Ensuring that licensees implement and operate at all times the most efficient and 
accurate billing system; 
3) The promotion of fair competition …and protection of providers from misuse of 
market power or anti-competitive and unfair practices 
4) The development and monitoring of performance standards and indices relating to 
the quality of telephone and other communications services and facilities supplied 
to consumers in Nigeria having regards to the best international performance 
indicators; 
5) Proposing, adopting, publishing and enforcing technical specifications for the 
importation and use of communications equipment; 
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6) Carrying out type approval tests on communications equipment and issuing 
certificates thereof on the basis of technical specifications and standards prescribed 
from time to time by the Commission; 
7) Examining and resolving complaints and objection filed by and disputes between 
licensed operators, subscribers or any other person involved in the communications 
industry, using such dispute-resolution methods as the commission may determine 
and arbitration; 
8) Designing, managing and implementing Universal Access strategy and programme 
in accordance with federal government’s general policy and objectives thereon. 
Source: Nigerian Communications Act (NCA, 2003: Section 4(1)) 
The provisions in section 4(1) above are of particular interest to the consumer; they have direct 
impact on their everyday experience and expectations. In practice, the Quality of Experience 
(QoE) of the ordinary consumer is predicated on how well the Commission performs these 
functions and on how well it monitors and enforces compliance with those provisions.  
The consumer interests deducible from the objectives of the Act and functions of the 
Commission also include all those in Section 5.3.1, deduced from the NTP and they are listed 
in Table 9. 
Also relevant to consumer interest are the national interest provisions in the Act. These 
provisions obligate licensees to endeavour to prevent the use of the network facilities and 
services, in the execution of any offence under any law in operation in Nigeria. The violation 
of this provision was also cited in the recent imposition of fine on MTN a network provider. 
MTN was indicted for allowing the use of unregistered phone numbers on its network by the 
Boko-Haram terrorist group.  
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TABLE 9.  MOBILE LAW: DEFINITION OF CONSUMER INTEREST 
S/N 
Consumer Interest Legislation/Regulation 
 
1 Independent, Efficient, and Effective, 
Regulator 
 
Act: Sections 4(2), 7(3); Chapter II Part II, 
III, IV. 
 
2 Easy access to modern 
communications services 
Act: Sections 1(c), 3(e), 33, 112(1), 114 
Universal access & Universal service 
Regulations  2007 
3 Fair and cost oriented tariff and 
charges 
 Act: Sections 108 (1-3), 109, 110(1), (2a-
c) 
4 Affordable communications services Act: section 1(c) 
5 Needs of vulnerable consumer Act: 1(h), 107 (2)(d) 
General Code  15(1 - 2); 40(1 - 2) 
6 Complete, accurate and easy to 
understand information 
General Code: Sections 6(1) (2a-d), 8(1-
5), 9 ,10, 11 ,17, 18 
Quality of Service Regulations 2012: 
Section 2(d) 
7 Efficient & reliable telecoms services Quality of Service Regulations 2012: 
Schedule 1, Table 2 ( 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 
3.2) 
8 Fair competition Act: 1(e), 90, 91, 93, 97 
Competition Practice Regulations 2007: 
Regulation 7, 8, 13, 18(d) 
9 Complaints resolution and redress Act: Sections 4(p), 61 – 63, 73 – 76,  
Dispute Resolution Guide Lines 2004 
General Code: Sections 8(3), 13, 39 -49, 
Quality of service Regulations 2012: 
Sections 8(1- 3) 
Complaints adjudication Guidelines 
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10 Security of consumer information General code : Sections 34 -38 
11 National security and 
consumer/public safety 
Act: sections 97(3), 146(1 -2), 148, 149 
12 Safe communication equipment Act: sections 130, 132(1 – 3) 
13 Consumer education/ engagement Act: sections 57(1 -3) 
General Code: Sections 4(1), 5 
Source: Compiled from the Act and regulations 
5.3.4.1 Tariff Rate Regulation: Investment Versus Affordable Services  
In the list of consumer interests listed in Table 9 there is an inherent tension between the 
provision of fair and cost oriented tariffs/charges and affordable communications services 
(Items 3 and 4). Tariff rate is always a matter of concern for the ordinary consumer hence the 
Act and the NTP stipulates that tariff rate shall be fair, non-discriminatory and cost oriented.  
However, the provisions set out elsewhere in the Act appear to be pitched against both the 
affordability of communication services, and fair, non-discriminatory, cost-oriented tariff. For 
example, the Act in sections 108 (4d-e) enjoins the structuring and setting of tariff rates and 
levels to attract investments into the communications industry and to align with the 
recommendations of the international organisations of which Nigeria is a member (NCA, 2003).  
Structuring and setting tariff rates and levels solely to attract investment, without taking into 
consideration the impact on the ordinary consumer, or the overall economic situation of the 
ordinary consumer is not in accord with the spirit of the National Telecommunications Policy 
(NTP) and definitely not in the best interest of the consumer. As was noted earlier in section 
(5.2.3) the NTP foresaw that before full-blown competition is achieved, it is appropriate to 
consider consumers’ interest in regulating prices. 
There is no evidence that the Commission has given effect to this provision in order to resolve 
the tension between affordability and accessibility of telecoms services. Hence, regarding the 
existing provisions on tariff rate, ordinary consumers have cause for concern; their interest in 
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affordable prices is not assured and they would inevitably be paying high prices, which will 
adversely affect the accessibility of basic telecoms services particularly for those in the low-
income group. 
5.4 Mobile Administration: Numerous secondary legislations but not effectively utilised  
In order to facilitate the realisation of her objectives, the Commission had also enacted a total 
of thirteen regulations and fourteen guidelines. These secondary legislations include three 
guidelines and six regulations with direct bearing on the mandate to promote and protect 
consumer interests.  
These are:  
Guidelines on consultations, 2007; 
Guidelines on dispute resolution, 2004; 
Guidelines on advertisements and promotions (Commission in collaboration with the 
advertisements and promotions’ regulatory agency); 
Quality of service regulations, 2012; 
Regulations on the registration of telecoms subscribers, 2011; 
Regulations on Universal access and Universal service, 2007; 
Consumer code of practice regulations, 2007; 
Regulations on enforcement processes, 2005; and 
Regulations for number portability, 2014 
 
.  
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TABLE 10 POLICY GUIDELINES AND REGULATION 
 Total Number Pro-consumer General/Pro-service 
provider 
Policy Guidelines 14 3 11 
Regulations 13 6 7 
Total 27 9 18 
Source: Nigerian Communications Commission website (NCC, n.d.-c) 
It is noteworthy that the Consumer code of practice regulations, 2007 (General Code) was 
enacted in 2007, six years after the liberalisation of the sector. During this period, the ordinary 
consumer was exposed to the activities of the services providers without any law defining how 
the services providers should engage with the ordinary consumers and without the support of 
any consumer body to advocate for the ordinary consumer. The result was that neglecting 
ordinary mobile consumer interest with impunity became the norm. The late introduction of the 
General Code has been unable to reverse the trend. This evidence also shows that the 
Commission was not consumer-focused from inception.  
Notwithstanding the merits of these regulations in providing ample instruments to facilitate the 
regulatory functions, it appears that there are many similar provisions relating to consumer 
interest in the Act and the various regulations as shown in the Tables, 9 and 10, above. This 
seems to complicate things as provisions are spread in a large number of documents. In addition, 
it seems that there is repetition of the same provisions without any elaboration as to how these 
consumer interests can be conceptualised and actualised. The number of regulations the 
Commission has put in place for consumer protection does not indicate the efficiency of the 
administration (Saleth and Dinar, 1999).  If these numerous subsidiary legislations are not 
matched with corresponding effort to put them into effect, they will appear to be empty 
provisions and licensees will be inclined to disregard them completely and thereby increasing 
the burden on the enforcement institution. 
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5.4.1 Mobile Administration: Definition of consumer interest is not consistent across the 
organisation 
 In mobile administration, the Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) is the principal organ for 
dealing with consumer issues. The Commission has also put in place a five-year operational 
plan – the Strategic Master Plan 2014-2018 (SMP) – to focus and direct its activities. Hence, 
the Commission’s procedural definition of consumer interest is more clearly reflected in the 
provisions of the SMP and the activities of CAB. 
In the Strategic Master Plan (SMP), the Commission did not use the term ‘consumer interest’ 
when referring to factors relating to consumer interest issues but rather employed terms such 
as ‘consumer needs’ and ‘consumer demand’. Hence in its Strategic theme 1, the Commission 
states: 
“On the demand side, the theme emphasises the Commission’s role in ensuring that the 
growing and changing needs and demands for communication services by our 
consumers are met. This entails ensuring availability of a wide range of choices and 
services to consumers, easy migration for maximum satisfaction, fair and competitive 
pricing and tariff etc.” (NCCSMP, 2014: 23). 
In addition, in the Strategic Theme 2, the Commission stated that its response “to the needs of 
stakeholders such as consumers” would cover issues such as availability, ease of access and 
quality of service, protection, enlightenment, education and empowerment (NCCSMP, 
2014:24). Hence, under the term ‘needs and demand’ of consumers the following factors 
relating to consumer interest are visible: Choice, Fair price and tariff, Accessibility, 
Affordability, Quality, Protection, Information, (education, enlightenment, empowerment). 
The Consumer Affairs Bureau has as its mission “the protection of the rights and privileges and 
interests of telecoms consumers” and states its mandate to include “protecting the consumer 
against unfair practices in the industry, to inform the consumers and to empower the consumer 
by educating on the rights and obligations”. The Bureau did not state what the privileges of the 
consumers are nor did it indicate what constitutes the consumer interest; rather it gave a list of 
what it termed ‘consumer expectation’ as: access to robust services, acceptable quality of 
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service, affordability, availability of services, transparent tariff regime, redress when wronged 
and compensation when wrongly billed/loss of service. 
It is noticeable that there are discrepancies between the ‘needs and demand’ and the ‘consumer 
expectations’. For example, information and protection against unfair practices – which are part 
of the CAB mandate – are not included in the ‘consumer expectations’ but are listed among the 
‘needs and demand’ in the SMP while ‘redress’, which featured in the expectations, was not 
listed in the needs and demands. 
Hence, in mobile administration, there is inconsistency in the definition of consumer interest, 
which is also referred to under various terms such as consumer expectation, consumer 
privileges, consumer needs and demands. This lack of consistency in terminology also leads to 
variation in the scope and meaning attached to the concept of consumer interest; hence “the 
perceived consequences of policies will differ as well” (North, 1990: 101). Consequently, the 
level of awareness and the degree of importance attached to consumer interest issues would 
vary across the organisation with adverse effect on the Commission’s mandate to promote and 
protect the interest of consumers. For example, the Commission’s erroneous definition of 
consumers’ ‘right to be heard’ has a far-reaching impact on its conceptualisation of consumer 
representation. This issue is discussed in detail in section 6.4.4 of the next chapter. 
The Act in establishing the Commission as an independent regulatory agency determined her 
organisational structure and made ample provisions of instruments to facilitate the regulatory 
functions. Hence, it can be concluded that the Commission has adequate administrative 
provisions and instruments to implement the provision of the Act as it relates to definition and 
promotion of consumer interest. However, the application of the administrative procedures falls 
short of achieving their objectives partly due to inconsistences in the procedural definition of 
the interest of the consumer and as a result, neither the Commission nor the services providers 
hold the consumer interest at a level consistent with the law. 
5.4.2 Prepaid Service: Disclosure of terms and conditions at point of sales is essential 
The Act is clear in its definition of a consumer: by purchasing a subscription medium (SIM 
card) a person is deemed to have subscribed to a communications service (refer to Section 5.2.1). 
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However, there are no disclosure guidelines that make it mandatory for the licensee to supply 
information on the tariff rate, quality level, and the terms and conditions of the pre-paid service 
to the consumer at the point of sale as is applicable to services contract. The implication is that 
the vast majority of consumers on the pre-paid platform are left out of the provisions of the 
General Code Sections 6(2) and 8(3), which stipulates, “a licensee shall provide specific 
information regarding any compensation, refund or other arrangements, which may apply if 
contracted quality levels are not met….” (NCC, n.d.-c). 
The lack of disclosure guidelines for prepaid services at the point of sales militates against the 
ordinary consumers’ interest in the availability of information that will enable informed choice 
and fair redress mechanism. If the non-inclusion of pay-as-you-go consumers in these 
provisions is rectified, it will go a long way to curb the lack of transparency and subsequent 
consumer complaints of dissatisfaction that are prevalent in the industry today by enhancing 
the ordinary consumers’ capacity to make informed choices and seek redress when wronged. 
This will also have a significant impact on the market because the pre-paid services are 
predominant in the telecoms market and over 90% of the ordinary consumers are on the prepaid 
service platform (NCC.CSS, 2012).  
5.4.3 Vulnerable Consumers: More than meets the eye  
The Act restricts the concept of vulnerable consumers to the disabled and the elderly persons 
and enjoins licensees to comply with any specific obligations the Commission may impose in 
respect of special services arrangement for subscribers with disabilities (Act, section 1 (h); 
General Code, Sections 5(1 – 2)). 
It would appear that no special attention is accorded to other vulnerable consumers, for example, 
those with little education, low socio-economic groups, and those in difficult-to-access rural 
areas. In addition, there is yet no evidence that the Commission has given effect to the 
provisions in 5(2) of the General Code above. This regulatory gap has provided services 
providers a hiding place in their failure to make any concrete provisions for vulnerable and 
disabled consumers as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5.4.4 Quality of Service (QoS) Regulations 2012: Many indicators less quality  
The QoS Regulations enjoined licensees to publish the quality of service measurements. It 
specified that the parameters that are reportable shall be set out in tabular format and shall 
include comparison of service quality and information to help the Commission or subscriber to 
assess the performance of competing services providers- QoS Regulation, 2012, Sections 7(d, 
e), 10(f)- (NCC, n.d.-c). In schedule 1 of the QoS Regulation, the Commission gave a list of 42 
threshold Targets and Key Performance Indicators (KIPs) for wireless services and the target 
resolution times in the event of a failure.  The KPIs range from accounts related complaints, 
time to load credit and credit run-out alert, time to resolve complaint to unsolicited messages, 
meeting advertisement commitment and waiting time to be physically attended to by relevant 
staff at customer care centres. 
The long list of KPIs presents considerable challenge to consumers and operators. A huge list 
of targets, which the consumer cannot comprehend and which are not enforced, does not serve 
the interest of consumers. It is a disincentive to operators who may be overwhelmed by the 
effort required to monitor, measure and report on these targets (NCC.CSS, 2012:65). It is 
unlikely that the Commission can monitor and enforce all the KIPs hence the licensees tend to 
ignore most of them. In practice the department of Consumer Affairs Bureau monitors and 
reports only four out of the 42 threshold targets and KPI in the effort to determine the 
performance of the Consumer Care Centres. These four are rate of failed call attempts, rate of 
connection of calls to live agent, rate of connection of calls to Interactive Voice Response (IVR) 
and average waiting time before connecting to live agent. Although the Commission publishes 
each services providers score in each of the four parameters, it is not immediately obvious to 
the ordinary consumer which of the services providers is the best overall performer because the 
scores are neither weighted nor   aggregated. Therefore, the report of the monitoring of the 
Customer Care Centres does not offer useful information that help the ordinary consumer make 
a choice. Reporting on more KIPs will definitely create more confusion for the ordinary 
consumers. 
Studies in Europe indicate that it is expedient to reduce the list of quality of service indicators 
to those that are of current concern to consumers and easy for operators to measure and monitor. 
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The recommended list of service performance indicators includes, service connection, fault rate 
per connection, fault repair time, call failure rates, billing, response time for operator services, 
dial tone delay, transmission quality statistics and availability of public pay phones. It is further 
recommended that a regular review of these indicators is necessary to ensure that consumers’ 
concerns are adequately addressed (Milne, 1997).    
The provisions in the General Code and the Quality of Service Regulations apart from the few 
provisions discussed in the fore going sections are generally consistent in establishing the rules 
and structures that facilitate the promotion and protection of the interest of ordinary consumers. 
This trend is also visible in other pro-consumer regulations. The Act has made substantial 
provisions aimed at the definition, protection and promotion of the interest of consumer. It has 
also provided the administrative structures and enforcement mechanisms to give ‘full effect and 
force’ to the promotion and protection of consumer interest. However, the Act cannot perform 
by itself nor act in isolation to influence institutional performance. It is the interactive 
transactions that continuously go on between the four components of the Nigerian 
communications institution – Policy, Law, Administration and Enforcement – in formulating 
and implementing the rules of the game that determine the level of performance, and the extent 
the mobile law has contributed in the definition of and promotion of the ordinary consumers’ 
interest (North, 1990; North, 2005; Saleth & Dinar, 1999; Saleth & Dinar, 2004). The following 
sections examine the extent to which the Mobile administration has enabled or not the 
realisation of the objectives of Act and policy. 
5.5 Mobile Enforcement: Compliance monitoring is incentive to performance 
The Act (Section 89) and similar provisions in regulations gave the Commission the mandate 
to monitor all significant matters relating to the performance of all licensees and publish annual 
reports thereon. The issues to be monitored, apart from overall performance of all licensees and 
compliance with the Act include parameters relating to consumer interest such as, service 
quality, tariff rates and charges paid by consumer for services. Other include breaches of code 
provision and remedial actions taken, the adequacy and availability of services in all parts of 
Nigeria, complaints resolution and other consumer issues. In carrying out this mandate, the 
Commission may specifically invoke any of its expansive powers of investigation and 
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information gathering and powers of enforcement as per the various legislative provisions listed 
in Table 11. 
However, the Commission does not appear to be adequately equipped to carry out this function 
of compliance monitoring. This is reflected, for instance, in the Compliance Monitoring and 
Enforcement 4th quarter 2013 Report which recommended that the Commission should “acquire 
tariff monitoring equipment in order to […] facilitate an effective tariff monitoring regime in 
ensuring that operators’ charges are within the approved tariff” (NCC, n.d.-b, Otubu, 2013). 
The implication is that some violations of the provisions in the Act will escape detection and 
operators are most likely capitalising on this to perpetuate violations. 
In addition, licensees and the Commission are enjoined to publish the results of the monitoring 
exercises in a comparative format that will help consumers to assess the performance of the 
services provides. It is expected that the exposure inherent in this strategy will put pressure on 
the licensees to compete based on performance. This strategy however has not yielded 
significant result because the performance indicators apart from not been widely publicised are 
sometimes suppressed (Ubochioma, 2013) nor have the consumers been educated on how to 
interpret the indicators. In addition, comparative information is usually publicised on the 
websites and official reports, which are not easily accessible to a large body of ordinary 
consumers.  
TABLE 11.  ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER INTEREST 
 Enforcement Action Legislative provisions 
1 Information gathering. 
Monitor and enforce industry 
compliance to laws. 
Act: sections 65, 66, 89(1 – 4), 90, 92, 94;  
General Code: sections 9, 51, 55(1 – 5); 
QoS Regulations: sections 11, 14(b-c); 
Regulation on enforcement: Part V 
2 Imposition of fine/sanction Act: sections 31(2), 55, 65(1 – 2), 59(5), 111, 131, 133, 140, 141;  
QoS Regulations: 14(c) & Other regulations 
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Enforcement Processes Regulations Part IV; 
Second schedule part A- B 
3 Enforcement of license conditions/ deregistration 
Act: sections 31, 37, 45(1a – f), 51 
4 Issuing directions Act, section 53 
5 Dispute resolution Act: sections 73, 76, 78(1 – 2),  
QoS Regulations: section 14 
General Code: sections 39 – 49. 
Source: Compiled from the Act and regulations 
To give full effect to the provisions of the law entails enforcing compliance in order to realise 
the objectives, which include the promotion and protection of the interest of consumers. Hence, 
enforcement matters. It is an essential aspect of the regulatory institution. North (1993) asserts 
that institutions are critical in setting the rule of the game so that when backed up with 
appropriate enforcement of rules the desired objectives can be achieved. Although the 
Commission’s annual report does not indicate the percentage of the budget that goes into 
monitoring and enforcement, the transaction cost involved in obtaining the required information 
and executing the monitoring and enforcement activity could be a constraining factor. This may 
explain why the Commission carries out limited number of enforcement tasks annually, 
recording an average of less than two activities per month as shown in Table 12 below. Each 
of the monitoring exercise reveals gross violation of consumer interest issues because of gross 
contraventions of the rules set out in the Act and regulations. 
TABLE 12.  COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT: 2013 – 2015 
Period 2013 Activities  2014 Activities   2015 Activities 
1st Quarter Nil 5 Nil 
2nd Quarter 6 7 10 
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3rd Quarter 7 Nil   8 
4th Quarter 6 8 Nil 
Total 19 20 10 
Source: Compiled from Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement reports 2013-2015 
5.5.1 Enforcement: In defence of consumer interest 
The Nigeria Communications (Enforcement Processes etc.) Regulations, 2005, states the 
processes and procedures for exercising the Commission’s monitoring and enforcement powers 
and provides for the imposition of sanctions in the event of a breach of set rules without 
prejudice to any other sanctions that may be imposed under any other regulations. Some of the 
considerations for the determination of the amount of fines to be imposed reflect concern for 
consumer interest. These include: 
- Degree of harm, discomfort and cost occasioned by such contravention to 
consumers. 
- The severity of the contravention and the need for the fines to serve as deterrent. 
- The prevalence of the contravention in the industry generally and likelihood of 
repetition. 
The sanctions in the enforcement processes regulations are in two categories: Those calculated 
based on each contravention range from N 250,000 to N 5,000,000 (US$ 1,250 to US$ 25,000) 
and those calculated on daily basis range from N 50,000 to N 500,000 (US$ 250 to US$ 2,500) 
per day. 
In addition, all the pro-consumer regulations include penalty or sanction for non-compliance 
with the provisions contained therein as indicated in the schedule of fines in Table 13. These 
penalties/sanctions are in addition to or in the alternative to any other penalties that may be 
contained in the Act or the Enforcement Regulations 2005. Furthermore, where there is any 
difference or conflict between fines specified in the Enforcement Process Regulations 2005 and 
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any other regulations the fines in the most recent of the regulations shall prevail- Quality of 
services Regulations, 2012, Schedule 3- (NCC, n.d.-c). 
Hence, it would appear that the Commission has numerous options for penalty and sanction to 
deal with contraventions of the Act and regulations. However, each of the monitoring exercises 
carried out by the Commission’s Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement department, 
revealed gross violation of consumer interest issues because of gross contraventions of the rules 
set out in the Act and regulations. These contraventions include violation of tariff plans; 
violation of Mobile Number Portability Regulation; violation of Advertisement and Promotion 
guidelines; failure to meet Quality of Services key performance indicators; marketing of non–
type approved mobile devices; unlawful telemarketing and violation of consumers’ privacy 
with unsolicited SMS; violation of Registration of Telephone Subscribers Regulations and anti-
competition practices. Other contraventions of a general nature are unauthorized use of 
spectrum, operating without authorisation, violation of License Term and noncompliance with 
enforcement directive.  
These contraventions are pervasive and increasingly attaining the status of ‘tools of the trade’. 
All the four network/services providers and Value Added Services (VAS) providers are 
implicated in the violations. In some of these cases, the Commission undertook some 
enforcement measures including issuing directives, warnings, sanctions and imposition of fines. 
Generally, the perceived attitude of the Commission is to ignore the violation of its regulations 
(Otubu, 2013; Ndibe, 2013). This is evidenced by the scope of these serious contraventions of 
the provisions of the Act, which suggests that the offenders were relying on the Commission’s 
history of non-responsive enforcement strategy and ineffective enforcement regime. These in 
turn have been attributed to the Commissions soft-hand approach (Abdullahi, 2015) and the 
fact that the fines are not stiff enough to serve as deterrent (Isaac, 2015) because the fines fall 
below the provisions in the schedule of fines in terms of either the rate or the duration. Hence 
the evidence suggests that enforcement actions do not provide sufficient incentive for 
compliance because how the game is played depends not only on the formal rules but also on 
the effectiveness of enforcement (North, 2005).  
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All these issues point to the presence of a huge agency problem. First, the prevailing conflict 
of interest accounts for the Commission’s strategy of turning a blind eye to the violation of its 
regulations (Otubu, 2013; Ndibe, 2013). Secondly, the Commission’s activities are inherently 
difficult to monitor because the annual reports are usually three or more years late; the 2013 
annual Report is the last published report. Thirdly, the principal (legislators) is inherently 
unable to monitor the agent (Commission and Licensees) because of the corruption and 
cronyism prevalent in the socio-political environment in Nigeria, which was discussed in 
chapter 3. 
The Commission has responded to the perceived weakness by pointing to the need to review 
the Communications Act 2003: 
“There are certain provisions on sanctions and fines that need to be reviewed from the 
2003 era. This is because the provisions for penalty and fines are so low that they no 
longer serve as deterrents to errant operators” (NCC Annual Report, 2010; NCC Annual 
Report, 2011:57).  
The Commission’s argument is in itself an indictment of the Commission. The Act gives the 
Commission not only the power to review regulations whenever it deems necessary but also in 
many instances to determine the level of fines to impose (Act Sections 72, 53, 55).  For example, 
the Commission has power to prescribe appropriate financial penalties on licenses for 
exceeding approved tariff rates (Act Section 111). Documentary evidence indicates that the 
unabated violations of set rules are a result of laxity in the enforcement of rules as the following 
two examples reveal. 
i) Failure to meet Quality of Service KPI: When piracy pays, the consumer loses 
Poor quality of service has been a major and growing concern for consumers since the advent 
of mobile telecommunications in Nigeria in 2001 (NCC.CSS, 2012). In the 1st quarter 2014, for 
consistent failure to meet the key performance indicators (KPI) as specified in the QoS 
Regulation, the Commission, in line with Section 14 of Quality of Service Regulation 2012, 
imposed a total fine of N 647,000,000 (US$ 3.9 M) plus sanctions on three network providers. 
Earlier in 2012, the Commission had imposed a total of N1.7 billion (US$ 10.6 M) as fines on 
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the four mobile service providers for same failure to achieve the minimum level of quality of 
service.  
The fines imposed on the licensees are questionable because there are exceedingly low and not 
in line with the Quality of Services regulations 2012. Schedule 3 of the Quality of services 
Regulations states that failure by a licensee to meet and maintain a target for the parameter of 
the Key Performance Indicators (KPI) shall attract a fine of N15,000,000 (US$ 88,000) for each 
contravention and N25, 000,000 (US$ 125,000) for each day the contravention continues to 
occur. On that basis the fines imposed on the licensees barely covered 11 days’ violation of one 
parameter of KPIs, while the failure to meet the various qualities of service parameters has been 
going on for several months (NCC.CSS, 2012:25). It appears that it is easier for licensees to 
pay the fine than to solve the quality problems. That may explain why the imposition of fine in 
2012 did not deter the operators from continuous violation of the quality of services rules. North 
asserts that to effect the required solution, requires the establishment of institutions and 
enforcement structures that will alter the payoffs to achieve compliance because “if the highest 
rate of return in an economy is to piracy we can expect organisations will invest in skill and 
knowledge that will make them better pirates” (North, 2005:61). 
Nevertheless, in the above instances the Commission appeared to have acted decisively to stem 
a long-standing issue that has been a concern for consumers.  However, there is no evidence 
that the Commission implemented the provision of section 14(b) of the Quality of Service 
Regulations, 2012, which enjoins it to: 
“Directing licensees to compensate subscriber or consumers for poor quality of service” 
(NCC, n.d.-c). 
On the issue of paying compensation to consumers, the Commission’s Executive Vice-
Chairman, said "There is nothing in our law that empowers NCC to share money, which is paid 
as penalty...” to consumers (Cellular News, 2014). He added that the paying of compensation 
seemed to be less of a sanction for the mobile networks, who would find it less of a burden to 
offer free airtime, than pay cash to the government. The Commission’s argument misrepresents 
the law and subordinates the consumer interest to other interests. The provision for 
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compensation to consumers in Quality of Services Regulations, 14(b) is distinct and in addition 
to the imposition of fines in Section 14(c).  
The failure of the Commission to ensure that licensees pay compensation to consumers is in 
itself a violation of consumer interest in fair redress mechanism. The ordinary consumers suffer 
the multiple loss of frustration and economic loss because of poor quality of service including 
sometimes complete loss of service and lose their compensation. The difference between the 
law and what the consumer is getting is a consequence of the prevailing laxity in the 
enforcement of rules (Bardaragoda, 2000). 
TABLE 13.  SCHEDULE OF FINES  
Item Regulation Schedule of fines 
1 Nigerian Communications 
(Enforcement Processes etc.) 
Regulations 2005 
Category A. N250, 000 to 5,000,000 (US$ 
1,250 to US$ 25,000) on the basis of each 
contravention. 
Category B. N 50,000 to 500,000 (US$ 250 
to US$ 2,500)  per day for each 
contravention 
2 Quality of Services Regulations 2012 N 15 million for each act of contravention 
and N 25 million for each day that 
contravention continues. 
Directive to licensees to pay compensation 
to subscribers and consumers for poor 
quality of service ( QoS Regulation 14(b-
c)) 
3 Mobile Number Portability Regulations 
2014 
N 2million for each act or omission and N 
200,000 for each day that the contravention 
continues to occur. 
N 200,000 and/or 1 year imprisonment for 
unauthorised porting 
4  Consumer Code of Services 
Regulations 2007 
As per 1 above 
5 Competition Practice Regulations 2007 As per 1 above 
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6  Registration of Telephone Subscribers 
Regulations 2011 
N 200,000 for each subscription medium 
per contravention 
N 1 million per subscription medium for 
utilisation of consumer information for 
commercial purpose 
7 Guide Lines on Advertisement and 
Promotions 
N 1 million per violations of guidelines. 
N 2 million for unauthorised promotion 
N 5 million for failure to register 
promotion with Consumer Protection 
Council 
Source: Author. Compiled from regulations (Rate = N200 to US$1 – as of Q1 2016) 
ii) The MTN Fine: No more business as usual. Enforcement of rules leads to compliance 
The recent case of US$5.2 billion fine imposed on MTN is another case to the point. MTN had 
violated the SIM card registration rules by failing to disconnect non-registered SIMs in addition 
to failing to comply with the direction of seven-day dead line fixed by the Commission in 
August 2015 to remedy the breach (Isaac, 2015). SIM registration is a public interest issue 
because it has implication for national security. 
The fine of US$5.2 billion was for failure to deregister 5.1million SIM cards at a penalty of N 
200,000 (US$1,000) per SIM per contravention- Telephone Subscribers Regulations 2011 
(NCC, n.d.-c). Also in the 3rd quarter, 2015, the Commission sanctioned MTN with a fine of 
N80, 400,000 (US$402,000) for failure to deactivate 420 improperly registered SIM. These 
were achieved without a change in the existing enforcement rules but rather by the commitment 
of the new leadership of the Commission to play by the law by enforcing the existing rules 
(Osuagwu, 2015). MTN, as is the wont in the industry, had taken the Commission’s laxity in 
rule enforcement for granted (Otubu, 2013). In this instance, Umar Danbatta, the new Executive 
Vice Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of the Commission asserted, “the regulator cannot just 
stand by and watch as these various infringements are being committed with impunity. No 
responsible regulator will stand by and watch” (NCC.Communicator, 2015:10). 
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In contrast in the 2nd quarter 2015, the Commission under the previous leadership, imposed four 
sanctions totalling only N22 million (USD110,000) on MTN for various violations including 
the sale of pre-registered SIM cards, unapproved promotions and violation of Mobile 
Termination Rate (MTR) (Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Report, Q2 2015). These 
fines, which fell far below the existing, rules/fines highlighted in Table 13, did not obviously 
achieve the expected deterrent effect and the consequence is the present MTN predicament. 
This confirms that the set rule along with appropriate enforcement mechanism is crucial in 
engendering cooperative solutions (North, 1993) which facilitates the promotion of ordinary 
consumer interests which is part of policy objective.  
The MTN Group (MTNG) in South Africa described the fine as “A fine Mess” while Dobet 
Pater of African Analysis says it was quite hard-fisted, “but there seems to be no outright 
objection from MTN in the announcement of the fine” (Tshabalala, 2015); which indicates that 
due process and transparency were reflected in the enforcement action which was meant to alter 
the payoff in order to deter reoccurrence. Pater also conceded that the heavy fine was imposed 
as a “way to discourage uncompetitive behaviour and encourage compliance” (Tshabalala, 
2015). 
 MTNG in its 3rd November Press release reported that the Commission has approved the 
renewal and extension of the tenure of MTN’s operating spectrum to 2021. The renewal of the 
licence is conditional to MTN fulfilling its regulatory obligations. This indicates the 
Commission’s readiness to issue the red card – revocation of license. The Commission, through 
its Director of Public Affairs, stated “If you don’t make room for punishment, it can lead to 
impunity” and “There is a signal now that it won’t be business as usual” (Osuagwu, 2015).  
The imposition of the fine on the errant operator and the threat of red card have sent a strong 
message to the industry, which will engender greater level of compliance to rules (North, 1993). 
Consequently, it will enhance consumer interest because if through weak enforcement 
mechanisms the system creates room for rogue operators, they will abound (North, 2005) and 
the consumer will be the loser. 
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5.5.2 The Unfolding Fine Saga 
Early in December 2015, following a plea for leniency by MTN and pressure from officials of 
South Africa and subsequent intervention by President Buhari, the fine was reduced by 25% to 
N 780 billion (USD 3.4bn) and the deadline shifted from November 16 to December 31, 2015. 
However, on December 17, 2015, MTN announced its decision to challenge the fine in court, 
stating, “the manner of imposition of the fine and the quantum thereof is not in accordance with 
the Commission’s powers under the Nigerian Communication Act” (Adaramola & Nurudeen, 
2015). MTN also stated that both parties should stay further action in line with the ils pendens 
rule until the matter is finally determined. Meanwhile the imposition of the fine had sent a 
strong message across the sector even as it awaits the outcome of the litigation. 
As was stated earlier, monitoring and enforcement activities facilitate performance and 
constitute a defence of consumer interest and in so doing indicate what is construed as consumer 
interest. However, in spite of the Commission’s expansive enforcement powers the 
Enforcement Institution is being overwhelmed by pervasive contravention of the provisions of 
the Act.  All the findings point to laxity in the enforcement institution and processes, confirming 
that besides the presence of appropriate rules, the efficacy of the enforcement mechanism 
influences to different degrees the efficiency of the telecommunications institution in different 
settings (North, 2005). 
Effective enforcement in telecommunications is a key and complex task. It entails frequent 
monitoring to collect accurate data, high-level expertise to interpret the data accurately and the 
strong will to enforce compliance. This is important because the performance of the market 
depends on the enforcement outcomes. Without an effective and responsive enforcement 
institution, the rules set out in the Act and regulations are of no avail or at the best remain mere 
optional guidelines. 
5.6 Conclusion   
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to answer the question: if and how have the legislators, 
regulator and market players in Nigeria defined the ordinary consumer interest in the field of 
mobile communications? 
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This study addressed the question by evaluating how each of the components of the 
decomposed Nigerian communications institution – mobile policy, mobile law, mobile 
administration and mobile enforcement – has enabled or not enabled the realisation of the 
consumer interest and a summary is presented here. 
The NTP while setting the policy direction and the characteristic of the envisioned 
communication services telecommunications sector had the interest of the consumer in view. 
The mobile law established a regulatory framework and an independent regulatory Commission 
with the mandate to promote and protect the interest of consumers. These are vital for a 
sustained campaign for the promotion and protection of ordinary consumer interest. The 
interests of the consumer, which the Act specifically undertakes to promote and protect are not 
explicitly defined or listed in the Act but are embedded in and are deducible from several 
provisions of the Act and regulations. 
However, some provisions of the mobile law are not in the interest of the consumer: 
1) The directive on the structuring and setting of tariff rates and levels solely to attract 
investments does not align with the mobile policy objective of affordable tariffs for ordinary 
consumers and the directive that it is appropriate to consider consumers’ interest in regulating 
prices before full-blown competition is achieved. Unaffordable tariffs will adversely affect the 
accessibility of basic telecommunications services particularly for those in low-income groups. 
2) There are no disclosure guidelines that make it mandatory for the licensees to supply 
information on the tariff rate, quality level, and the terms and conditions of the pre-paid service 
at the point of sale as is applicable to services contract. This lack of transparency militates 
against the ordinary consumers’ interest in the availability of information that will enable 
informed choice and fair redress mechanism. 3) The mobile law restricts the concept of 
vulnerable consumers to the disabled and the elderly persons. It would appear that no attention 
is accorded to other vulnerable consumers, for example, those with little education, the low 
socio-economic group, and those in difficult-to-access rural areas. 4) The failure of the 
Commission to ensure that licensees pay compensation to consumers is in itself a gross 
violation of consumer interest in fair redress mechanism (Quality of Services Regulations, 
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14(b)). The ordinary consumers suffer the multiple loss of frustration and economic loss 
because of poor quality of service including sometimes complete loss of service and lose their 
compensation. The difference between what the consumer is gets and what the law provides is 
a consequence of the prevailing laxity in the enforcement of rules (Bardaragoda, 2000). 
The Consumer code of practice regulations, 2007 (General Code) was enacted in 2007, six 
years after the liberalisation of the sector. During this period, the ordinary consumer was 
exposed to the activities of the services providers without any law defining how the services 
providers should engage with the ordinary consumers. This evidence clearly shows that the 
Commission was not consumer-focused. It also explains how the neglect of consumer interest 
became entrenched as a norm in the mobile sector, which the late introduction of the General 
Code is unable to reverse. 
In Mobile Administration the concept of consumer interests varies across the mobile 
organization (the actors) both in content and terminology and engendering different levels of 
awareness and the degree of importance attached to consumer interest issues in both the policy 
and law. This creates the opportunity for some stakeholders to take advantage of the lapse in 
how the concept of consumer interest is construed to violate consumer interest rules. The result 
is that the Commission and the industry players are not consistent in their practice in upholding 
the consumer interest at a level in line with the policy and law rather they routinely undermine 
consumers interest; subordinating the consumer interests to their interests by violating the 
existing rules.  
Under the mobile enforcement institution (monitoring and enforcement processes and 
procedures), the Commission has exclusive power and competence to monitor and enforce 
compliance of all persons to the provisions of the Act and its regulations. However, the 
monitoring and enforcement institution lacks the technical facilities to carry out effective 
monitoring of the Nigerian telecommunications landscape on a regular basis probably due to 
the transaction cost it entails.  
More importantly, there has been an obvious lack of political will to impose appropriate 
sanctions on erring operators. Consequently, in spite of the Commission’s expansive 
enforcement powers the Enforcement Institution is being overwhelmed by pervasive 
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contravention of the provisions of the Act. The contraventions of consumer interest issues range 
from violations of tariff rule, failure to meet Quality of Services key performance indicators 
and provisions of the General Code to noncompliance with enforcement directives. These 
contraventions thrive because of the endemic laxity in the enforcement process that allows gaps 
between the mobile law on one hand and the mobile administration and enforcement on the 
other hand because how the game is played depends not only on the formal rules but also on 
the effectiveness of enforcement (North, 2005). The evidence of reoccurrences suggest that 
enforcement actions do not provide sufficient incentive for compliance but rather the soft-
handed- pussy-footed strategy of the Commission creates room for impunity and it prevails. 
These are some of the symptoms of the prevailing conflict of interest, which is part of the huge 
agency problem afflicting the Commission discussed in chapter 3. 
Therefore, regarding the first research question, this study holds that the legislators have defined 
the interest of the consumer through the instruments of the National Telecommunications 
Policy and the Communications Act and the establishment of an independent regulator invested 
with exclusive powers and legal instruments to execute the communications institution. In 
practice, the Commission is not fully consumer focused because it suffers from acute agency 
problems and conflicts of interest. The services providers in turn exploit the compromised 
regulatory institution to violate consumer interests with impunity. Hence, consumer interest is 
greatly undermined by the inefficient mobile administration and the prevalent violations of the 
provisions in the Act and regulations, which the soft-handed strategy of the enforcement 
institution is unable to curtail. Therefore, the policy and legal objectives in this regard are yet 
to be realised. 
In the next chapter, this study looks at the extent the ordinary consumers are able to contribute 
to regulatory decisions that affect their interest.  
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CHAPTER 6 Ordinary consumer influential participation in the regulatory process 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses mainly on the evaluation of institutional structures and processes for the 
ordinary consumers’ influential participation in the regulatory process and seeks to answer the 
question: focusing on regulatory structures and processes, how have ordinary consumers been 
represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile market in 2001? 
In chapter 4, it was stated that consumer representation involves engaging consumers in five 
main areas. These are provision of information, consultation, compliant resolution, and 
provision of choice, and efficient framework for consumer representation (Muzzini, 2005; ITU 
2006). The provision of choice is usually inherent in liberalised telecommunications markets. 
Here the focus is on provisions that facilitate ordinary consumers’ choice making in such a 
manner that it enhances their welfare; the issues to be looked at include the availability, 
presentation, and accessibility of information. These factors are essential if information is to 
achieve the intended objective. Consultation (including research) is a veritable means of 
ensuring ordinary consumers’ involvement in the regulatory decision process. In this study, the 
attention will be not only on the provisions made in this regard but also on the ordinary 
consumers’ capacity to use those provisions. Ordinary consumer complaints management will 
be the focus of the next chapter and hence it will not feature in the present chapter. Therefore, 
this investigation will examine the structures and processes, which are specifically provided to 
facilitate the realisation of the four key dimensions of consumer representation as have been 
explained above.  
In addressing the research question this study, will employ the extended Institutional 
Decomposition Model framework, which was used in chapter 5. The analysis will be based on 
the four main components of the telecommunications institution– mobile policy, mobile law, 
mobile administration and mobile enforcement - and their main aspects in order to ascertain 
their individual contributions to the four dimensions of ordinary consumer representation. 
The three aspects of NIE, which guided the investigation in chapter 5, are also applicable under 
slight different aspects in this chapter: transaction cost, agency and property rights. The 
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transaction cost covers the ‘costliness’ of actualising the provisions in the mobile law. Agency 
problem will arise if the regulator circumvents those provisions in the pursuit of interest other 
than the consumer interest or acts in a non-transparent manner in the application of those 
provisions. In the context of the current research question, property rights refer to issues 
regarding consumer advocacy bodies. It covers the “concept of a representative body reflecting 
the interests of constituent groups” (North, 1990:49) such as the ordinary consumer groups, 
who facilitate exchanges between consumers and their mobile service providers and the 
Commission. 
Starting with the National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) this study will seek to find out if 
the NTP in its vision of the proposed telecommunications sector had issued any directions that 
relate to the four dimensions of consumer representation listed above and if there are directives 
on how these will be achieved in practice. Thereafter attention will be shifted to the mobile law 
(the Act and its secondary regulations) to assess if the provisions in the mobile policy have been 
given adequate legal backing. Rules are crucial to define how the game should be played (North, 
2005). Specifically, this study will attempt to ascertain if there are provisions in mobile law for 
formal structures and processes to facilitate the actualisation of the provisions of the law and to 
ensure that ordinary consumers’ opinions and interests are adequately captured in the regulatory 
decision-making processes. Finally, this study will also examine how the mobile administration 
and enforcement components of the mobile institution have contributed to influencing the 
realisation of the policy objectives as it relates to the representation of the ordinary consumer. 
It is helpful to recall that the Mobile Administration is conceptualised to encompass facilities, 
processes, procedures, standards, and accountability mechanisms established to facilitate the 
implementation of the mobile policy, mobile law, and mobile enforcement.  The mobile 
enforcement includes the enforcement mechanisms for monitoring, assessment and 
enforcement of appropriate sanctions to achieve compliance to mobile law. 
6.2 Mobile Policy: Consumer representation is in focus 
The National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) created the framework for an independent 
regulatory institution for the telecoms sector. This condition, which is fundamental for 
facilitating the inclusion of consumer’s voice in regulatory decision--making process is further 
197 
 
strengthened with the provision of a window for the creation of institutional framework for 
consumer representation. The NTP provides that stakeholders – operators and consumers – 
“shall be afforded access to the Commission’s proceedings and the right to submit opinion in 
support of their interest…. Parties shall have the right to appeal such decisions through 
transparent administrative and legal channels” (NTP, section 3.1.4.1). The NTP with this 
provision reemphasised two fundamental consumer rights: the right to be informed –through 
access to proceedings, and the right to be heard – that is to submit opinions. These fundamental 
rights are also guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution and based on them consumer advocates 
may engage in any campaign of their choice to raise consumer awareness and amplify the voice 
of consumers (CI, 2014). 
Establishing a right is one thing and having the wherewithal to facilitate the realisation of the 
right is quite another. The NTP did not only state that consumers have a right to the 
Commission’s proceedings, it emphasised that consumers shall be afforded access. In a formal 
sense, it means that consumers shall be assisted and provisions made to enable them to exercise 
this right. The implication is that consumer representation, as a means of assisting consumers 
to exercise their rights is a policy injunction. The extent to which the mobile law, administration 
and enforcement institutions have responded to this policy directive is the issue to be examined 
in the following sections. 
6.3 Mobile law: Legal provision for consumer representation is crucial 
Implementing the NTP provision for consumers and other stakeholders to be informed and 
make input to the Commission’s proceedings, necessarily involves the establishment of 
appropriate laws, structures and processes that will facilitate the effective engagement with 
consumers and their representatives. The Act gave effect to the provision of NTP as it relates 
to consumers right to be informed and to be heard, stated above through its directives on 1) 
public inquiry, 2) gathering and publication of information, and 3) other regulations on issues 
relating to consumer engagement. However, there is no provision in the Act for independent 
statutory consumer representation bodies. 
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6.3.1. Public Inquiry: A high jump for consumers  
Apart from mandatory public inquiries, for example, before enacting new regulations or 
reviewing existing regulations (Act, sections 71, 72), the Act also enjoins the Commission to 
hold public inquiries in response to a written request from a person or on its own initiative on 
any matter that relates to the administration of the Act and is of significant interest to the public. 
The Act also stipulates that all public inquiries shall be adequately publicised, in the manner 
the Commission deems appropriate, with regards to timing, nature of the subject matter and the 
period within which members of the public are invited to make submissions (Act, sections 57, 
58(1)). It enjoins the Commission to consider any submission made within the time limit with 
the proviso that submissions made by members of the public shall be “in the form and the nature 
specified by the Commission” (Act, Section 58(3)). This means that all submissions to public 
inquiries must conform to the format and standard prescribed by the Commission. Furthermore, 
the Act in section 60 affords consumers access to the Commission’s proceedings by directing 
that the Commission shall publicise its findings in respect of any public inquiry within 45 days 
of the conclusion of the inquiry. It is also stated that a person whose interest is adversely 
affected by any decision of the Commission may request in writing to the Commission for an 
explanation of the reason for the decision. These provisions of the law are to ensure that 
consumers’ and other stakeholders’ inputs are solicited and taken into consideration in the 
Commission’s decision making process in a fair and transparent manner, however meeting the 
requirements poses considerable challenge to consumers. 
Public inquiry gives consumers the opportunity to participate in the Commission’s decision-
making process and influence the way their interests are promoted. Hence, information 
regarding public inquiries is very important for effective consumer engagement. The 
Commission’s usual manner (which is also applicable to services providers) is to publicise on 
its website and in two national newspapers (General Code, section 7). This may be adequate 
for literate consumers who have access to the internet and the print media but it excludes a large 
portion of the consumers who do not have access to electronic media or who are illiterate. 
Hence, the mode of publicising information adopted by the Commission is clearly inadequate 
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because it does not cater for all categories of consumers. The outcome of inadequate 
communication about public inquiries is examined in the next section on mobile administration. 
The directive that submissions made by members of the public, to public inquiries shall be “in 
the form and nature specified by the Commission” (Act, section 58(3)) is a difficult hurdle not 
for services providers but only for consumers. This requirement presumes a well-articulated 
and informed input, which may be beyond the capacity of the ordinary consumers. It points to 
the need for the ordinary consumers to have resort to the services of a representative who is 
able to articulate and amplify their diverse voices and present it at a quality (form and nature) 
that meets the prescribed criteria and is comparable to the well-researched input of service 
providers. Participating in a public inquiry is not an easy task for the ordinary consumer. It 
implies substantial transaction cost for the ordinary consumer and their representatives - time, 
research and secretarial costs, - which constitute a grave impediment to consumers’ 
participation in public inquiries. Hence, there is need for legislative provisions aimed at 
mitigating these costs. 
6.3.3 Consumer advocacy is missing in the Act 
In its provisions, the Act established a broad framework aimed at empowering and educating 
consumers through the provision of adequate information and for making their input into the 
Commission’s decision-making processes. As was discussed in section 6.2, the NTP indicated 
that formal provisions should be made to enable consumers to participate in the Commission’s 
decision-making process. It has been argued in section 6.3.1 that participating in these laudable 
provisions, with the conditions, requirements and the costs involved, presents enormous 
practical difficulties for ordinary consumers. It necessarily implies the active involvement of 
well-informed and well-resourced consumer representation/advocacy bodies. However, in spite 
of this obvious requirement the Act made no specific provision for any framework for the 
establishment, inclusion or support of independent consumer advocacy groups. This is in sharp 
contrast to the Consumer Protection Council Act which “encourages the formation of voluntary 
consumer groups” as one of its prime objectives (CPC Act, section 2(h)); though it is a weak 
provision. Providing legal backing to consumer representation is crucial because institutions 
matter. Institutions are essential to create the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1999). Without legal 
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provisions the role of the consumer representative bodies remains undefined, and by 
implication, irrelevant. 
Informing and educating consumers, expedient as it may be, is not sufficient to guarantee that 
ordinary consumers will be able to participate in the Commission’s decision making process 
nor that consumers will be able to make the right choice when faced with difficult choices. 
Ordinary consumers need support and guidance in order to play an effective role in the industry. 
Consumer representation is also about facilitating the realisation of the Commission’s mandate 
to promote and protect the interest of consumers; providing a legal backing to consumer 
representation is in the best interest of both the consumers and the regulator. It is a necessary 
condition to guarantee that consumers benefit from the provisions of the Law and that the 
regulator and services providers are held accountable for the implementation of their mandate 
and license conditions. This issue is of utmost importance in Nigeria with very little history of 
civil societies and advocacy groups.  
6.4 Mobile administration: Mechanisms, procedures and processes for consumer 
representation 
6.4.1 Informing consumers: ‘Plain English’ is not ‘clear language’ 
Apart from public inquires, the Act mandates the Commission to provide information to 
consumers through the publication of Annual Reports. The Act stipulates that the annual report 
shall include: operation and administration of the Act, efficiency of licenses in the provision of 
services, quality of services, tariff rates and charges paid by consumers, adequacy and 
availability of services in all parts of Nigeria and other relevant matters (Section 89). The 
publication of some of this information is mandatory as prescribed in the Quality of Services 
Regulations (QoS) and General Code (sections 7, 9, 10 and Part 2 respectively). 
 The General Code mandates service providers to provide information on their services that is 
“complete, accurate and up to date and in simple, clear language in print and electronic format” 
on the services providers’ web site and retail outlets (General Code, section 6(1), 2a). The QoS 
further stipulates that the Commission may publish some or all the Key Performance Indicators 
(KPI) not more than two months after the end of a reporting period in a tabular format. It further 
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requires the Commission to publish “any other information or comparison of services quality 
to help the Commission and/or consumers to assess the performance of competing Licensees” 
(QoS Regulations, 9(2), 10f). Again all information shall be publicised in a manner that the 
Commission deems appropriate which is plain English in electronic and print media. 
Simple plain English is not ‘clear language’ for consumers who do not understand English. For 
example, in 2011, the data from the Commission’s contact centres show that only 23% of the 
complaints received were in English while 73% were made in local languages as depicted in 
Table 14 below. 
TABLE 14.  COMPLAINTS RECEIVED AT COMMISSION CONTACT CENTRES IN CLEAR 
LANGUAGE 
Language No. of 
complaints 
%  
English 10784 23 
Hausa 31238 67 
Igbo 579 1 
Yoruba 1843 4 
Pidgin 1943 4 
  Source: CAB Annual Report for 2011  
If the purpose of these provisions for information in a prescribed manner is to ensure that 
consumers will be able to access and assess the information and thereby be educated, 
empowered and sufficiently discerning to make informed choices of services and service 
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providers and to protect the interest of consumers from unfair practices, then the information 
ought to be also available in the three main Nigerian languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba): in 
the language the illiterate and those with poor education will understand: in this regard radio 
programmes in vernacular is also a viable option. In that way, it will be assessable to a larger 
body of ordinary consumers. The inadequacy of the print and electronic media alone for 
disseminating information to ordinary consumers was noted above. On information to 
consumers, the Mobile Law in Section 6(2d) of the General Code includes a curious provision 
whose implementation presents practical difficulties to the ordinary consumers. The section 
enjoins the licensee who seeks a change to tariff rates to notify their consumers “in an effective 
manner that lets them comment to the Commission on the proposed changes….” It is not clear, 
how and in what manner the consumers are to make their comments to the Commission. If we 
presume that the affected consumers have been well informed and are able to understand the 
intricate calculations that go into the determination of tariff rates, the question remains: if and 
how does the Commission intend to handle the comments of a few million individual consumers 
who may be willing to do so, without the involvement of consumer bodies? Moreover, the 
burden of justifying changes to tariff rates should not be laid on the ordinary consumer; the 
burden ought to be laid on the licensee who seeks such changes.  
6.4.2. Consumer Codes: No room for consumer input  
The Consumer Code of Practice Regulation 2007 and the General Consumer Code of Practice 
(General Code), govern the provision of telecommunications service to ordinary consumers. 
They set out the minimum requirements and the minimum standard and related issues pertaining 
to how services providers shall deal reasonably with consumers (Act, section 104b). With 
respect to individual codes, the Consumer Code of Practice Regulations provides that a licensee 
may, at any time, prepare and submit an individual consumer code to the Commission for 
approval with the proviso that: 
“Individual consumer codes prepared and submitted by licensees shall include at least 
the terms and conditions of the General Code or equivalent terms and conditions that 
are no less favourable to consumer than the General Code” (NCA, 2003: Section4(3)). 
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The General Consumer Code of Practice covers a wide range of consumer interest and related 
issues, such as provision of information to consumers, consumer billing and charging and tariff 
setting rules. Other consumer interests addressed in the general code include quality of service, 
resolution of consumer complaints and protection of consumer information. 
Neither the Communications Act nor the General Code made any direct provision for consumer 
input in the development or review of individual consumer code as would be expected if the 
codes were to address the ordinary consumers’ needs and interests. Hence, the mobile operators, 
in practice, did not carry along their ordinary consumers during the development of the 
consumer code of practice. The implication is that the mere existence of the codes may not 
serve the consumer interest or guarantee their effective implementation. Hulsink (1999) asserts 
that policy and its effective implementation are the result of negotiations between organisations 
and this is missing in this case. 
The NCA (2003: section 106(6)) provides for an annual review of the consumer code and 
ratification by the Commission before publication whilst the General Code (section 5) enjoins 
“…the commission would expect to consult on any such changes”. This provides the window 
for consumer input to code development but unfortunately, the window has remained closed 
for there is no evidence that the General Code has been reviewed since its enactment in 2007. 
There is also no evidence that any individual industry code has been reviewed or that the 
Commission has held any public consultation on any consumer code as directed (sections 57 
and 58 of the Act). This implies that consumers are exposed, without any safeguards, to new 
harm and challenges, which continue to develop in the fast changing telecommunications 
market because the outdated codes cannot adequately address the prevailing circumstances of 
the ordinary consumers. 
6.4.3. Administration of Public Inquiries: Are consumers not to be heard? 
As stated earlier the Commission is mandated to carry out public inquiries before the enactment 
or review of regulations/guidelines and consumer codes (Act, Sections 71, 72). From 2001 to 
2015, the Commission has enacted a total of 11 regulations and 16 guidelines. The Commission 
carried out twelve public inquiries, between 2009 and 2015, during which it received 49 
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submissions: 1 from a consumer body; 1 from Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB); 2 from legal 
firms; 2 from Government; 3 from industry bodies; 2 from installation companies; and 38 from 
services providers. Out of the 12 public inquiries, only three inquiries have bearing on 
consumers’ immediate concerns, the Mobile Number Portability Regulations, SIM card 
registration and SIM replacement. The other public inquires pertain to network issues as shown 
in Table 15. It is also of note that the Commission received zero submissions in the two public 
inquiries on satellite communications scheduled on July 15, 2009. This may have been a 
reflection of the general apathy towards the Commissions public inquiries.  
TABLE 15.  PUBLIC ENQUIRIES 2009-2015 
Date & Place Title Purpose No of 
Responses 
Publications & 
Notices 
22 March 
2013 
NCC Abuja 
Draft Mobile 
Number 
Portability 
Regulations 
Incentive for SP 
to improve QoS 
and consumer 
satisfaction 
4  
(all Service 
Providers 
(SPs)) 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
18/03/2013 &  
15-17/3/2013   
21 February 
2013 
NCC Abuja 
Draft Annual 
Operating Levy 
Regulations 
Administrative 
purposes & 
clarify doubts  
6 
(all SPs) 
NCC websites  
3 Newspapers 
5/2/2013 & 
6/2//2013 
9 December 
2010 
NCC Abuja 
Registration of 
SIM card 
Regulations 
Enhance  the 
security of lives 
and property, 
Ensure database 
5 
(3 SPs, 1  
industry body,  
1 consumer 
body)  
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on 
7/12/2010 
9 February 
2010 
NCC Abuja 
Guidelines on 
common and 
premium short 
codes operation 
To provide 
operational 
guidelines for 
short codes 
4 
(all mobile SP) 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on  9/1/2010 
14 July 2009 
NCC, Abuja 
Guidelines on 
technical 
specification for 
installation of 
Masks & Tower 
To set standards 
for the industry 
compliance 
4 
(2 SPs and 2 
installation 
companies) 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on 12/06/2009 
& 15/06/1009 
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Source: Author: Extracted from Reports on Public Inquiry published by the NCC Legal 
Services Directorate (2009-2015) 
15 July 2009 
NCC Abuja 
Satellite 
Network filing 
processes and 
procedures 
Procedures for 
management of 
satellite filing 
No submissions 
were received 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on 
12/06/2009 
&15/06/2009 
15 July 2009 
NCC Abuja 
Commercial 
Satellite  
Communications 
guidelines 
Provisions to 
facilitate the 
regulation of 
satellite 
communications 
No submissions 
were received 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on 12/06/2009 
&15/06/2009 
12th July 2009 
NCC Abuja 
Advertising and 
promotions 
guidelines 
To set minimum 
requirements and 
standards to 
ensure ethical 
marketing and 
promotions 
6 
(4 SPs, 
ALTON and 
CAB) 
 
7 July 2015 
NCC  Abuja 
Licencing 
regulation 
Rules to ensure 
efficient/effective 
licencing process 
4 
(3 SPs and 
1 legal firm) 
NCC web site 
3 Newspapers 
on 24, 25, 30 
June 2015 
7 July 2015 
NCC  Abuja 
Lawful 
interception of 
communications 
regulation 
Rules on type, 
privacy issues, 
collection of 
info/disclosure 
and penalties 
5 
(3SPs, National 
Human Rights 
Commission 
and1 consumer) 
NCC web site 
3 Newspapers 
on 24, 25, 30 
June 2015 
14 July 2015 
NCC  Abuja 
Enforcement 
Processes 
Regulations 
T provide robust 
regulatory 
enforcement 
framework  
6 
(4 SPs,  
1 Industry body 
& 1legal firm)  
NCC web site 
3 Newspapers 
on 24, 25, 30 
June 2015 
14 July 2015 
NCC  Abuja 
SIM 
replacement 
guideline 
To ensure secure 
process for SIM 
replacement 
5 
(5 SPs) 
NCC websites 
2 Newspapers 
on 
24/06/2015& 
55/06/2015 
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The public inquiries have not been effective in soliciting consumers’ input into the 
Commission’s decision-making process because of two main reasons. First, under the mobile 
administration, there is no clear definition of consumer rights, as was noted in Chapter 5 and 
the consumer’s right to be heard is misconstrued by the Commission. In its Fact Sheet on 
Consumer Bill of Rights, the in-house Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) defines the consumer’s 
‘right to be heard’ as: 
Right to be heard: “right to get fair, inexpensive and quick redress of grievances. 
Consumers must have accessible knowledge of the complaint process and steps needed 
to lodge a complaint. Consumers have the right to a consumer-oriented response for 
complaints and as prescribed by the consumer code of practice regulation”, and 
Right to Timely Redress: “consumers have the right to timely dispute resolution by 
service providers. Service providers must provide clear information on customer bills 
of exchange explaining how and where consumers can complain. Consumers must have 
their complaints addressed in a timely manner without harassment” (NCC, n.d.-a). 
This definition by CAB is erroneous and restrictive. It is about complaints and their resolution 
after a problem has occurred. CAB’s definition of ‘the right to be heard’ is not in alignment 
with the National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) directive that consumers shall be accorded 
“the right to submit opinion in support of their interests” (NTP, Section 3.1 – 4.1). Equating 
the ‘right to be heard’ to the ‘right to redress’ is a misrepresentation. It portrays that the 
Commission does not recognise the consumer’s ‘right to be heard’ and it has implications for 
the way the Commission envisages the role of the consumer.  
In contrast, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) in its Consumer Bill of Rights 
makes clear distinction between:  
- “The right to make representations to those delivering or regulating and/or governing 
the provision of communications services on matters pertaining to the services offered 
to them” and 
- “The right to complain with regards to quality, delays in provision of rectification, 
quantity and prices of such goods and services offered” (KCC, 2011). 
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Consumer complaints are important verifiable indicators of consumer experience but they are 
not substitutes for consumer meaningful participation in regulatory decision-making process. 
CAB’s perception of the consumer ‘right to be heard’ explains the Commission’s apparent 
indifference to consumers’ non-participation in public inquiries and other regulatory decision 
making process. In the CAB’s perception, consumers are passive recipients. This is collaborated 
in the research report in Box 4.  
The second reason why consumers are not heard is that the theme of the inquiries did not 
address consumers’ immediate concerns. As was noted earlier, out of the 11 public inquiries 
held by the Commission since 2009, only three (SIM card registration, Mobile Number 
Portability and SIM card replacement) were related to consumer interest.  This is a direct 
consequence of the dearth of consumer advocacy bodies; a result of the exclusion of consumer 
advocacy from the Act. 
BOX 4.  CONSUMERS ARE REDUCED TO MERE SPECTATORS 
This work has…conceded that consumers benefit from the activities of regulatory 
agencies via improved quality of products and services, the fact remains that lack of 
active participation or involvement of consumers in the scheme of things reduces them 
to mere spectators. This denies them the opportunity to act as real and recognised 
drivers to influence the market place as envisaged by this project. 
This state of affairs is created by gaps in the statutory framework as well as nonchalant 
attitude of many consumers to the enforcement of their rights. Most of the existing laws 
in the field of consumer protection do not involve consumers directly either as members 
of governing bodies or as parties to be consulted by product or service providers. . .  
Source: Research report on the state of consumer protection in Nigeria: A review of consumer 
protection in the telecommunications sector in Nigeria (CI, 2014:156). 
Without active and well-resourced consumer representation bodies, consumers’ concerns and 
issues that lead to consumer detriment will not be escalated to the Commission’s attention. This 
confirms that ordinarily the regulator cannot represent the consumers (Cannock, 2002). 
Consumer representation is not the function of the regulator. The regulators mandate is to 
enable the consumers to voice their opinions and to consider the consumers’ views in its rule 
making process (Act, sections 57, 71, 72). Without independent, well-informed and adequately 
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resourced consumer input, it will be difficult to balance the well-informed and well-resourced 
industry representation. 
6.4.4. Consumer Outreach Programme: Consumers out there are beyond the reach  
The Consumer Affairs Bureau outreach programme is the Bureau’s flagship instrument for 
engaging consumers. It is organised in three tiers, targeted at different consumer cohorts as 
follows: the first tier, Telecoms Consumer Parliament (TCP) aims at city dwellers, is scheduled 
to hold monthly in a state capital; the second tier, Consumer Outreach Programme (COP), a bi-
monthly event, is held in an urban city; and the third tier, Consumer Town Hall Meeting (CTM) 
also a bi-monthly event, targets rural dwellers. Hence, the Commission plans a 60 outreach 
programmes per annum. At the present level of scheduling it will take 3 years to reach out to 
each of the 36 states capitals through the TCP and 33 years to hold one CTM event in each of 
the 774 local government areas of the country. Apart from its limited reach, the outreach 
programmes translate to a one-off event for consumers without the possibility of a follow up 
because of its extremely few events per year and consequently long cycle period. Therefore, 
the outreach events have made no significant impact on consumers.  
Although the Commission has four zonal offices, all the outreach programmes are designed, 
and executed from the Commission’s head office at the Federal Capital, Abuja. This partly 
accounts for the inconsistence in the execution of the outreach programmes: each year the actual 
number of events executed falls grossly short of the plan of 60 events per year as shown in 
Table 16.  
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TABLE 16.  CONSUMER AFFAIRS BUREAU OUTREACH PROGRAMME 
Event Plan 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Telecoms consumer 
Parliament 
12 7 5 5 3 3 - 
Consumer outreach 
Programme 
12 6 11 7 8 8 6 
Consumer Town hall 
Meeting 
12 2 4 - 4 3 2 
Total 24 15 20 12 15 14 8 
 Source: Author Compiled from CAB Consumer Portal (2015)  
At almost the end of 2015 and in its 12 years the Commission has hosted 76 Telecoms 
Consumer Parliaments (TCPs), 75 Consumer Outreach Programmes (COPs), and 16 Consumer 
Town hall Meetings (CTMs) totalling to 167 events. There are no statistical records of the 
attendance at the outreach events. If one assumes a high average attendance figure of 250 
participants per event, the Commission in its 167 (TCPs + COPs + CTMs) events would have 
reached out to only 41,750 consumers in 12 years. There are no records to suggest that 
information/proceedings of the outreach programmes are extended beyond the event centres 
through leaflets or other means of grass root campaigns. Hence, the reach of the outreach events 
is severely constricted. Apart from the inadequacy of the structure of the outreach programmes 
as a means of reaching the consumers, there is also a dearth of information to the consumers. 
For instance, in 2011, CAB organised 20 outreach events. The theme for 18 of those events was 
“SIM Card Registration”. The implication was that apart from whatever ad hoc issues that might 
have cropped up at the outreach events, 90% of the information delivered to the consumers in 
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that year was on SIM registration. Consumer awareness of the SIM card registration exercise 
would have been more effectively communicated via radio, TV and the print media.  
The outreach programmes were primarily designed as an interactive platform where consumers, 
services providers and regulator meet to share information on consumer related issues. 
However, due to very high incidences of consumer complaints the emphasis was shifted to 
resolving complaints and the events increasing accorded more attention to the resolution of 
minor/low cost consumer complaints rather than to informing and educating the consumers. 
Resolving minor complaints on the spot gave the service providers the opportunity to play to 
the gallery while neglecting the root causes of the complaints or the primary need to inform and 
educate the consumers. Consequently, the outreach programmes have achieved very limited 
impact in raising the level of consumer awareness. The Commission recently became aware of 
this fact as the Head of Legal and Regulatory Services confirms that, “Despite all the awareness 
programmes and campaigns by the Commission over the years – Telecoms Consumer 
Parliament, Consumer Outreach Programmes and Consumer Town Hall meetings – we have 
found out that telecommunications subscribers are still not well informed as we want them to 
be” (Ogbodo, 2014). 
The cause of this short fall is that the information dissemination structures and processes of the 
Commission, and its overall strategy are inadequate to reach consumers out there.  Hence, the 
consumers remain largely uninformed and uneducated with regard to their rights. In 2012, this 
fact was collaborated in the report of the Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCC.CSS, 2012). For 
example, consumers showed a very low level of awareness of their rights and that leads to their 
detriment. 31.6% are unaware that they can opt out of unsolicited SMS while 42.5% wrongly 
believes that they cannot opt out (NCC.CSS, 2012). Again, the Commission’s Head of Legal 
Services and Regulation reiterates, “consumers across the country get ripped off or get into 
trouble with their service providers because they are not sufficiently informed” (Ogbodo, 2014). 
The consumers’ low level of awareness of key quality of Services parameters is shown in Table 
17. 
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TABLE 17. CONSUMER LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF RIGHTS 
 Lack of awareness 
of rights 
% of total sample 
Knowledge of right 
% of total sample 
Max waiting time (customer 
care centre 
10.6 28.8 
Time to load credit 10.4 11 
Max waiting time (call centre) 10.1 37.4 
Period before losing number 22.6 19.5 
Opt-out of unsolicited 
messages 
31.6 25.8 
Aware of number portability 22.3 - 
Source: Adapted from Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCC.CSS, 2012:117) 
In an attempt to redirect the outreach programmes to improve consumer outcomes, the 
Commission introduced the repackaged version of the Telecommunications Consumer 
Parliament (TCP) programme in 2014. The new strategy is focused on making the forum a 
platform for services providers to show “graphic illustration to better convince the consumers” 
of what they are doing to address consumer issues (Okonji, 2014). Although it is early to assess 
the outcome of the repackaged TCP, providing comparative information that will enable 
consumers make better choices is more important than advertising services providers’ activities.  
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TABLE 18.  CONSUMER LEVEL OF AWARENESS 
Source: Adapted from Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCC.CSS, 2012: 118) 
The provision of information to consumers does not appear to be a priority for service providers 
either. In spite of the provisions of the General Code and Quality Services Regulation 2007, the 
NCC Consumer Satisfaction Survey conducted in 2012 reports the unavailability of consumer 
contracts and code of practice on operators’ websites: “Our inspection of GSM operators’ 
websites located no customer contracts and only one customer code of practice” (NNC.CSS, 
2012:65). This study confirms that AIRTEL is the only network operator whose consumer code 
is on its website. This is of note that this issue, which was reported in the Commission’s first 
ever Consumer Survey had not featured in the trumpeted Telecommunications Consumer 
Parliament (TCP) and has not, attracted any sanction by the Commission. This is another 
example of the Commission overlooking the contravention of the General Code of Practice. 
 Can you opt out of 
getting unsolicited 
SMS (%)? 
Are you aware of toll free 
no. you can use to contact 
NCC call centre (%)? 
NO 42.5 88.0 
YES 25.8 11.3 
DON’T KNOW 30.8 - 
NO ANSWER 0.8 0.7 
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6.5. Mobile Enforcement 
6.5.1 ‘Minor infractions’: Eroding the enforcement institution 
Lack of awareness, which results from an inadequate and ineffective information disseminating 
process was noted by the Commission, in the previous section, as a major cause of consumer 
detriment. The Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) in its 2011, 2012 and 2013 Annual/Quarterly 
Reports consistently highlighted the breach of the General Code and of the Quality of Services 
Regulations 2012, which deal with the provision of information to consumers and some 
parameters of the thresholds on Call Centres respectively. The breaches of consumer rights and 
set rules include, Insufficient Customer Care Centres (CCC) spread across the country and 
inaccessibility of Customer Care help lines of service providers. These issues are examined in 
detail in the next chapter. However, there is no evidence that any enforcement action has been 
taken against any service providers for any of these breaches. 
The breaches are by no means minor because they have implications for consumers’ everyday 
experience. For example, CAB in 2011 revealed that some states had only one CCC while some 
states have none. The reports equally highlighted the inadequacy of having CCC only in state 
capitals. Furthermore, customer care lines are practically inaccessible with the rate of failed call 
attempts to the Customer Care help lines ranging from 57% to 91% among the services 
providers. The Commission’s contact centres did not fare any better: the report stated that the 
rate of failed call attempts to the Commission’s contact centres stood at 25%. When this failed 
call attempt rate is viewed in the light of the consumers’ low level of awareness (11%) of the 
Commission’s contact centre (NCC.CSS, 2012), it is easy to appreciate that only very few 
consumers get through to the Commission. The implication is that the consumers are on their 
own: they cannot get attention or help when they need it and this impact negatively on their 
quality of experience.  
 It would be of benefit to consumers if tables of comparison of these factors, which may 
constitute the ‘minor’ infractions, are published, distributed and discussed at the outreach 
programmes. This will further consumers’ awareness of their rights and empower them to make 
informed choices of service providers. This fact is supported by the NCC.CSS (2012) finding 
214 
 
that consumers from the South-West zone who have a higher socio-economic status and higher 
level of satisfaction expressed a greater likelihood of changing service providers. The survey 
report suggests that this may be associated with “high level of awareness with consumer rights 
and an understanding of what is involved in changing providers” (NCC.CSS, 2012:56).  
Awareness influences expectation and drives the assertion of rights. Publishing the ‘minor’ 
breaches is a sure way of empowering consumers and encouraging compliance. On the other 
hand, failure to publish them will eventually erode the enforcement institution because the 
service providers will be inclined to ignore completely those thresholds on the ground that they 
are unimportant. 
6.5.2. ‘Major’ contraventions: Bane of the enforcement institution 
The contraventions that fall into the category of “major” monitoring and enforcement activities, 
which the Commission publishes quarterly on its website, are listed in Appendix 2. These 
contraventions include anti-competitive practices, infractions against license conditions, 
unapproved tariff rates, slamming, unapproved advertisement and promotions, violations of the 
MNP and registration of SIM card regulations. This thesis notes, in the previous chapter, that 
these major contraventions are wide spread across the network providers and the value added 
service providers and the contraventions are recurrent. It also noted that these factors reveal the 
weakness in the Commission’s monitoring and enforcement institution, structures and 
processes. 
In many instances, the Commission had responded to these infractions by issuing warnings, 
directives and in a few cases imposition of fines, which is the highest level of sanction imposed 
by the Commission. The fines, which are imposed by the Commission have been criticised by 
stakeholders for not being sufficiently heavy to serve as deterrent. The Commission has also 
been criticised for collecting the fines for the government while neglecting the payment of 
compensation to consumers (refer to the last chapter, section 5.5.2i). The Consumer Satisfaction 
Survey recommends that compensation should be paid to consumers for poor quality of service 
(NCC CSS, 2012:65). The view of the Director General of the Consumer Protection Council of 
Nigeria (CPC) on this issue is presented below: 
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“Fines are legal but we want to move beyond fines to see what we can do to ensure that 
consumers get value for money…. ordinarily it is a deterrent measure to prevent 
reoccurrence. However, it does not seem that it is reflective in the overall objective of 
the fines because infractions continue. I believe the time has come for the operators to 
recognise the fact that they have an obligation to the consumers to make sure they get 
value for money” (Akinsuyi, 2014). 
In the same vein, the industry body representing telecommunications services providers, the 
Association of Telecomm Companies of Nigeria (ATCON) has also called for stricter sanctions 
for erring operators and “payment of compensations to consumers if a network performs 
consistently below standard” (Okonji, 2012). The Association denounced rogue operators who 
cut corners while pledging support for those who play by the rules to provide high quality 
services.  
a) Unsolicited telemarketing: Violation of consumer privacy 
Unsolicited messages and telemarketing is a major concern for consumers. The 2012 Nigeria 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCC.CSS, 2012) commissioned by the Consumer Affairs 
Bureau (CAB), reported that 77% of the whole sample said they receive unsolicited messages. 
Although the General Code in section 20 prohibits ghost telemarketing and enjoins providers 
to conduct telemarketing in accordance with any ‘call” or “do not call” preferences of the 
consumer, the problem of unsolicited messages remains rampant.   
Section 23 of the QoS Regulations, 2012 in a similar vein, directs service providers to provide 
opt-out option for subscribers where such messages originate from the service provider or its 
third party partners, and to make reasonable effort to “block and filter bulk unsolicited and 
offensive messages from other source”. In spite of these provisions, consumers have been 
continuously inundated with unsolicited messages. Two services providers and twelve (12) 
VAS providers were indicted, in first quarter 2014, for contravening these provisions. 
The Commission also responded with warning letters and a directive to all services providers 
to restrict unsolicited messages and telemarketing to 8am–8pm. This curfew on unsolicited 
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telemarking has been effective in reducing the nuisance of unwanted calls and messages in the 
night hours.  
However, the ‘opt-out’ option has not been effective in addressing the nuisance of unsolicited 
telemarketing for two main reasons: 1) it is not being utilised because it is not visible to the 
consumer. The NCC.CSS, (2012) report also confirmed that 31.6% of consumers were not 
aware of the “opt out” option. 2) The Commission has not established a specific register for 
consumers to call when they wish to opt out. The President of NATCON who emphasised the 
need for establishing a code to which the consumer can call to opt out (Akinsuyi, 2014) 
highlighted this issue at the repackaged edition of the Telecommunication Consumer 
Parliament. Without an opt-out register, the Commission will be unable to track and identify 
service providers’ abuses on unsolicited messages.  
The need for ‘opt-out register’ manifests clearly when considering the curious advice of the 
Commission’s Director, Public Affairs, to aggrieved consumers: “Send stop to the number that 
sent the message and it will stop and if they don’t stop walk over to our office in Lagos and 
complain. You can call us on 622, our toll free number to lodge your complaints” (UNILAG 
FM, 2015). This advice is not consumer focused; the Commission does not indicate any 
commitment to addressing the main issue it is shifting the burden to the ordinary consumer. It 
does not represent the interest of the consumer. It reflects the Commission’s soft hand approach 
to enforcement of rules which results in the subordination of ordinary consumer interests to 
other stakeholders’ interests. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the question: focusing on regulatory structures and processes, 
how have ordinary consumers been represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile 
market in 2001. 
It deployed the extended Institutional Decomposition Analytical framework (IDA) and the NIE 
analytical approach to assess 1) how the four components of the Nigerian telecommunications 
institution – mobile policy, mobile law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement – have 
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influenced the representation of the ordinary consumer and 2) the effectiveness of the existing 
structures and processes for consumer representation. 
The findings of the investigation are presented in this section. 
The National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) explicitly addressed two key dimensions of 
consumer representation in its provisions that consumers and operators “shall be afforded 
access to the Commission’s proceedings and the right to submit opinion in support of their 
interest,” (NTP, 3.1.4.1): thereby affirming the consumers’ constitutional right to information 
and right to express their opinion. The NTP also laid the basis of the Commission’s corporate 
values by directing that all deliberations of the Commission shall be undertaken with 
considerations for fairness, equity and transparency. These provisions lay the framework for 
the Commission’s engagement with consumers. Engaging consumers in a fair and transparent 
manner will also imply that consumers are adequately represented and their interests are taken 
into consideration in the regulatory process. These policy statements indicate that consumer 
representation in the regulatory decision making process is not optional; it is a policy injunction 
and an important aspect of policy objective. In practice, nevertheless, the Commission is 
circumventing these provisions. 
The mobile law, through the instrument of the Act and other secondary regulations, established 
rules for ordinary consumer engagement and participation in the Commission’s decision-
making processes through the directives on public inquiries and dissemination of information. 
However, the mobile law did not make any provision for any structure to facilitate the ordinary 
consumer utilisation of these provisions:  ordinarily, ordinary consumers lack the capacity and 
capability to exploit these provisions hence as they stand, they are null provisions.  
From 2009 to 2015, the Commission carried out twelve public inquiries and received only one 
submission from a consumer body in relation to the inquiry on Registration of SIM card 
Regulations. Participating in public inquiries is a difficult hurdle for the ordinary consumer 
because it involves considerable transaction cost to generate a well-articulated and informed 
input comparable to the well-resourced input of service providers. Ordinary consumers’ input 
to public inquiries requires the services of consumer representatives. However, there is no 
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provision in the mobile law for the establishment, inclusion or support of independent consumer 
advocacy groups. Consumer representation is missing in the Act. Providing legal backing to 
consumer representation is crucial because institutions are essential to create the rules for the 
active engagement of consumer bodies with the regulator and service providers (North, 1993). 
Without legal backing, the role of the consumer and consumer representation bodies remains 
undefined and irrelevant in the telecommunications decision-making process. 
Neither the Act nor the Mobile Administration made any provision for consumer input in the 
development or review of individual industry consumer code as would be expected if the codes 
are to address the ordinary consumers’ interests, hence the mobile operators, in practice, do not 
carry along their ordinary consumers in the development of the Consumer Codes.  Thus, with 
regard to consumer representation, public inquiries have been ineffective in soliciting 
consumers’ input into the Commission’s decision-making process.  
It was noted in chapter 5, that the procedural definition of consumer interest by the 
Commission’s Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) is at variance with the NTP and the Act. The 
CAB definition distorts the consumers’ ‘right to be heard’ by equating it to ‘right to complain’. 
This gross misrepresentation of the consumers’ right to be heard is not in alignment with the 
provisions in the Act and the NTP direction that consumers shall be accorded ‘the right to 
submit opinion in support of their interest’ (NTP, 2000: Section 3.1.4.1). CAB’s conception of 
consumers’ right to be heard implies that consumers may complain but may not hold an opinion; 
consumers are passive recipients. This has implication for the way the Commission construes 
the role of the ordinary consumer. It partly explains why the Commission does not solicit 
consumers input into regulatory process but rather circumvents this provision of the Act.  
Apart from public inquiries, the Commission’s main structures and processes for the 
engagement of the ordinary consumer include Consumer Outreach Programmes and 
information dissemination machinery. The Commission’s outreach programme, which is the 
main structure for engaging consumers, has very limited reach and an extremely long event 
cycle. Moreover, the outreach programme communicates little information because it is 
focussed more towards resolving minor consumer complaints without addressing systemic 
issues, for example, the lack of awareness or unfair trade practices. Hence, the Commission’s 
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main structure for engaging the ordinary consumer and its overall approach are grossly 
ineffective and inadequate to reach ordinary consumers out there. 
The dissemination of information to consumers through the publication of annual reports and 
comparative information about licensees’ performance is mandatory as prescribed in the Act, 
Quality of Service Regulations and the General Code (General Code, Section 6(1), 2a). 
However, the manner of publication, which the Commission deems appropriate (and which is 
applicable to licensees), is to publicise on its website and two national newspapers. Publicising 
information in this manner excludes a large portion of ordinary consumers who do not have 
access to electronic media or who have poor knowledge of the English language. Simple plain 
English is not ‘clear language’ for consumers who do not understand English. If the purpose of 
these provisions for information is to facilitate the ordinary consumer’s access to information, 
then the information ought to be also available in the three main Nigerian languages; in the 
language, those with minimal education will understand. In this regard radio programmes in 
vernacular is a viable option as it will be accessible and assessable to the body of consumers. 
The Commission’s 2011, 2012 and 2013 quarterly reports have been consistent in highlighting 
the recurring breaches of the rules set out in the General Code and Quality of Service 
Regulations, which relate to the poor spread and inadequacy of Consumer Care centres, 
inaccessibility of service providers help lines and provision of information to consumers. The 
implication is that consumers cannot get attention or help when they need it. In spite of the 
detrimental effects of these prevalent issues on the interest of ordinary consumers, there is no 
evidence in regulatory documents that any enforcement action has been taken against any 
services providers for the above breaches. 
The Many provisions in the mobile law and mobile administration on consultation and 
dissemination of information are not sufficient to guarantee the ordinary consumers’ influential 
participation in the regulatory decision making process. This is because these provisions did 
not take into consideration the ordinary consumer’s limited resources and capability to harness 
those provisions. This is compounded by the absence of independent consumer bodies and the 
prevalent ineffective enforcement mechanism, which means that consumers are unable to hold 
the Commission and services providers to account. Providing legal backing to consumer 
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representation is in the best interest of both the consumer and the regulator. It is a necessary 
condition for guaranteeing that consumers derive full benefits from the provision of the law and 
that the regulator and service providers are held accountable for the implementation of their 
mandate and license conditions. This issue is of utmost importance in Nigeria with very little 
history of civil societies and advocacy groups. 
Therefore, regarding ordinary consumer representation, the Commission’s main structures 
besides processes and its overall strategy for engaging the ordinary consumer are grossly 
inadequate and ineffective to reach ordinary consumers, who remain largely unengaged and 
uninformed and unrepresented.  Consequently, the policy objectives with regard to giving 
ordinary consumers access to the Commissions’ proceedings and the opportunity to submit 
opinion in support of their interest have not been realised.  
In the next chapter, this study will examine the process for the ordinary consumer complaint 
management, which is an important aspect of consumer representation.  
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CHAPTER 7 Ordinary Consumer Complaints Management: Providing redress or cause 
for complaints 
7.1 Introduction  
Complaints resolution is one of the key dimensions of consumer representation. The other 
components – provision of information, consultation, and provision of choice and efficient 
framework for consumer representation – were discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, 
the focus is on the question: What processes have been established in the Nigerian mobile sector 
for the resolution of ordinary mobile consumer complaints and how effective have they been? 
In addressing the research question this chapter employs the extended Institutional 
Decomposition Model, which was used in the previous two chapters. The   analysis will be 
based on the four main components of the telecommunications institution– mobile policy, 
mobile law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement - and their main aspects in order to 
ascertain if they have influenced ordinary consumer complaints management. 
In drawing conclusions, the chapter will also rely on the transaction cost, agency and property 
rights aspects of NIE. Accessing the complaint-handling platform and going through the 
process involve considerable cost for the ordinary consumer. In chapter 5, this study revealed 
that the cost of arbitration is beyond the capacity of the ordinary consumer; this will be 
elaborated in this chapter. As the analysis in the last two chapters has shown, agency problem 
exists within the Commission. It accounts for the Commission lack of commitment to the 
enforcement of rules and the circumvention of the provisions in the mobile law in pursuit of 
interests other than the consumer interest. 
First, the chapter will examine the provisions in the NTP to find out what is its vision for 
consumer complaint management. Then the chapter will take a critical look at the mobile law 
and the General Code. The General Code defines how the Commission and the services 
providers engage with the ordinary consumer and lays out the procedures for resolving dispute 
and complaints arising from this encounter. It will deduce from the mobile law and the General 
Code and from the services providers’ individual consumer codes the main features of their 
complaints handling processes and compare these with the indices of best practice in complaints 
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management. It will ascertain from this comparison the adequacy or otherwise of the codes with 
regard to ordinary consumer complaints. Attention will also be focused on the Commission’s 
second level complaint platform to ascertain its effectiveness. The effectiveness of the 
Commission’s application of the mobile administration (regulations, structures, processes, 
standards and thresholds) and the effectiveness of the enforcement institution to influence 
industry compliance with the complaints process will be evaluated. The result of the analysis 
will be presented in the concluding section. 
7.2 National Telecommunications Policy, 2000: No directive on consumer complaints 
In its statement of general objectives, the National Telecommunications Policy, 2000 (NTP) 
stated that the envisaged telecommunications service “should accordingly be efficient, 
affordable, reliable and available to all” (NTP, 2000: Section 2.0:23). Consumer complaints 
arise whenever these criteria are compromised or whenever in the consumer’s assessment, 
his/her actual experience falls below his/her expectation. In spite of this fact, the NTP gave no 
explicit direction with regards to consumer complaints management. The task of addressing the 
issue of consumer complaint handling is taken up in the Communications Commission Act 
2003 and its regulations and guidelines. 
7.3 Mobile Law: Provision for the ordinary consumer complaint management 
7.3.1 The Act and General Code: Aligned with best practice but not in practice  
The 2003 Act empowers the Commission, upon a written complaint of a person, to investigate 
any matter in which the Commission believes an infringement, civil and/or criminal, of the 
provisions of the Act or its regulations has been, is or will be committed. Consequently, the Act 
confers on the Commission the powers to resolve any dispute between persons in any matter 
under the Act or its regulations (Act, Sections (61, 62 and 73)). Under these expansive powers, 
the Act made further provisions for the protection of consumers, by directing all service 
providers to meet such minimum standards of quality of service as the Commission may specify 
and publish. Thus, the Act enjoins licensees to: “Deal reasonably with consumer and adequately 
address consumer complaints” (NCA, 2003: Section 104). 
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Dealing reasonably with consumers implies the application of the principles of responsiveness 
and fairness in attending to consumer issues: it involves the willingness to accept feedback from 
complaints and a credible commitment to resolving complaints. These factors are essential if 
consumer complaints are to be adequately addressed. Adequately addressing a complaint will 
additionally involve finding out the cause of the complaint, rectifying the situation and 
compensating the consumer for any loss he/she may have incurred. The extent to which these 
indices are put into practice is a reflection of the degree of consumer-oriented focus of the 
complaint management system (WAO, 2010). Services providers’ complaints handling process 
will be evaluated with these key indices.  
The Act enjoins the Commission to resolve complaints received from consumers in matters 
relating to customer service, consumer protection, and quality of service and breach of 
consumer code of practice (Act, Section 105 (2)). Hence the Act directs the Commission to 
establish guidelines for the lodging, receipt and handling of consumer complaints regarding the 
conduct or operations of licensees and to designate an industry body to prepare a consumer 
code which shall include “model procedures for handling consumer complaints and for the 
compensation of customers in case of a breach of the consumer code” (Act, Section 106(1-3)). 
However, this study did not find evidence of the existence of any industry body assigned with 
this function. In addition, the licensees’ individual consumer codes are required to include terms 
and conditions no less favourable to the consumers than those expressed in the General code.  
The Act further provides that consumer codes shall be subject to annual review and ratification 
by the Commission. These criteria of periodic review of the codes and publishing the code – 
making it visible and accessible – are part of the indices for evaluating the complaint process.  
The Commission is also empowered to institute alternative dispute resolution processes 
including an inexpensive arbitration process other than a court for handling consumer 
complaints and disputes which had not been satisfactorily resolved with the provision that: 
“the licensee’s dispute resolution procedures shall first have been exhausted by the 
customers without resolution of the complaints before presentation of the complaint to 
the Commission” (NCA, 2003: Section 105 (2)). 
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The unsatisfied consumer ordinarily has to escalate his/her complaint to the Commission’s 
second level intervention process before proceeding to arbitration. The weakness of ‘one code 
serving all’ is clearly exposed here, as the requirements for arbitration are too stringent for the 
ordinary consumer as will be discussed in the section 7.4.6. 
The Act, still focusing on the issue of a streamlined, standardised procedure for handling of 
consumer complaints directs that Consumer Codes shall include further recourse available to a 
consumer who is dissatisfied with the licensee’s complaint handling procedures, together with 
specific details of compensation and refund scheme. The individual consumer codes shall also 
include information to customers regarding services, rates and performance levels, customer 
charging, billing, collection and credit practices, provision and fault repairs of services (NCA, 
2003: Section 106(4)). 
These provisions allude to the importance of educating consumers by providing them easily 
understood information about their rights and the remedy available to put right any wrong they 
may suffer. They refer to matters that are capable of causing grave concern to the ordinary 
consumer because a breach of any of these issues, resulting from the conduct or operations of 
service providers, engenders consumer complaints and if not timely, reasonably and adequately 
resolved leads eventually to consumer frustration, disempowerment, economic loss and 
detriment. More importantly, unresolved complaints may lead to consumers’ apathy and 
eventual withdrawal from the complaint management process. This is more likely to happen 
among the more vulnerable group of consumers. 
In the above section, the review of various points in the Act has facilitated the capture of the 
main provisions in the mobile law that relate to the envisaged consumer complaints handling 
process. These provisions encapsulate important principles of effective complaint management: 
a well-defined, visible and easy to access procedure for complaints management, the provision 
of remedy when a complaint is upheld and regular review and improvement of the complaint 
handling process. In the sections that follow, these indices will form the bases for evaluating 
the adequacy and effectiveness of existing processes for ordinary consumer complaints.  
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7.4 Mobile Administration: Processes, procedure and structures for the Ordinary 
Consumer Complaint Management  
In the following sections, this study will examine the important sections of the General Code 
that provide additional directives on the complaint process. It will also assess the extent to 
which the services providers’ complaints processes align with the mobile law and indices of 
best practice in complaints management.  
7.4.1 General Consumer Code of Practice: Several provisions but few in use  
The General Consumer Code of Practice (Sections 39-49) sets out the procedures and 
substantive requirements for consumer complaints handling which also serves as the model and 
minimum standard for licensees’ individual code for consumer complaint handling process. 
The General Code directs that licenses shall provide easy to understand information on 
complaint handling processes in various media and formats and ensure that consumers can 
easily identify how a complaint may be lodged at the service provider’s office either physically 
or through telecommunication. It specified that information about complaint handling shall 
contain: “consumer right to complain, how the licensee can be contacted in order to lodge a 
complaint and the information the consumer needs to furnish when making a complaint” (NCA, 
2003: section 39(3)). This directive on the provision of not just visible, but also accessible and 
easily understood information on complaint process- is another important index for evaluating 
the effectiveness of the complaints resolution process.  
Licensees are enjoined to act on written complaints within the time frame set out in the Quality 
of Services Regulations, 2012 (NCC, n.d.-c). This rule ought not to be restricted to written 
complaints only but should also be applicable to complaints lodged via telephones because most 
complaints by ordinary consumers (90%) are lodged via the telephone, which is an approved 
medium for complaints (NCC.CSS, 2012). 
When a consumer is not satisfied by the outcome of her/his complaint, the consumer shall have 
the option of pursuing the complaint through an escalating process involving the re-examination 
of the complaint by a suitably qualified person in the licensee’s organisation. In the event that 
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the complaint has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the consumer in spite of the escalation 
process within sixty days, the licensee shall inform the consumer that he/she may refer the 
complaint to an identified person in the Commission. Section 41(3) states that “in any event, 
no consumer complaint shall remain unresolved for more than three (3) months”. For 
complaints that remain unresolved, the Commission may apply the processes set out in the 
Dispute Resolution Guidelines 2004. Unlike the arbitration process, the complaints process is 
free of charge but the licensee may, with the consent of the consumer, impose a reasonable 
charge where the investigation involves retrieval of record more than 12 months old -General 
Code, Section 42- (NCC, n.d.-c). 
The General Code further directs that service providers shall establish appropriate systems for 
recording, categorising and analysing complaints and their outcomes as required by Quality of 
Service Regulations 2012. Regular reviews and updating of the complaints management 
process is also mandatory. The outcomes of these reviews shall be communicated to the 
Commission and to the consumer and the Commission is required to audit the complaint 
handling and tracking procedures of the licensees -General Code, Sections (40, 45-49)- (NCC, 
n.d.-c). This study did not find any evidence of the review of the General Code or any complaint 
management process since it was gazetted in 2007. The failure to review the General Code in 
the last eight years raises the question of its relevance as a working document. 
The General Code makes a distinction in the procedure for lodging complaints. Individual 
consumer complaints are to be first lodged and dealt with by the services providers while 
industry complaints – those made by a consumer body against a services provider and those 
made by a licensee against another licensee – are lodged directly with the Commission (General 
Code, Sections 53 and 54). However, regarding alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the 
provisions are the same for the ordinary consumer and the corporate consumer and licensee, 
thus placing the ordinary consumer at a relative disadvantage. This issue is further explored in 
the section (7.4.6) on ADR. 
The General Code is in synergy with the Act in its provision for consumer complaints handling. 
It expatiates some of the provisions in the Act to include areas like complaints tracking and 
escalating procedures, complaints recording, analysing and categorising requirements and 
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complaints resolution time limit.  These requirements are part of the criteria for assessing the 
performance of the licensees’ complaints handling process. The extent to which the 
Commission and the licensees have met these requirements and the degree of consumer 
awareness and ease of access to these procedures will be the focus in the following sections.  
7.4.2 Service Providers Complaint Handling Process: Consumers are not able to 
complain but suffer in silence  
The General Code established the minimum standard for the complaints process that shall be 
implemented by licensees. In response, the major network/service providers to varying extents 
have incorporated these rules in their individual consumer codes but in practice, there are gaps 
as shown in Table 19. There is no documented evidence of consumers’ input to code 
development or review, as was discussed in the previous section. The evidence suggests that 
the process of approval did not pass through a transparent process. The following section 
evaluates the extent to which the services providers’ complaints processes align with the mobile 
law and indices of best practice in complaints management. It examines how the interactions 
between the consumers and the services providers are influenced more by the rules in use than 
the rules in the Codes.  
One major challenge confronting all categories of consumers is the dearth of accessible 
information about service providers’ complaint handling processes. In the competitive mobile 
telecoms market service providers place numerous adverts daily on radio, via SMS (unsolicited) 
and the print media. However, this study did not find any awareness campaign aimed at 
informing consumers about complaint handling process by service providers. Neither is the 
complaint process visibly displaced in their websites and customers care centres (see Section 
7.4.4 for an interview with the industry on these issues). In Chapter 6, it was noted that the 
Consumer Satisfaction Survey 2012, reported that, with the exception of AIRTEL, service 
providers’ consumer individual codes are not available on their websites. This situation is still 
prevailing and this study confirms it. In addition, this study observes that the mobile service 
providers’ Individual Consumer codes of practice are in English only and have not been 
translated into the three main Nigerian languages, and therefore are not assessable to all groups 
of consumers. Furthermore, the consumer code of practice, complaints handling process and 
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Consumer Contract Terms are neither at the customer contact centres nor in the pay-as-you-go 
starter pack.  
The implication is that the services providers’ complaints process is not visible to consumers. 
This means that the ordinary consumer remains largely uneducated about his/her rights, 
uninformed and unaware of the service providers’ complaint handling procedures. The low 
level of consumers’ awareness of their rights was also highlighted in Table 17 of the previous 
chapter. Hence, it would appear that the service providers’ complaint management processes 
do not anticipate nor welcome nor aspire to make good use of feedback from complaints. In 
other words, the service providers’ complaint processes do not meet the first requirement of 
being customer-focused as shown in Table 19. 
TABLE 19.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SERVICE PROVIDERS’ INDIVIDUAL CONSUMER CODE 
OF PRACTICE 
Indicators Provision 
in the law  
MTN 
Consumer 
Code 
AIRTEL  
Consumer 
Code 
ETISALAT  
Consumer 
Code 
GLO 
Consumer-
focused 
Openness to 
feedback from 
complaints and 
commitment to 
resolution of 
complaints 
Act 
(section10
4) 
No evidence    
 
No 
complaints 
data 
 
No evidence 
 
No 
complaints 
data 
 
No evidence 
 
No 
complaints 
data 
 
No evidence 
 
No 
complaints  
Data 
Visibility 
Information 
about how and 
where to 
complain 
including all 
General 
Code 
(sections 
39 (1-3), 
41(6,7)); 
and Act 
Not visible 
Consumer 
Code & 
complaint 
process not 
on web, 
Consumer 
Code on web 
only; not on 
customer 
contact 
Not visible 
Consumer 
Code & 
complaint 
process not 
on web, 
Not visible 
Consumer 
Code & 
complaint 
process not 
on web, 
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options are 
well publicised 
to consumers, 
personnel and 
stakeholders 
(section, 
106(4)) 
customer 
contact 
centres nor 
starter packs 
centres nor 
starter pack 
customer 
contact 
centres nor 
starter packs 
 
customer 
contact 
centres, 
starter pack 
 
Accessibility 
Complaint 
process is easy 
to access and 
understand. In 
various media 
and formats; 
Assistance is 
available to 
consumers to 
make 
complaints 
General 
Code 
(sections 
39, 
40(1)(2)) 
 
Inaccessible 
 
 
Inaccessible 
 
Inaccessible 
 
Inaccessible 
 
Responsiveness 
Complaints are 
acknowledged 
in timely 
manner, 
addressed 
promptly. 
Consumers are 
treated 
courteously 
and informed 
of progress 
General 
Code 
(sections 
41(1-8)) 
Act 
(section 
104) 
Feedback in 
≤ 48 hours. 
Tracking 
system. 
 
Targets 80% 
First Call 
Resolution.  
Feedback in 
≤ 72 hours. 
 
Tracking 
system. 
 
- - 
Complaints 
are 
Monitored 
Tracking 
system. 
-  
Charges 
Access to 
complaints 
Act 
(section 
106(3)) 
Free Free Free Free 
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handling 
process is free 
of charge 
General 
Code 
(section 
57) 
Confidentiality  
Personal 
information of 
the complaint 
and people 
who are 
subject of the 
complaint is 
kept 
confidential 
General 
Code 
(section 
57), Act 
(sections 
(59, 60, 
86(3)) 
Confidentialit
y clause 
included 
Confidentialit
y clause 
included 
Confidentialit
y clause 
included 
Confidentialit
y clause 
included 
Remedy 
If complaint is 
upheld 
remedy/ 
compensation 
is provided 
Act 
(sections 
106(3)) 
Remedial 
action and/or  
restitution/co
mpensation 
Reimburse 
full sum of 
value lost by 
customer 
- - 
Refund / 
commensurat
e 
compensation 
Accountability 
Accountability 
for complaint 
handling is 
established. 
Complaint are 
monitored and 
reported 
General 
Code 
(section 
47) 
Yes, Officer 
in charge 
identified. 
 
Complaints 
are 
Monitored 
Officer in 
charge not 
specified. 
 
Complaints 
are 
Monitored 
Officer in 
charge not 
specified. 
 
Complaints 
are 
Monitored 
Identity of 
officer 
provided on 
customer 
request. 
Complaints 
are 
Monitored 
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Review 
Complaint 
handling 
process is 
internally and 
externally 
reviewed 
General 
Code 
(sections 
(45, 46, 
47, 519)) 
No data No data No data No data 
Source: Author - indicators adapted from Western Australia Ombudsman (WAO, 2010) 
All service providers have listed in their consumer codes of practice multi-channels through 
which consumers may reach their complaint handling process in order to lodge complaints. 
These channels include Interactive Voice Response (IVR) systems, toll-free lines, e-mail, 
terrestrial mail and walk-in contact centres but in practice, consumers are experiencing 
difficulties in the use of these channels to activate the complaint process. 
In the 75th edition of its Consumer Outreach Programme (COP) Consumer Affairs Bureau 
reported the inaccessibility of customer care helplines and poor spread of customer care centres 
among the prevailing challenges meaning that the consumer contact help desks are beyond the 
reach of most consumer (Okonji, 2014). This issue had been a regular feature in CAB’s annual 
report since 2011 and was highlighted in the research on consumer protection in Nigeria by 
Consumer International (2014). 
The magnitude of this challenge is reflected in Table 20, which shows the average accessibility 
rate to consumer contact centres of the four network/service providers for the 1st quarter of 2011 
and 2012 respectively. For example, the average failed call attempts to service providers’ 
customers care lines stands at 73% as against the set threshold of 2%. That means that the 
chances of a consumer to be connected to a help line are less than 3 in 10. In other words, only 
3 out of 10 consumers are connected to a consumer care line as against the threshold of more 
than 9 in 10. For consumers on the GLO (a network/services provider) network, failed call 
attempts for the period March 2011 to July 2011 was 99.2%. This meant that, during that period, 
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consumers on GLO network had 1 in 100 chance of connecting to their service providers’ help 
lines. GLO attributed this situation to a system upgrade project. 
TABLE 20. ACCESSIBILITY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS’ COMPLAINT HELP LINES (1ST QUARTER 
2011/2012) 
 Consumer complaints 
Failed attempt to 
customer help 
line 
Connection to live 
agent 
Connection to 
IVR        
Quality of service threshold 2% 98% 95% 
  2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
AIRTEL 67 85 45 45 71 85 
ETISALAT 30 72 69 28 92 93 
GLO 96 92 15 7 52 94 
MTN 64 77 14 23 92 89 
AVERAGE 73 31 83 
Source: Developed from Consumer Affairs Bureau 1st quarter reports 2011 and 2012 
The average rate of connection to a live agent of the four service providers is exceedingly low 
at 31% compared to the set threshed of 98%. Hence, a consumer has a frustrating 1 in 3 chances 
of speaking to an agent of his/her service providers. These situations meet the definition of 
inaccessible complaint process. It means that most of the aggrieved consumers are unable to 
reach the customer care centre help desk by telephone and are therefore unable to access and 
activate the complaint management process. In these circumstances, consumers have no option 
but to suffer in silence.  
The chances of a consumer to be connected to the service providers’ toll-free Interactive Voice 
Response system (IVR) are reasonably good at 83% (4 in 5 chances) when compared to the 
Quality of Service threshold of 95%. The IVR of service providers gives consumers the option 
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to lodge complaints in English or any one of the four local languages. The option for the 
different languages is relayed consecutively. This implies that the consumer has to listen 
patiently through the voice instructions until he/she can hear his/her preferred language. The 
task on the consumer’s patience could be reduced if automatic language filters are incorporated 
to select the consumer’s language as soon as the consumer utters a few words of his preferred 
language. This will also reduce the equipment holding time and consequently improve access 
to the IVR. A major shortfall of the IVR system is that it is not a dedicated platform for 
complaints. All four mobile network/services providers use their IVR for advertisement. Very 
often, a consumer who wishes to lodge a complaint has to hold on listening to advertisements 
for several minutes, beyond the set threshold of five minutes, without connection to a live agent. 
The IVR relays advertisement when the live agents are busy. The fact that this happens more 
often than not points to the inadequacy of the number of live agents as shown in Table 20 above. 
Overall the consumer complaints handling process is grossly ineffective because it is 
inaccessible to consumer. It is bogged down by three major handicaps: consumers’ poor 
awareness of their rights which is compounded by the non-availability of information on the 
service providers’ complaints handling procedure either in the pay-as-you-go starter pack or 
customer care centres or on the service providers’ website; the inaccessibility of customers’ 
care-help lines and inadequate number of live agents of service providers. 
In addition, the number of the customer care centres and outlet shops commissioned by the 
mobile service providers in the six geo-political zones of the country given in Table 21 shows 
that the contact centres are grossly inadequate and unevenly spread. With an average of six 
States per zone, the implication is that some States have only one or two contact centres while 
some have none. In all the zones, the contact centres are located in the commercial areas of 
major cities while the suburbs and rural areas are neglected. The relatively high number of 
contact centres in the South West is due to the status of the city of Lagos as the commercial hub 
and former Federal capital as well as the political disturbances and insurgency in the North East 
Zone accounts for the low number of contact centres in that zone.  
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TABLE 21. MOBILE SERVICE PROVIDERS’ CUSTOMER CARE CENTRES IN THE SIX GEO-
POLITICAL ZONES 
Geo-Political 
Zones 
MTN AIRTEL GLO EMTS 
(ETISALAT) 
TOTAL 
North East 7 3 4 2 16 
North West 17 2 11 4 34 
North Central 24 4 8 7 43 
South West 56 14 36 30 136 
South East 18 7 11 9 45 
South South 20 4 11 6 41 
Total 142 34 81 58 315 
Source: Collated from the Mobile Service Providers’ websites  
The low number and uneven spread of customer care centres in the six geo-political zones show 
that most consumers have grave difficulties in physically accessing the customer care centres 
in addition to not being able to contact the help lines of their service providers.  
An interviewee explained the situation as follows: “NCC has only KPI (Key Performance 
Indicators) which will guide the licensee to provide enough agents to meet such KPI.  Only 
access (to customer care centre) is specified not the location. However, Licensees are expected 
to have a care centre in every state of the federation and every city of the state and in each local 
government. Some use channel (trade) partners as care centres” (Interviewee-CAB 1, 6 
February 2015). 
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The interviewee’s reply indicates that their obligation is to provide access for example contact 
numbers and IVR and not necessarily to facilitate physical access.  
7.4.3  Kiosks/Umbrella People: Freelance business  
Some mobile service providers’ complaints handling process contain certain provisions that 
impose undue burden on consumers. For example, MTN customers’ complaints procedure 
involving prepaid airtime cards or starter packs present some practical problems. MTN advises 
prepaid consumers in the first instance: “To contact the outlet service where the purchase was 
made and allow the outlet reasonable time to address the inquiry” (MTN Individual Code of 
Practice, 2010: 17).  
This presents a number of challenges to consumers. First, whatever meaning is attached to 
‘reasonable time to address the inquiry’ it is likely to exceed the period established in the 
Quality of Services Regulation, 2012. Secondly, many consumers on the prepaid platform often 
purchase a starter pack and airtime on the go from hawkers (kiosk/umbrella people) who have 
no fixed address or location, which makes tracking these outlets practically difficult. Thirdly, 
the Commission is yet to establish any guidelines for these outlets and, moreover, they are not 
operating under General Code; hence, it will be difficult to hold them to account. Furthermore, 
even if the consumer is able to trace these moving outlets, these umbrella people/kiosks are 
unlikely to have the capability to resolve consumer complaints such as ‘inability to recharge’ 
or the ‘correctness of airtime balance after a recharge attempt’. In addition, the consumer cannot 
easily ascertain who is an accredited representative of the service provider. Although the 
relationship between the service providers and these umbrella outlets is not clear, it is 
reasonable for the consumer to assume that these ‘umbrella people’ have some sort of business 
relationship with the service providers since they are generating revenue for the service 
providers. Therefore, the service provider in fairness cannot shift the burden of resolving 
complaints arising from starter-packs and pre-paid airtime cards to the kiosk/umbrella people 
to the detriment of the ordinary consumers.  
Two interviewees, CAB1 and CAB2, clarified that the Kiosk/Umbrella people are neither 
licenced by the Commission nor operating under the Commission’s rules or guidelines. They 
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are supposed to belong to Sales and Installation categories of Class licenses, but because of 
their low volumes, the Commission exempts them from being licensed. They can freely set up 
and operate in line with the policy on availability and deepening of service/universal access 
(CAB 2, 2015; CAB 1, 2015). However, both interviewees offered no response to the question: 
what happens if an issue develops between a mobile prepaid consumer and the kiosk 
vendor/umbrella people? Therefore, patronising the kiosk vendor/umbrella people is a risky 
business for the ordinary consumer. 
7.4.4 Vulnerable Consumers: Need for more attention 
The General Code also mandates licensees to make adequate provision to ensure that people 
with disabilities or special needs are able to access their complaints handling process. The 
licensees are to ensure that these groups of consumers, if need be, can be represented by their 
authorised representatives and are also given assistance when they request assistance in lodging 
complaints (General Code, Sections 15(1), 40). However, in practice, the attention given by 
some service providers to these provisions to enable consumers with disabilities to access the 
complaint process does not appear to go far enough. For example, concerning these provisions, 
EMTS (trading as Etisalat) in its Consumer Code of Practice states: 
“It is our policy to support customers with disabilities in being able to benefit from 
communications. Customers with disabilities affecting their use of telecoms services 
should enquire about services available to assist their special needs. 
It is our policy to comply with specific obligations that NCC may impose on operators 
in respect of special services or service agreement for our customers with disabilities. 
Our customer service centre can advise you about these obligations” (EMTS Consumer 
Code of Practice, 2010: 5). 
This statement does not reflect an effective commitment by EMTS to making its complaints 
handling process accessible to consumers with physical disabilities. It offered no information 
to consumers with disabilities affecting their use of telecommunications on how or where “to 
enquire about services available to assist their special needs” (EMTS Consumer Code of 
Practice, 2010: 5) in order to lodge complaint. EMTS recommends that they physically present 
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themselves at their customer care centres first, to enquire about available services and secondly 
to be advised about obligations imposed by the Commission. 
Advising consumers with disabilities about obligations (if any) imposed by the Commission 
completely missed the point. Implementing whatever obligations there may be and making it 
accessible to the consumer is the issue. It would be justified to conclude that EMTS has made 
no specific provisions in their complaint process for consumers with disabilities. EMTS 
reference to ‘obligations’ may be an allusion to the failure of the Commission to impose any 
specific obligation on operators in respect of consumers with disabilities as provided for in 
section 15(2) of the General Code which states, “licensees shall comply with any specific 
obligation the Commission may impose on operators in respect of services for subscriber with 
disabilities”. This study did not find any evidence in the General Code (which has not been 
reviewed since 2007) or the licensees’ individual consumer codes, that the Commission has 
complied with the directive to impose obligations on licensees in respect of consumers with 
disabilities. 
EMTS statement in its Consumer Code of Practice about consumers with disabilities (quoted 
above) presents further challenges with a loosely worded code, containing no specific 
commitment: how shall the Commission that approved that code measure the extent of 
compliance or enforce compliance? 
With regard to enabling consumers with disabilities to access its complaint handling process, 
two network providers –  MTN and GLO stated in its Consumer Code of Practice their proposals 
to commence SMS-based customer assistance centre operations for customer with disabilities 
– hearing and speech impairment – to enable them access their call centres to lodge complaints. 
Although this proposal does not cover consumers with sight impairments, it represents a 
concrete commitment (unlike EMTS). MTN and GLO also reported the installation of ramps 
in some of their walk-in customer centres to aid consumers on wheelchairs. Making this 
information, including the location of the customer centres with ramps, available in various 
media will be useful to consumers with physical disabilities. 
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Airtel’s Consumer Code of practice states that for consumers with special needs and physically 
impaired subscribers, Airtel contact centres, Interactive Voice Response system (IVRs) and 
web channels are optimised through speech and visual support to meet their needs. 
There are no provisions for such access to information, as in braille or audio format in local 
languages, for consumers with sight impairment. Hence, it would appear that sufficient effort 
has not been made by all the mobile service providers to improve access to the complaint 
handling process for customers with disabilities. 
The General Code section 40 injunction to licensees to ensure that consumers with disabilities 
can be easily represented in order to make a complaint extends to all consumer groups. 
Awareness should be created to encourage consumers including parents and teachers among 
others, to represent and lodge complaints on behalf of not only consumers with disabilities but 
also for the elderly, those with little education and the young consumers who may not be able 
to stand up for their rights. 
7.4.5 The Rules in Use 
To throw more light on why the rules in practice are not aligned to the rules in the law, an 
interview with the senior officer of Association of Licensed Telecoms Operators of Nigeria 
(ALTON) and the reaction of the Director General of Consumer Protection Commission (CPC) 
is reported in Box 5. The industry view is quite revealing, by attempting to justify why the rules 
in practice are not aligned to the rules in the law; it shows that the practice has become an 
established norm, with grave negative impact on the promotion of consumer interest and the 
representation of the ordinary consumer as was highlighted in in chapters 5 and 6 of this study. 
The challenges of doing business in Nigeria were discussed in chapter 3. These challenges 
include non-transparent bureaucracy, inadequate electricity supply, vandalism of existing 
infrastructure and multiple taxations. However, the existing business environment in Nigeria is 
not peculiar to the telecommunications sector and hence, cannot justify the violation of set rules 
as was aptly explained by the Director General of the Consumer Protection Council (CPC), in 
Box 5.  
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BOX 5.  GENERAL CODE VERSUS THE RULE IN PRACTICE 
Why is there a gap between what is stated in the legal/regulatory framework and what obtains 
in practice with regards to consumer protection? The researcher put this question to the 
interviewee – Senior officer, Association of Licensed Telecoms Operators of Nigeria 
(ALTON) and he said: 
“The Legal and Regulatory frame work is to guide the operators on the right of the 
consumer.  However, in Nigeria there are some factors responsible for the operators 
in not meeting the legal and regulatory framework, no matter how they tried to.  The 
issue of Power Generation, Insecurity, Accessibility, Infrastructural Gap and 
Multiple Taxation has created a huge gap between practical consumer protection and 
the existing legal/regulatory framework.  The above mentioned factors has limited 
the operators in fulfilling their obligation to their respective consumers as they focus 
more on tackling the problems created by the environment in which they operate. 
Unless the issues mentioned above are resolved the gap will continue to exist because 
more attention is focused to how to maintain the networks, which requires double 
cost, how to deal with the accessibility issue that prolong the downtime period more 
than necessary”.  
Director General, Consumer Protection Council (CPC) presents the consumers’ view 
“What comes out from our side is that the operators use the challenge of doing business as a 
reason why they cannot give value for money.  
From the consumer side, we say it is not fair because if providers are in business and are 
making profit and that profit emanates from the resources that consumers put into that 
business; as long as they are in business it means it is profitable, as long as no operator has 
filed for bankruptcy it means the business is good. Therefore, in the light of the above, the 
concern for CPC is how do operators plan to assuage consumer complaints?” (Akinsuyi, 
2014) 
Source: Interviewee-ALTON and Director General (CPC)’s Comment on QoS 
7.4.6 The Commission’s Complaint Management System: Second level support for 
consumers 
One of the functions of the Commission stated in the Act is to examine and resolve complaints, 
objections and disputes filed by operators, subscribers or any other person involved in the 
communications industry (Act, section 4(p)). In order to give effect to this provision, the 
Commission has established structures within the Consumer Affairs Bureau including two toll 
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free lines (0800 MY CONSUMER, 0800 CALL NCC) and two consumer contact centres for 
the management of consumers’ complaints. Through these contact centres, the Commission 
provides the second level support to aggrieved consumers whose complaints have not been 
satisfactorily resolved by their services providers. Utilisation of this provision also suffers from 
low consumer awareness which concerning the Commission’s toll-free number, stands at an 
average of 11% but is as low as 5% in some states in the country (NCC.CSS, 2012:55). 
The General Code stipulates that the Commission shall monitor compliance with complaints 
handling rules and publish quarterly progress reports on complaints and their resolution. It also 
directed that the Commission’s annual report will contain a summary of all the progress reports 
of the relevant year (General Code, section 51 (2-3)). This study is awaiting the publication of 
Commission’s 2014 annual reports. However, from the available reports, the Commission apart 
from not being consistent in reporting the complaint statistics does not include any information 
regarding the nature/categories of the complaints as shown in Table 22. The reports show that 
seven (20%) and 845703 (94%) of complaints received by the Commission in 2010 and 2012 
respectively were left unresolved by the end of the year. This in itself is a violation of the 
provisions of the General Code, which stipulates, “in any event, no complaint shall remain 
unresolved after 90 days” (General Code, Section 41(3)). This study could not ascertain the 
reason for the huge difference in the number of complaints received in 2010 and 2012. 
The report credited to the Director of Consumer Affairs Bureau, at the 2014 fourth quarter 
Industry Consumer Advisory Forum (ICAF): “that the regulatory agency received about 40,000 
complaints each day from consumers across the country on various breaches perpetrated by 
network operators” (Okonne, 2014) appears to be erroneous because it is not consistent with 
available data. It would appear that there is no reliable statistical data on consumer complaints 
either from the Commission or from the services providers. 
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TABLE 22.  EFFICIENCY OF COMMISSION’S COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Consumer Complaints -  -   
Number of complaints - 35 - 903098 264 
 Resolved - 28 - 57395 - 
 Outstanding - 7 (20%) - 845703 
(94%) 
- 
Compliance Complaints - 47 44 - - 
 Resolved - 8 8 - - 
 Outstanding - 33 30 - - 
 In court  6 6 - - 
Source: Compiled from the Commission’s Annual Reports (2009 – 2012) 
7.4.6.1 Consumer Affairs Outreach Programme: Little Effect 
Consumer Affairs Bureau outreach programmes are also used by the Commission as an 
interactive platform for addressing consumer complaints. In these events consumers meet face 
to face with their service providers to lodge their complaints, many of which are resolved on 
the spot. The outreach events address very few consumer complaints as depicted in Table 23. 
The 2013 outreach programme recorded 294 consumer complaints in 15 events at an average 
of less than 20 complaints per event.  
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TABLE 23.  COMPLAINT HANDLING AT 2013 OUTREACH PROGRAMME 
Outreach 
Programme 
Number of 
events 
Number of 
complaints 
Complaints per 
Event 
Telecoms Consumer 
Parliament 
3 55 18 
Consumer Outreach 
Programme 
8 153 19 
Consumer Town hall 
Meeting 
4 86 22 
Total 15 294 <20 
Source: CAB Annual Report (2013) 
Apart from the paucity of complaints addressed at these events, there is no evidence of reports 
on the nature/categories of the complaint or the nature of their resolution. Hence, the outreach 
programme does not generate useful feedbacks that would facilitate a review of service 
providers’ performance.  Nevertheless, the interactive sessions are a veritable means of raising 
consumer awareness albeit to a handful of consumers. 
7.4.7 Alternative Dispute Resolution: Not a viable option for the ordinary consumer 
In line with the provisions of the Act (Sections 4(P) and 75(2)), the Commission established 
the Dispute Resolution Guidelines, 2004. It is specifically an arbitration procedure for small 
claim disputes involving amounts not exceeding one million Naira (N1, 000,000.00 /US$5000). 
The main objective of the guideline is to “obtain a fair resolution of consumer disputes by an 
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impartial arbitration without unnecessary delays and expense” (Dispute Resolution Guidelines 
2004, sSction1.2). The guidelines also include the option of mediation. 
When disputes remain unresolved after exhausting the ordinary complaints resolution process 
i.e. the service provider’s complaint process and the Commission’s second level intervention, 
the Commission or the consumer may initiate the processes set out in the Dispute Resolution 
Guidelines, 2004. The arbitration rules provide for a ‘document-only’ determination by an 
arbitrator(s), appointed by the Commission whose decision shall be final and binding on the 
parties.  
Although the 2004 Dispute Resolution Guidelines state that, the arbitration process is designed 
to be simple, quick, informal and inexpensive; in practice, it actually entails a rigorous process, 
which may exceed 12 weeks. In addition, about it being inexpensive, the actual cost of 
arbitration includes a registration fee, administration fees, arbitrators’ fees and expenses, and 
those of experts. In addition, each party to the arbitration shall bear its own costs of preparing 
and submitting its case. Furthermore, registration fees are payable by the claimant while “the 
cost of arbitration shall be borne by the losing party but subject to the overriding discretion of 
the arbitrator as to which party bears what costs” (Dispute Resolution Guidelines, section 7(2-
4)). These provisions as they stand are intimidating to the ordinary consumer and are likely to 
deter the ordinary consumer from recourse to arbitration. 
The schedule of fees indicates a range of registration fees from a minimum of N5, 000 (US$ 25) 
to a maximum of N20, 000 (US$100) and arbitrators’ fees ranging from N20, 000 to N50, 000. 
This scale of fees may be ‘inexpensive’ for the corporate consumer but it is a tall order for the 
ordinary consumer. For example, the minimum registration fee of N5, 000 is 28% of the 
national minimum monthly wage of N18, 000 and represents a significant cost for low-income 
consumers (Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act 20011, Section 2). Besides, preparing the 
arbitration documents (claim and reply documents) entails five separate submissions of 
documents which may involve substantial resources – funds, time and expertise – beyond the 
capacity of the ordinary consumer and which may well outweigh his/her small claim.  
It is stipulated in the guidelines that the arbitration documents shall contain: 
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- All allegation of facts or matters of opinion; 
- Evidence in proof of the facts; 
- Law to be relied upon; 
- Signed and dated affidavits containing statement of evidence of any witnesses; 
- Relief sought or remedies claimed; and 
- Detailed calculation of any sums claimed. 
Viewed from the perspective of the corporate consumer these requirements are unlikely to 
present any challenge but from the standpoint of the ordinary consumer, it presents a herculean 
task whose cost is most likely to outweigh its benefits. As was discussed earlier, neither the Act 
nor the Dispute Regulation Guidelines 2004 made any distinction between the ordinary 
consumer and the corporate consumer nor did they take into consideration the specific 
circumstances of widely differing groups of consumers. Most ordinary consumers (98 %) are 
on the prepaid platform and usually purchase small airtime at a time – portraying the 
endowment bias. Analysis of consumer claims reported in the CAB 2011, 1st quarter report, 
showed that the maximum claim was N,2000 – which is less than half (40%) of the minimum 
arbitration registration fee. Hence, it does not make economic sense for the ordinary consumer 
to incur an expenditure that is higher than the expected claim. 
The present arbitration process as it stands is not a viable option for the ordinary consumer. It 
was apparently designed with focus on the corporate consumer rather than the ordinary 
consumer. There is yet no evidence that an ordinary consumer has ever escalated his/her 
complaint to arbitration. This status was confirmed by an interviewee (CAB1, 2015). The 
implication is that if an ordinary consumer complaint is not resolved by the normal complaint 
resolution process, it remains unresolved.  
7.5 Enforcement Institution for Complaint Management: Monitoring without 
Enforcement is ineffective 
The Commission has the mandate to monitor compliance with the provisions of the General 
Code and the individual consumer codes in achieving the objectives of complaint monitoring 
and management and to publish quarterly reports which shall include: 1) recurring complaints 
and actions taken to address these; 2) statistics on complaints and their resolution; and 3) 
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breaches of the applicable code provisions and remedial action taken (General Code, sections 
51 and 55). This study however did not find any report on services providers’ complaints 
handling statistics. 
Since the introduction of mobile telecoms in 2001, the ordinary consumer has continuously 
bemoaned the quality of services. The nationwide consumer satisfaction survey (NCC.CSS, 
2012) reported in its findings that the percentage of respondents that rated the Quality of 
services Indicators as ‘poor or very poor’ ranged from 12% to 46%. With regards to complaint 
handling the survey recorded that time to answer complaint calls and time to resolve complaint 
were rated as ‘poor or very poor’ by 46% and 40% of respondents respectively; alignment of 
charging with advertising and correctness of charging was rated as ‘poor or very poor’ by 26% 
of respondents (NCC.CSS, 2012:59). 
CAB undertakes the task of monitoring and investigating compliance with the Quality of 
Services Regulations and General Code with emphasis on consumer complaint management. 
The Bureau carries out these functions by daily monitoring of customer help lines and by 
monitoring the activities at some Customer Care Centres because the Bureau lacks the capacity 
to monitor all the customer care centres across the country. Although CAB has developed a 13-
items-checklist for evaluating Consumer Care Centres, it usually audits the complaint handling 
and tracking procedures using only three out of the 13 items namely: complaint ticket number 
issued to consumer who comes to complain; most persistent complaints received from 
consumers; and average number of complaints received per day/per week. This is yet another 
example of a long list of indices, which are developed without any commitment to put them 
into effect. 
 In addition, CAB carries out investigation of complaints lodged with the Commission by 
unsatisfied consumers. The results of these monitoring and investigation exercises are reported 
internally every quarter. These reports have never ceased to highlight a number of recurring 
breaches of the General Code and complaint handling process. For example, in the 75th edition 
of its Telecoms Consumer Parliament (TCP) CAB’s Deputy Director recounted the prevalent 
consumer complaints to include unsolicited text messages/telemarketing, inaccessibility of 
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customer care helplines, poor spread of customer care centres, unlawful deduction of credit for 
value added services, poor data services and disruption without compensation (Okonji, 2014). 
CAB reports always include recommendations, to the Commission, in general terms without 
any indications for sanctions on offenders. The recurring recommendations include: 
- Services providers should endeavour to make their help lines as accessible as possible; 
- Enforcement of gazetted Quality of Service Regulation, 2012; 
- Management should enforce the right number of contact centre agents and channels on 
services providers according to their subscriber base; 
- Services providers should be monitored to ensure that their complaints status displays 
the latest action taken on complaints. 
The action of CAB falls short of the QoS Regulations which directs that where a licensee 
contravenes any of the parameters or fails to resolve a consumer complaint within the resolution 
time stated in the regulations, the licensee shall compensate the consumer in addition to paying 
any fines that may be imposed by the Commission -QoS Regulations, 2012: Section 14- (NCC, 
n.d.-c). 
From the Commission’s quarterly publications on Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement 
reports and other documents that were analysed this study did not find any evidence that 
sanctions or penalties had been imposed for any breach of the complaint handling guidelines.  
The prevailing inefficiencies and consequent ineffectiveness of the ordinary consumer 
complaint handling process is a result of the Commission’s soft-handed approach to the 
enforcement process. This situation is envisaged by the theoretical framework which states that 
the rules of the game also provide for rule of enforcement as well as penalties for rule violation 
which provide some measure of incentives to discourage rule violations (North, 1990). In this 
regard, Bandaragoda (2000:28) confirms that: the difference between what the law states and 
what obtains in practice is attributable to “laxity in rule application and enforcement”.  
The frustration of consumers in this prevailing situation can be discerned from the report of the 
investigation by the National Mirror Newspaper: Consumers are expecting more commitment 
of the Commission in the area of enforcement so that they may get value for money spent on 
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telecommunications service and appropriate compensation when their rights are violated 
(Erhawarien, 2015). 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the third research question:  What processes have been 
established in the Nigerian mobile sector for the resolution of ordinary mobile consumer 
complaints and how effective they have been?  To answer this question, it employed the 
Institution Decomposition Analytical framework and sought to explore the role of each of the 
components of the decomposed Nigerian Communication institute – mobile policy, mobile law 
mobile administration and mobile enforcement – in the management of ordinary consumer 
complaints.  
The results of the analysis are summarised in this section: 
The National Telecommunications Policy gave no explicit direction about consumer complaint 
management. This task is undertaken by the National Communications Act 2003 and its 
regulations namely the General Consumer Code of Practice, the Quality of Service Regulations, 
the Dispute Resolution Guidelines and Industry Code of Practice. 
The Act defined the Commission’s functions to include the investigation and resolving of 
complaints and disputes between operators, subscribers and any other persons involved in the 
communication industry (Act, Sections: 4(p), 62 and 73). It further directs the Commission to 
establish procedures and guidelines for making, receiving and handling of consumer complaints 
that would form the model procedure for licensees’ individual complaint handling processes. 
The provisions in the Act and its regulations, particularly the General Consumer Code of 
Practice regulations and the Quality of Service Regulations, largely covered the essential 
principles of best practice for consumer complaint handling. The provisions enjoined service 
providers to provide visible, accessible and assessable information about the complaint process; 
backed with responsiveness, objective and consumer focused disposition. Others include 
protection of consumer information and regular review of the complaint handling process. In 
this regard, the licensees in their individual consumer codes of practice are expected at the 
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minimum to conform to the model established in the General Code. However, when compared 
with indices of effective complaint handling all four mobile service providers’ complaint 
processes were found to be inadequate and ineffective particularly with regard to being visible, 
accessible and consumer focused.  
Information about the complaint process is not available on the web, pay-as-you-go starter pack 
or at the customer care centres and outlets. The consumer helplines have a very high average 
failed call attempt rate of 70% as against the threshold of 2%. A consumer has less than 3 in 10 
chances of being connected to a helpline and a frustrating 1 in 3 chances of speaking to an agent 
of his/her service provider. This means that most aggrieved consumers are unable to reach the 
customer care help desk and consequently are unable to activate the complaint management 
process. Although the service providers’ Interactive Voice Response (IVR) systems offer multi-
language options, they are not dedicated to complaint handling but are also normally used for 
advertisement. This study was unable to receive any statistical data on consumer complaints 
from any of the services providers.   
The provisions in Section 40 of the General Code that enjoin service providers to make adequate 
provisions for consumers with disability to access the complaint process have not received 
adequate attention. Two mobile operators MTN and GLO have initiated the installation of 
ramps to facilitate access to their customer care centres for consumer with disabilities. AIRTEL 
claims that its website is optimised for sight and speech and ETISALAT made no provisions in 
this regard in its vaguely worded consumer code. However, there is no evidence of any 
information in braille or any other provision for consumers with sight impairment. There is also 
no evidence that the Commission has imposed any obligation on service providers with respect 
to consumers with disability as was directed by the Act. 
The Commission offers consumers a second level support through two consumers contact 
centres and a multi-channel multi-lingual toll free line and outreach programmes. However, 
this second level support is not efficient. The Commission is not consistent in reporting 
consumer complaints statistics in its annual reports. The complaints statistics reported vary 
widely without any explanation, hence the reports appear to be unreliable. For example, 
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845,703 (94%) complaints, which were escalated to the Commission in 2012, remained 
unresolved at the end of the year (NCC Annual Report, 2012).  
The provisions for arbitration involve substantial transaction costs – fund, time and expertise, 
which outweigh the ordinary consumers’ small claims and hence arbitration is not a viable 
option for the ordinary consumer. It entails five separate submissions of documents and a 
minimum registration fee of N5, 000 (28% of the national minimum monthly wage) which 
represents a significant cost for low-income consumers. It was apparently designed with focus 
on the corporate consumer rather than the ordinary consumer. There is yet no evidence that an 
ordinary consumer has ever escalated his/her complaint to arbitration. 
The Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) oversees the service providers’ compliance with quality 
of service Key Performance Indicators (KPI) by daily monitoring of customers’ helplines and 
contact centres. Although the Commission has developed a 13-items-checklist for evaluating 
Consumer Care Centres. This is yet another example of a long list of indices, which are 
developed without any commitment to put them into effect. CAB usually audits the complaint 
handling and tracking procedures using only three (Failed call attempts, connections to live 
agent and connection to Interactive Voice Response – IVR) out of the 13 items. CAB’s 
quarterly reports on the services providers’ complaint handling process highlights a number of 
recurring breaches, which include failure of network/service providers to meet the Quality of 
Service threshold on consumer complaints handling procedures; inadequate spread of customer 
care centres across the six geo-political zones of the country and slow response to complaint 
inquiries/investigation. 
This study did not find any evidence, from reports of the Commission’s enforcements actions 
and others documents, that sanctions or penalties had been imposed on any services provider 
for any breach of the complaint handling guidelines. The prevailing inefficiencies and 
consequent ineffectiveness of the ordinary consumer complaint handling process is largely the 
result of the Commission’s soft-handed approach to the enforcement because beside the set 
rules the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism influences the efficiency and outcome of 
the telecommunications institution. (North 2005). 
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Therefore, from the evidence exposed in this chapter, this study concludes that in spite of the 
ample provisions in the mobile law and the processes and structures established by the mobile 
administration, the consumer complaints handling processes remain to a very large extent 
inaccessible to the consumer and therefore ineffective. The situation creates feelings of 
frustration, disempowerment and apathy among consumers who have learnt to suffer in silence. 
In the next chapter, a summary of the thesis will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 8 Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The key objective of this thesis was to assess how ordinary consumers are represented in 
liberalised mobile telecommunications markets. The case for this study was Nigeria, chosen 
based on increasing number of recorded consumer complaints. The study was facilitated by 
the following three research questions: 
1. If and how have the legislators, regulators and market players in Nigeria defined the 
ordinary consumer interest in the field of mobile communications? 
2. Focusing on regulatory structures and processes, how have ordinary consumers been 
represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile market in 2001? 
3. What processes have been established in the Nigerian mobile sector for the resolution 
of ordinary mobile consumer complaints and how effective have they been?  
This chapter offers concluding reflections by indicating not only how the above questions were 
answered but also the key strengths of the study and areas of further research. 
 
Rethinking Mobile Consumers in a Wider Context 
Not many studies have critically looked at the interests of mobile telecommunications 
consumers. The aim of Chapter 2 was to situate the thesis in a wider context and to set the 
theoretical and analytical framework to guide this study. Traditionally, telecommunications fall 
under public interest. Because liberalisation of mobile markets does not automatically serve 
policy objectives, regulation is needed to achieve policy objectives that include the promotion 
and protection of ordinary consumer interest. Hence, this thesis is situated in the broader context 
of public interest and policy failure (what happens after policies are enacted and adopted). The 
research focused on aspects of compliance monitoring and enforcement. 
The primary data collection technique employed in this case study has been document analysis. 
This is complemented by semi-structured interviews and other interviews. The study drew from 
the literature on the New Institutional Economics - the study’s theoretical framework – 
including its analytical tools namely: transaction costs and property right which determine the 
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simultaneous causal links between institutions and economic performance to guide the 
empirical section. This study acknowledged a link between the regulatory environment and the 
course of history. Therefore, in order to capture the impact of the 30 years of military 
dictatorship preceding the liberalisation of the sector on the underlying focus of the key players 
– legislator, regulator and service providers – this study also relied on the Principal-Agent and 
Path Dependency concepts drawn from the literature on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
framework.   
The NIE framework adapted the Saleth and Dinar (1999) Institutional Decomposition Model, 
which the study extended to include the enforcement component of institution. Hence, the 
mobile institution was decomposed into four main components, namely: mobile policy, mobile 
law, mobile administration and mobile enforcement. Thus, it facilitated the study to assess if 
the regulatory reform is supported by appropriate institutional arrangements, to ensure that the 
interests of the ordinary consumers are adequately protected in the Nigerian competitive mobile 
market. 
Nigeria, the largest economy in Africa with a telecommunications industry that is one of the 
fastest growing in the world is still writhing in the aftermath of the 3 years of civil war (1967-
1970) and the 30 years of military rule. These events left a cultural legacy of bureaucratic 
corruption and cronyism, which has not abated in the 16 years of democratic rule. The 
prevailing weak institutions, weak civil societies, lack of infrastructural development, tracing 
the pattern of path dependency have left their marks on the liberalised mobile 
telecommunication industry. The main argument here is that the present regulatory framework 
cannot be completely detached from the course of history and that the regulator is influenced 
by the historical legacy and is susceptible to political corruption. It is burdened by agency 
problem and conflict of interest that leads to the subordination of the ordinary consumer interest 
to the interests of the political elites and the industry as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 assessed the current trend in institutional arrangements for consumer representation 
and complaints management. Considerations from this chapter informed the bench marking and 
interpretation of findings in the empirical chapters 6 and 7 of this study in evaluating the 
representation of the ordinary consumer and the management of ordinary consumer complaints 
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respectively. In this regard, the chapter argues that the effectiveness of the various options 
depends on the prevailing socio-political environment and advocates a mixed approach for 
developing countries. 
The following sections present the main findings of the empirical chapters in answer to the 
three research questions:  
8.2 Research Question 1 
 If and how have the legislators, regulators and market players in Nigeria defined the ordinary 
consumer interest in the field of mobile communications? 
Ordinary consumer interest is in the law: without effective administrative and enforcement 
institutions, the law is of no avail.  
The NTP while setting the policy direction and the features of the envisioned communication 
services in the telecommunications sector had the interest of the consumer in view. The mobile 
law established a regulatory framework and an independent regulatory Commission with the 
mandate to promote and protect the interest of consumers. These are vital for a sustained 
campaign for the promotion and protection of ordinary consumer interest. However, in practice, 
the prevailing socio-political environment, which is heavily weighed down by bureaucratic 
corruption and cronyism infiltrates the Commission through its institutional framework; its 
leadership is appointed by the politicians. This infection spreads through the organisation 
because the favoured agents create their own internal clientele network. The result is that the 
Commission’s commitment towards the attainment of policy objectives as it relates to consumer 
interest is compromised. 
The interests of the consumer, which the Communications Act, 2003 specifically undertakes to 
promote and protect are not explicitly defined or listed in the Act but are embedded in and are 
deducible from several provisions of the Act and regulations. There are however certain 
provisions in the Act that are not in the best interest of the consumer. The researcher summarises 
three examples discussed in the thesis. 
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First, the directive on the structuring and setting of tariff rates and levels solely to attract 
investments does not align with the mobile policy objective of affordable tariff for consumers 
and the mobile policy’s directive that it is appropriate to consider consumers’ interest in 
regulating prices before full-blown competition is achieved. The result is that the cost of 
running a mobile in Nigeria is about 5% of personal income, which is significantly above the 
threshold value of 2-3% of personal income (GSMA 2014). Unaffordable tariffs adversely 
affect the accessibility of basic telecoms services particularly for those in the low-income 
group.  
Second, consumers on the pre-paid platform accounts for 97% (130 million) of total mobile 
subscriptions. However, there is no disclosure guideline that mandates the licensees to supply 
information about tariff rate, quality level, and the terms and conditions of the pre-paid service, 
to the consumer at the point of sale as is applicable to services contract. This lack of 
transparency militates against the ordinary consumers’ interest in the availability of information 
that will enable informed choice and fair redress mechanism.  
Third, the mobile law restricts the concept of vulnerable consumers to the disabled and the 
elderly persons. It would appear that no attention is accorded to other vulnerable consumers, 
for example, those with little education, the low socio-economic groups, and those in difficult-
to-access rural areas. For instance, the Universal Service Fund-USPF10 (2013) identified two 
hundred and seven (207) clusters, with an estimated population of thirty six million and eight 
hundred thousand (36.8m) people, as areas that have no access to basic voice telephony because 
they live in the rural communities in Nigeria.   
The Consumer code of practice regulations (General Code) was enacted in 2007, six years after 
the liberalisation of the mobile segment. During this period, the ordinary consumer had no 
                                                 
10 USPF is established by the Nigerian Federal Government to facilitate the achievement of national ICT policy 
goals for universal access and universal service in rural, un-served and under-served, areas in Nigeria.  
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safeguards from the activities of the services providers. First, this evidence shows that the 
Commission is not consumer-focused. It also explains how the neglect of consumer interest 
became entrenched as a norm in the competitive mobile market, which the late introduction of 
the General Code is unable to reverse.  
In Mobile Administration, the definition of the consumer is not aligned with the Act; the notion 
of consumer interests varies across the mobile organisation (the actors) both in content and in 
terminology. The result is that different levels of awareness and degree of importance is 
accorded to consumer interest issues and this detracts the force implied by the mobile law. It 
also creates the opportunity for some stakeholders to take advantage of the lapse in how the 
concept of consumer interest is construed to violate consumer interest rules. The outcome is 
that the Commission and the industry players are not consistent in their practice in upholding 
the ordinary consumer interest at a level in line with the policy and law rather they routinely 
undermine the ordinary consumer interest; subordinating the ordinary consumer interest to their 
interest by violating the existing rules.  
Under the mobile enforcement institution (monitoring and enforcement processes and 
procedures), the Commission has exclusive power and competence to monitor and enforce 
compliance of all persons to the provisions of the Act and its regulations. However, the 
monitoring and enforcement institution lacks the technical facilities and willpower to carry out 
effective monitoring of the Nigerian telecommunications landscape on a regular basis, which 
creates room for violations.  
More importantly, there has been an obvious lack of commitment to impose appropriate 
sanctions on erring operators. This is confirmed by evidence exposed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In 
addition, the failure of the Commission to ensure that licensees pay compensation to consumers 
for failure to meet quality of services key performance indicators is in itself a violation of 
consumer interest in fair redress mechanism (Quality of Services Regulations, 14(b)). The 
ordinary consumers suffer the multiple loss of frustration and economic loss because of poor 
quality of service including sometimes complete loss of service and loss of their compensation. 
The difference between what the law provides and what the consumer is getting is a 
consequence of the prevailing laxity in the enforcement of rules (Bardaragoda, 2000). 
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Consequently, in spite of the Commission’s expansive enforcement powers, pervasive 
contravention of the provisions of the Act overwhelms the Enforcement Institution. The 
contraventions of consumer interest issues range from violations of tariff rule, failure to meet 
Quality of Services key performance indicators and the provisions of the General Code to 
noncompliance with enforcement directives. These contraventions thrive because of the 
endemic laxity in the enforcement that allows gaps between the mobile law on one hand and 
the mobile administration and enforcement on the other hand because how the game is played 
depends not only on the formal rules but also on the effectiveness of enforcement (North, 2005). 
The evidence of reoccurrences of the violation the General Code suggest that enforcement 
actions do not provide sufficient incentive for compliance but rather the soft-handed-pussy-
footed strategy of the Commission creates room for impunity and it prevails. These are some 
of the symptoms of the prevailing conflict of interest, which is part of the huge agency problem 
afflicting the Commission, which was extensively discussed in chapter 2. 
Therefore, in answer to the first research question, this study holds that the legislators have 
defined the interest of the consumer through the instruments of the National 
Telecommunications Policy, 2000 and the Communications Act, 2003 and the establishment of 
an independent regulator invested with exclusive powers and legal instruments to execute the 
communications institution. In practice, the Commission is not consumer focused because it is 
not wholly independent and it is afflicted with acute agency problems and conflict of interest. 
The services providers in turn exploit the compromised regulatory institution to violate 
consumer interests with impunity. Hence, the consumer interest is greatly undermined by the 
inefficient mobile administration and the prevalent violations of the provisions in the Act and 
regulations, which the ‘soft-handed-pussy-footed’ strategy of the enforcement institution is 
unable to curtail. Therefore, the policy and legal objectives in this regard are yet to be realised, 
which is a clear indication of failure to achieve the policy objective concerning the interest of 
the ordinary consumer. 
8.3 Research Question 2 
Focusing on regulatory structures and processes, how have ordinary consumers been 
represented since the liberalisation of the Nigerian mobile market in 2001? 
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Legal provision for statutory independent consumer representation is crucial to enable 
ordinary consumer influential participation in the regulatory process. 
The NTP provided a window for the establishment of a framework for consumer representation 
by its directive that stakeholders including consumers shall be accorded access to the 
Commission’s proceeding and the right to submit opinion in support of their interest (NTP, 
section 3.1.4.1). Nevertheless, the Act made no legal provision for the establishment of an 
independent statutory consumer body or support for independent consumer representation 
bodies. Consumer advocacy is missing in the Act. This omission has adversely affected 
consumer representation in the telecommunications sector because institutions are essential to 
create the rules and structures of the game; the rules for the influential participation of 
independent consumer representation bodies in the regulatory process. An institutional 
framework has a major role in the establishment of a firm platform for the interactions between 
consumer bodies and the licensees (North, 2005). Without legal provision, the role of consumer 
representation bodies remains undefined and irrelevant in the telecommunications regulatory 
process.  
A consequence of the absence of legal provisions for independent consumer representation is 
the Commission’s lack of visible commitment in soliciting consumer input to its regulatory 
process. This is reflected in the fact that the Commission received only one (1) submission to 
its public inquiry form a voluntary telecommunications consumer body between 2009 and 2015. 
This submission was for the SIM Card Registration inquiry in 2010. This insignificant effort 
from consumers is a direct consequence of the dearth of active well-resourced consumer 
advocacy bodies that are able to bring to the Commission’s attention consumer concerns and 
issues that lead to consumer detriment. It is of note that out of the nine public inquires held by 
the Commission in that period (2009 to 2015), only the SIM card Registration and the Mobile 
Number Portability inquiries had any bearings on consumer immediate concerns. The other 
public inquiries were on network and licensing issues. This is another example of subordinating 
the consumer interest to other interests, which was highlighted in section 8.2 above. 
Participating in a public inquiry is a difficult hurdle for the ordinary consumer. It implies 
substantial transaction cost for the ordinary consumer (time, research and secretarial costs), 
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which constitute a grave impediment to consumers’ participation in public inquiries.  This is 
another reason for legislative provisions for independent consumer representation body.  
The Commission’s outreach programme, which is the main structure for engaging consumers, 
has very limited reach and an extremely long event cycle. The manner of information 
publication, which the Commission deems appropriate (and which is applicable to licensees) is 
to publicise on its website and two national newspapers. Publicising information in this manner 
excludes a large portion of ordinary consumers who do not have access to electronic media or 
who have poor knowledge of the English language. Hence, the Commission’s main information 
dissemination structures, procedures and its overall strategy are grossly ineffective and 
inadequate to reach ordinary consumers out there, who remain largely unengaged and 
uninformed. 
In the previous section, it was noted that the concept of consumer interest varies across the 
mobile organisation with far reaching implications for consumer representation. The Consumer 
Affairs Bureau (CAB), in its Facts Sheet on Consumer Bill of Rights defines the consumer 
‘right to be heard’ as follows: 
Right to be heard: “right to get fair, inexpensive and quick redress of grievances. 
Consumers must have accessible knowledge of the complaint process and steps needed 
to lodge a complaint. Consumers have the right to a consumer-oriented response for 
complaints and as prescribed by the consumer code of practice regulation” (NCC, n.d.-
a). 
Equating the ‘right to be heard’ to ‘right to redress’ is a gross misrepresentation in glaring 
contrast to the definition of the ‘right to be heard’, which the United Nations (UN) has defined 
as the right to have the interest of the consumer represented in government policy (UN 
guidelines for consumer Protection, 1985). In addition, CAB’s definition does not align with 
the NTP directive, which states that consumers should be accorded the right to submit opinion 
in support of their interest. Mobile organisation misconstrues the consumer’s ‘right to be heard’ 
and envisages the consumer as a passive recipient who may complain, but may not be heard. 
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Hence, the consumers’ input is neither sought for nor taken into account in the Commission’s 
regulatory process. 
Another example of the side lining of the ordinary consumer is seen in the development of 
consumer codes. Neither the Act nor the Consumer code of Practice Regulation (the General 
Code) made any specific provision for consumer input in the development or review of 
individual consumer codes as would be expected if the codes were to address ordinary 
consumer needs and interests. Hence, the mobile service providers, in practice, did not involve 
their consumers in the development of their consumer codes of practice nor did the Commission 
have it as a condition for code registration. Effective development of codes is usually the result 
of negotiations between organisations (Hulsink, 1999), otherwise their effective 
implementation cannot be guaranteed.  
Mobile Number Portability (MNP) was implemented in Nigeria in the first quarter of 2013. 
Available data reveal very low levels of porting (NCCStat, 2014). Two major reasons account 
for this: 1) the ordinary consumer with feasible insight from experience (North, 2005) and 
information gathered from hearsay has come to know that there is not much difference in the 
level of performance of the four mobile network providers. The Consumer Satisfaction Index 
is 59.1% with a spread of 3.1 point across services providers (NCC.CSS, 2012). Hence, the 
little differentiation between the network providers’ performance does not provide sufficient 
incentive for switching. 2) The comparative report published on the Commission’s web site is 
not consumer friendly and very infrequent, for instance the Technical Standards website has 
January 2014 Performance Indicator Comparative Report (mobile telephone service) still 
tagged as new (latest) in March 2016. Secondly, the reported performance indicators are neither 
weighted nor aggregated hence the ratings of the mobile service providers are not obvious to 
the ordinary consumer. Hence, the published information does not empower the ordinary 
consumer to make an informed choice.   
CAB in its Annual Reports has been consistent in highlighting the recurring mobile service 
providers’ breaches of the General Code and Quality of services Regulations, which relate to 
the: provision of information to consumers, inadequacy of locating Consumer Care Centres 
only in state capitals and inaccessibility of customer help lines. Inadequate information is a 
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major obstacle to consumer engagement. In spite of the negative impact of these issues on 
consumer engagement, there is no evidence from the Commission’s enforcement reports, which 
the Commission publishes every quarter on its website nor any other regulatory document so 
far, that any enforcement action was taken against any mobile service provider for any of the 
above breaches.  
Several pro-consumer provisions in the law, for example provisions on public inquiries and 
provisions of information, do not take into consideration the limited resources, literacy and 
knowledge level of ordinary consumers. Hence, the consumers are not benefiting from these 
provisions because they lack the capacity to exploit those provisions; they do not have the 
support of active independent consumer representation bodies. Therefore, despite the directives 
of the National Telecommunications Policy (NTP), which states that stakeholders – operators, 
consumers – shall be given access to the Commission’s proceedings and the right to present 
opinion in support of their interest, the Commission failed to establish the critically required 
administrative structures and strategies, which would ensure consumers’ effective engagement 
and participation in the regulatory process. This is another clear indication of failure to achieve 
policy objective relating to the interest of ordinary consumer. 
8.4 Research Question 3  
What processes have been established in the Nigerian mobile sector for the resolution of 
ordinary mobile consumer complaints and how effective have they been? 
Inaccessibility of the Complaint handling process is a major setback to complaint management. 
The General Consumer Code of Practice 2007 (General Code) made ample provisions detailing 
the procedure and requirement for the management of consumers’ complaints. The General 
Code also directed licensees to provide easily understood information about their complaints 
handling process in various media and formats and to make adequate provisions in their 
complaints procedures for consumers with disabilities. However, when compared with indices 
of effective complaint handling all the four mobile service providers’ complaint processes were 
found to be inadequate and ineffective particularly about being visible, accessible and consumer 
focused. With the exception of Airtel, the individual codes of service providers are on neither 
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their website nor the Commission’s website. In addition, information about the complaint 
handling processes of the network services providers is not at their customer care centres or 
retail outlets or pay-as-you-go starter packs. Earlier research (NCC.CSS, 2012), the only 
national consumer research undertaken by the Commission, also referred to the inaccessibility 
of these individual codes. Furthermore, this study particularly observed that the mobile service 
providers’ individual consumer code of practice is yet to be translated into the three main 
Nigerian languages. The implication of the inaccessibility of the individual codes is that 
ordinary consumers are unaware of the service providers’ complaint handling procedures and 
therefore remain largely uneducated about their rights (CI, 2014). In spite of these obvious 
shortcomings, the Commission, without any input from consumers as was earlier highlighted, 
approved the service providers’ complaints handling processes. 
The General Code directed that consumers should first exhaust the licensee’s complaints 
procedures before escalating the complaints to the Commission. This directive appears as a 
difficult hurdle for aggrieved ordinary consumers because the mobile service providers’ 
complaints handling platform is not easily accessible to consumers. Analysis of the 
commission’s 2011 and 2012 annual reports reveal that consumers have less than 30% (1 in 3) 
chances of connecting to a help line and a frustrating 31% (1 in 3) chance of speaking to a live 
agent of their mobile service provider. This implies that consumers have daunting challenges 
reaching the Customer Care help desk and are therefore unable to activate the complaint 
handling process of their service providers. Although call to the help lines are free of charge, 
the cost of time associated with their use makes them unattractive to the ordinary consumer. 
The interview conversation held with Vendor11 (2015) confirmed this finding. 
The Commission offers consumers a second level support through the outreach programmes, 
two consumers contact centres, web channels and a multi-channel multi-lingual toll free line to 
aggrieved consumers whose complaints have not been satisfactorily resolved by their service 
providers. Utilisation of this provision also suffers from low consumer awareness, which 
                                                 
11 Vendor - a Kiosk GSM recharge card vendor at Ibeju Lekki, Lagos, is an interviewee (face-face). 
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regarding the Commission’s toll-free number, stands at an average of 11% but is as low as 5% 
in some states in the country (NCC CSS, 2012:55). Furthermore, the second level support is 
ineffective and inefficient. The Commission’s outreach programmes handle less than 400 
complaints per annum. In 2012, the Commission received 903,098 complaints via the contact 
centres; by the end of the year, only 57,395 (6%) were resolved while the remaining 845,703 
(94%) complaints were pending (NCC Annual Report, 2012:47). This reflects the gross 
inefficiency in the consumer complaints management process; the General Code stipulates, “in 
any event, no complaint shall remain unresolved after 90 days” (General Code, Section 41(3)). 
In addition, the Commission is not consistent in reporting consumer complaints statistics in its 
annual reports, as stipulated in the General Code. Concerning service providers, this study was 
unable to obtain the services providers’ complaints statistics/records to deduce the efficiency 
of their complaint processes. Information on consumer complaints is not readily available either 
from the Commission website or from the individual mobile service providers’ websites. The 
ordinary consumer complaints handling is yet another example that the rules in use are different 
from the rules set out in the mobile law (Bardaragoda, 2000), that is, the mobile administration 
does not sufficiently mirror the mobile policy and the mobile law as an integral component of 
the mobile institution. 
The Act, 2003, the General Code and the Dispute Regulation Guidelines, in the provisions for 
arbitration, made no distinction between the ordinary consumer and the corporate consumer nor 
did they take into consideration the specific circumstances of widely differing groups of 
consumers. The same arbitration rules are applicable to all categories of consumers; one code 
serves all, marginalises the weaker one.  
Meeting the requirements for arbitration from the standpoint of the ordinary consumer, presents 
a herculean task. Preparing the arbitration documents (claim and reply documents) entails five 
separate submissions of documents which may involve substantial resources – funds, time and 
secretarial expertise – which are beyond the capacity of the ordinary consumer and is likely to 
outweigh his/her small claim. For example, the minimum registration fee of N5000 for 
arbitration is 28% of the national minimum monthly wage of N18000 (US$ 90) and represents 
a significant cost for low-income consumers (Minimum wage (Amendment) Act 2001, Section 
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2). The actual cost of arbitration also includes administration fees, arbitrators’ fees and 
expenses, and those of experts. In addition, each party to the arbitration bears its own costs of 
preparing and submitting its case. 
These provisions are intimidating to the ordinary consumer and are likely to deter the ordinary 
consumer from recourse to arbitration. The present arbitration process as it stands is not a viable 
option for the ordinary consumer. There is yet no evidence that an ordinary consumer has ever 
escalated his/her complaint to arbitration. The implication is that if the normal complaint 
resolution process does not resolve an ordinary consumer complaint, it remains unresolved.  
The Commission has developed a 13-items-checklist for evaluating Consumer Care Centres, 
but usually audits the complaint handling and tracking procedures using only 3 (namely: Failed 
Attempt to customer help line, Connection to Live Agent, Connection to Interactive Voice 
Response (IVR) out of the 13-items-checklist indicating a lack of commitment to enforcement. 
Although the results of these monitoring exercises including prevalent breaches of the 
provisions of the General Code are included in the internal quarterly reports, this study did not 
find any evidence, in any of the documents reviewed, that any sanctions have been imposed on 
any mobile service provider for any breach of the complaint handling rules. This also reflects 
the weakness, flaws and prevailing laxity in the enforcement institution and the lack of 
Commission’s commitment to its mandate to promote and protect the interests of the ordinary 
consumers, which were highlighted in detail in the empirical Chapters 5 and 6 of Part II. 
Therefore, given the invisibility and inaccessibility of the mobile service providers’ complaints 
process, the intimidating arbitration process and the non-responsive enforcement institution, 
the complaints handling processes and procedures are grossly inadequate for effective 
management of ordinary consumers’ complaint. As a result, consumers have developed apathy 
towards the mobile service providers’ complaint process, and suffer in silence. This is 
collaborated by Focused Group Interview conducted in Nigeria by Consumer International (CI) 
and the Nigeria based Consumer Awareness Organisation (CI, 2014). Hence, with regards to 
effective management of ordinary consumer complaints, the Commission has failed to achieve 
the policy objective. 
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8.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
Fixed Telephony Segment: a substitute for the mobile service 
The Commission issued licences for PNL-Microwave Radio, Fixed Wireless Access and 
CDMA. It was anticipated that these services would constitute substitute services for the GSM 
services and through competitive pressure facilitate to lower the tariff of the GSM services. 
However, the reverse has been the case. The subscriptions to these services have dwindled 
rapidly in spite of the potential of the fixed networks to drive broadband (ITU, 2013).  
The time now beacons for a research on this segment of the telecommunications industry. The 
research may focus on the following:   
To what extent has, the Nigerian Communications legal framework and regulatory 
interventions enabled the thriving of the fixed telephony segment? 
8.6 Summary 
Overall, this study has shown that the National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) is consumer-
focused in its vision of the liberalised telecommunication sector and the mobile law is largely 
in synergy with the NTP. However, the non-provision of an independent statutory consumer 
body leaves a huge gap in the protection of consumer interest, considering that Nigeria has a 
very little history of civil society. As a result, the ordinary consumers because of their limited 
capability are neither able to harness the legal provisions nor hold the Commission and the 
mobile service providers to account. The regulatory framework is highly susceptible to the 
socio-economic environment characterised by non-transparent transactions and weak 
institutions. The result is that the Commission is imbued with agency problems and therefore 
not consumer-focused. The services providers in turn exploit the inefficient mobile 
administration and weak enforcement institution to violate consumer interest’s rules with 
impunity. The result is that the policy objectives with regard to the promotion and protection 
of ordinary consumer interest, which aligns with the public interest has not been realised, an 
indication of telecommunications policy failure. 
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The public interest in telecommunications policy has so far benefitted mobile 
telecommunications companies rather than ordinary mobile consumers. The existing policy 
failure, as discussed in the case study of Nigeria, can be addressed by enforcing compliance to 
existing rules and by according independent consumer representative bodies influential voice 
in the implementation of policy objectives. 
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APPENDIX A: List of Interviewees 
s/n Name and Role Mode & Date of 
Interview 
Interviewee 
Code 
1 Senior officer 
Association of Licensed 
Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria 
(ALTON)  
e-mail/phone 
19 – 21 August 2014 
Alton  
2 Senior officer 
National Association of 
Telecommunications Consumers of Nigeria 
(NATCOM) 
e-mail/phone 
5  July 2014 
Natcom 
3 Senior Officer 
Consumer Awareness Organisation (CAO)  
e-mail/phone 
16 August-11 October 
2014 
Cao 
4 Former-Commission’s Director, Consumer 
Affairs Bureau (CAB)  
Face-to-face/mail 
2-hour in-depth  
19 August 2014/ –9 
March 2016 
NCC1 
5 Commission’s Zonal Controller  e-mail/phone call            
18 May 2014 - 26 
March 2016 
NCC 2 
6 Kiosk GSM card vendor, Ibeju Lekki, Lagos  Face-to- Face 
18 August 2014 
Vendor 
7 Obiageli Ezekwesili  
World Bank official 
Ex-Hon Minister of Education & 
Former Vice President for Africa at the 
World Bank &  
Co-Founder of the BringBackOurGirls 
campaign. 
Face-to- Face 
Al Jazeera Head-to-
Head  
14 April 2015 
Cons 1 
8 Private Lawyer 
Lecturer School of Media and 
Communication,  
Pan-Atlantic University, Lagos 
Face-to- Face 
20 August 2014 
Cons 2 
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9 Engr. Olawale A. Ige                                  
Ex-Hon. Minister of Communications & 
former Commission’s Board Executive 
Commissioner (2000-2010).             
Currently Chairman, Board of Trustees- 
Nigerian Internet Group.   
Face-to-Face 
2-hour in-depth 
5 August 2014 
Minister 
10 Engr. Vincent Maduka 
Consultant to NCC/Ministry of 
Communications (1990-1992)                  
DG of Nigerian Television Authority (1977-
1982;1984-1986)                               
Currently Senior Fellow at School of Media 
and Communication, PAU, Lagos 
Face-to- Face/e-mail 
2-hour in-depth 
28 August 2014 
Consultant  
11 Mr Roger Darlington 
Chairman, Consumer Forum for 
Communications (Ofcom) 
Face-to- Face/e-mail 
2-hour in-depth 
14 December 2015 
CFC1 
12 Mr Chris Taylor 
Director, Consumer Policy (Ofcom) 
e-mail 
23 December 2015 
Ofcom 1 
13 Chris Holland 
Communications Consumer Panel and 
Advisory-Member for England- (Ofcom)  
e-mail 
11 July – 3 December 
2015 
CCP 1 
14 Claire Milne 
Ex-Chairman, Consumer Forum for 
Communications (Ofcom).                           
Independent telecoms policy consultant 
e-mail 
5 June 2015 – 22 
September 2015 
 
CFC 2 
 
  
268 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abudullahi, B. (2015, April 26). BBC News. Retrieved April 26, 2015, from bbc.co.uk: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34638595) 
ACMA. (2015). Communications Report 2013-2014 Series Report 1: Australians' Digital Lives . 
Melbourne: ACMA. 
Adaramola, Z., & Nurudeen, N. (2015, December 17). Daily Trust. Retrieved March 21, 2016, 
from dailytrust.com.ng: http://dailytrust.com.ng/news/news/-3-4bn-fine-mtn-to-
challenge-nigerian-government/124852.html#iP1qjRYtORMgwKbK.99 
Adepetun, A. (2016, 02). Guardian. Retrieved from ngrguardiannews.com: 
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2016/06/02/etisalat-sues-mtn-for-acquiring-
visafone/ 
Adepetun, A. (2015, September 30). The Guardian. Retrieved from ngrguardiannews.com: 
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/cto-leadership-a-new-frontier-for-
nigerias-telecoms-sector/ 
Akinsuyi, Y. (2014, April 7). This Day. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from thisdaylive.com: 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/cpc-ncc-form-alliance-to-curb-abuses-by-
telecoms-firms/175585/ [ 
Aloo, C. (1998). Development of telecommunication infrastruture in Africa: Network 
Evolution, Present Status and Future Development. African Median Review, vol.2(3). 
Andrew, J. (2014, December 19). This Day Live. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from 
thisdaylive.com: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ncp-approves-sale-of-nitel-to-
natcom/197142 
Armstrong, M., Cowan, S., & Vickers, J. (1994). Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and 
British Experience . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. JAIP, 35(4), 216 - 224. 
Arowolo, O., & Folarin, F. (2014). Nigeria's telecommunications sector: what are the 
operational and fiscal challenges in the midst of success? W.C.R.R., 9(9), 30-31. 
269 
 
Auriol, E. (Nov., 2005). Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries. 
Communications & Strategies, Special issue, 31-52. 
Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R., & Cave, M. (1999). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R., Cave, M., & Lodge, M. (2012). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bandaragoda, D. (2000). A Framework for institutional analysis for water resources 
management in River Basin Context working Paper 5. Colombo, Srilanka: 
International Water Management. 
Baudrier, A. (2001). "Independent Regulation and Telecommunications Performance in 
Developing Countries". Prepared for Annual ISNIE Conferenc: Institutions and 
Governancee September 13-15, 2001. Barkeley, California. 
Bauer, J. M. (2010, February-March). Regulation, public policy, and investment in 
Communications infrastructure. Elsevier Ltd, 34(1-2), 65-79. 
Bickenbach, F., Kumkar, L., & Soltwedel, R. (1999). The New Institutional Economics of 
Antitrust and Regulation. Brussels, Belgium: Kiel Working Paper No 961. 
BIS. (2011). Empowering and ptotecting consumers: Consultation on institutional changes for 
provision of consumer information advice, education, advocacy and enforcement. 
London: BIS. 
Blackman, C. (2007). The public interest and global, future telecommunications landcape. 
Info, 6-16. 
Blackman, C.; Srivastava, L. (2011). A Level Playing Field: Regulating for Effective 
Competition. In C. Blackman, L. Srivastava, C. Blackman, & L. Srivastava (Eds.), 
Telecommunications Regulations Handbook (pp. 27-59). Washington, DC: 
IBRD/World Bank, InfoDev & ITU. 
Boven, M., & Hart, P. (2016). Revisiting the study of policy failures. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 1-14. 
270 
 
Brisby, P. (2005). Dispute Resolution in Telecoms - The Regulatory Perspective. CTLR, 4 - 9. 
Brown, R. (2012). The UN Guidelines For Consumer Protection: Making Them Work In 
Developing Countries. In J. Malcolm (Ed.), Consumers in the Information Society: 
Access, Fairness and Representation (pp. 113 - 139). Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: 
Consumers International. 
Bruce, R. R., & Macmillan, R. (2004). Dispute resolution inthe Telecommunications 
Sector:Current Practices and Future Directions (Discussion Paper). Geneva: ITU & 
World Bank. 
Bryman, A. (2001). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. (2004). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bulck, H. (2012). Towards a Media Policy Process Analysis Model and Its Methodological 
Implications in Trends in Communications Policy Research. (N. Just, & M. Puppis, Eds.) 
Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: Intellect. 
Cannock, G. (2002). "Feedback To ReGulators From Consumers", Apoyo Consultoria Report to 
the International TelecommunicationUnion, Global Symposuo for Regulators, 7-8 
December 2002. Hong Kong, China: Apoyo Consultoria. 
CCAAC. (2005). Principles For The Appointment of Consumer Representatives: A Process for 
Governments and Industry, Final Paper. Australia: Commonwealth of Australia. 
Cellular.News. (2014, April 26). Cellular News. Retrieved from Cellular News.com: 
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/65597.php (last Accessed 21st December 2015) 
CI. (2014). Research Report on the State of Consumer Protection in Nigeria: A Review of 
Consumer protection in the Telecommunications sector in Nigeria in partnership with 
Consumer Awareness Organisation. Abuja: Consumer International (CI). Retrieved 
January 10th, 2016, from 
http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1532727/consumer-protection-in-
nigeria-research-report-eng.pdf 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. In R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law 
(pp. 33 - 55). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
271 
 
Coase, R. H. (1964). The Regulated Industries: Discussion. American Economic Review, 54, 
194 - 197. 
Consumer Focus. (2011). Annex:Consumer representation for 21st century: A regulated 
industry. London: Consumer Focus. 
COnsumer.Panel. (2006, February). Consumer Panel (Ofcom). Retrieved August 8, 2014, from 
communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk: 
http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/downloads/our-
publications/research-and-
reports/capturing_the_consumer_interest%20a%20toolkit%20for%20regulators%20
etc.pdf 
Coppack, M., Jackson, F., & Tallack, J. (2014, July 28). HM Government: UKRN. Retrieved May 
7, 2015, from regulationtomorrow.com: 
http://www.regulationtomorrow.com/eu/ukrn-publishes-three-consumer-working-
group-discussion-papers/ 
Coren, D. (2005). Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to play Regulatory Games in 
European Utility Market Governance. International Journal of Policy, Administration 
and Institutions, 18, 375-398. 
CPC.Act. (1992). Consumer Protection Council of Nigeria. Abuja: The Federal Military 
Government. 
Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 
Applications, 3rd Edition. London: Sage. 
Cseres, K. J. (2008). What Has Competition Done for Consumers in Liberalised Markets. The 
Competition Law Review, 4(2), 77- 121. 
Daily Punch. (2011). Telecommunications Industry Performance Overview. Lagos: Nigerian 
Punch Newspaper. 
Davies, J., & Szyszczak, E. (2010). Effective protection of consumer rights? Thomson Reuters 
(lagal) Limited and Contributors, 695 - 706. 
Deakin university & ACCAN. (2011). Seeking Straight Answers: Consumer Decision-Making in 
Telecommunications. Sydney: ACCAN. 
272 
 
Deliotte & GSMA. (2012). Sub-Sahara Africa Mobile Observatory. London: GSMA. 
Deloitte. (2014). The Deloitte Consumer Review Africa: A 21st Century View. London: 
Deliotte. 
Denzin, N. (1978). Sociological methods, 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Dhaher, O. (2011). Consumer oriented telecom regulating authority: A possible solution in 
fragile state? The case of the Palestine authority. Palestine Authority. 
DTI. (2000). A New Future for Communications. London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
DTI. (2001). Communications Liberalisation in the UK. London: DTI. 
DTI. (2004). Consumer representation in regulated industries: A report by the Department of 
Trade and Industry and HM Treasuty. London: DTI. 
Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). Can Path Dependence Explain Institutional Change? Two Approaches 
Applied to Welfare State Reform. Germany: MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/2 / ISSN 0944 
- 2073. 
ECOWAS. (2007). Supplimentary Act on the Harmonisation of Policies and of the Regulatory 
Framework for the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Sector . 
Ouagadougou: ECOWAS. 
ECOWAS. (2008, January 16). ECOWAS: The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. 
Retrieved from womencount4peace.org: 
http://www.womencount4peace.org/en/legal_documents/frameworks/ecowas_con
flict_prevention_framework_ecpf 
Eggertsson, T. (1990, May). The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights in Economic 
Analysis. Elsevier European Economic Review, 34(2-3), 450 - 457. 
Elebeke, E. (2014, March 5th). Vanguard. Retrieved January 9th, 2016, from 
vanguardngr.com: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/senate-berates-ct-
minister-non-take-rural-telephony-project/ 
Erhawarien, I. (2015, August 13). National Mirror. Retrieved November 11, 2015, from 
nationalmirroronline.net: http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/subscribers-set-new-
performance-criteria-for-new-nccs-helmsman/ 
273 
 
EU. (2007). EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007 - 2013. Belgium: European Community. 
Fink, A. (2003). How to sample in survey. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Fink, C., Mattoo, A., & Rathindran, R. (2003). An assessment of telecommunications reform 
in developing countries. Information Economics and Policy, Vol 15,443-466. 
Flathman, R. (1966). The Public Interest. An Essay concerning the Normative Discourse of 
Politics. New York:: John Wiley & Sons. 
Flick, U. (2009). Introduction to qualitative research 4th edition. London: Sage. 
Forster, N. (1994). The analysis of company documentation. In C. Cassell, & G. Symon, 
Qualitative methods in organisational research: a practical guide (pp. 147-166). 
London: Sage. 
Foss, N. J., & Klein, P. (2005). The theory of the Firm and its Critics: A Stocktaking and 
Assessment. Copenhagan: Copenhagan Business School. 
Freedman, D. (2008). The Politics of Media Policy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Frempong, G. K., & Atubra, W. (2001). Liberalisation of telecoms: the Ghanaian experience. 
Elsevier Telecommunications Policy, 25(3), 197-210. 
Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1991). The New Institutional Economics: A collection of articles 
from the journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISBN: 316 145 7641, 
9783161457647: Mohr Sieback . 
Gaffinkin, M. (2005). Regulation as Accounting Theory. Wollongong (Australia): Research 
OnLine. 
Galexia. (2008). Consumer Protection in the Communications Industry: Moving to Best 
Practice. Australia: Choice and Galexia. 
Garnham, N. (1997). Universal service. In W. H. Melody(Ed), Telecom Reform Principles, 
Policies and Regulatory Practices (pp. 199 - 204). Lyngby, Denmark: Den Private 
Ingeniorfond Technical University of Denmark. 
Geoffrey, C. (2002). "Feedback To Regulators From Consumer",Apoyo Consultoria Report To 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)GlobalSymosium For Regulators, 7 
- 8 December 2002. Hong Kong, China: ITU. 
274 
 
Gibbons, T. (2005). 'Competitive Policy and Regulatory Style - Issues for OFCOM'. The Journal 
of Policy Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information and Media, 
Vol. 7. No. 5 pp 42 - 51. 
Gorp, A. (2008). Increasing Regulatory Capacity: The Role of the Region in Shaping National 
ICT Policy in Southern Africa. A dissertation in Information Sciences and Technology 
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the PhD deg. University of 
Pennsylvania. Ann Arbor: ProQuest LLC. 
Gray, C., & Kaufmann, D. (1998). Corruption and Development. Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Network, 7-10. 
GSMA. (2012). Brazil Mobile Observatory. London: GSMA. 
GSMA. (2013). Sub-Sahara Africa Mobile Economy. London: GSMA. 
GSMA. (2014). Country Overview: Nigeria. London: GSMA. 
GSMA. (2015). Global Mobile Economy Report. London: GSMA. 
Hantke-Domas, M. (2003). The Public Interest theory of regulation: Non-existance or 
Misinterpretation. European Journal of Law and Economics, 15, 165-194. 
Haring, R., & Weisman, D. (1993). Dominance, nondominance and the public interest in 
telecommunications regulation. Telecommunications Policy, 17(2), 98-106. 
Harker, M., Mathieu, L., & Price, C. (2006). Regulation and Consumer Representation. In M. 
Crew, & D. Parker, International Handbook on Economic Regulation (pp. 209 - 231). 
Cheltenham, UK: Edgar Publishing Ltd. 
Hertog, J. (2010). Review of Economic Theories of Regulation. Tjalling C. Koopmans Research 
Institute Discussion Paper Series, No 10-18. Retrieved January 10th, 2016, from 
http://www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rebo_use_dp_2010_10-18.pdf 
Hills, J. (1987). Universal Service: Liberalisation and Privatisation. Elsevier ltd, 129-144. 
Howells, G. (2000). Consumers and Participation. In D. Lewis, & D. Campbell, Promoting 
Participation, Law or politics? (pp. 291-318). London: Cavendish. 
Hulsink, W. (1999). Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications 
Comparing Britain, the Neherlands and France. London: Routledge. 
275 
 
ICT.Policy. (2012). National ICT Policy. Abuja: Ministry of Communication Technology. 
Ijewere, A. A., & Obeki, S. O. (2011). Consumerism in Nigeria. Jorind, 186-192. 
Iosifidis, P. (2011). Global Media and Communication Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Isaac, N. (2015, April 7). ThisDay Live. Retrieved November`12 12, 2015, from thisdaylive: 
http:www.thisdaylive.com/articles/cpc-ncc-form-alliance-to-curb-abuses-by-
telecoms-firms/175585/april2015  
ITU. (1994). World Telecommunication Development Conference Final Report. ITU WTDC. 1, 
pp. 1 - 179. Buenos Aires: ITU. 
ITU. (1999). World Telecommunication Development Report: Mobile Cellular. Geneva: ITU. 
ITU. (2004/2005). Trends in Telecommunication Reform Licensing in an Era of Convergence. 
Geneva: ITU. 
ITU. (2006). Consumer Protection in the Digital Age: Assessing Current and Future activities. 
ITU, 1 - 29. 
ITU. (2009). Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2009: Hands - on, Hands - off? Stimulating 
Growth Through Effective ICT Regulation. Geneva: ITU. 
ITU. (2013). Trends in Telecommunication Reform Transnational Aspects of Regulation in a 
networked Societey. Geneva: ITU. 
ITU-BDT. (2004). African Telecommunication Indicators. Geneva: ITU. 
ITU-D. (2007). itu.int. Retrieved November 17, 2015, from ITU: https://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/material/af_report07.pdf 
ITU-ICT Regulation Toolkit. (2010, May). ITU. Retrieved December 14, 2015, from itu.int: 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/ICT-Reg-News-e.pdf 
ITU-T. (11/88). Recommendations, E880: Field Data Collection and Evaluation on the 
Performance of Equipment, Networks and Services. Geneva: ITU. 
ITU-T. (2013). Technology Watch Report: The Mobile Money Revolution, Part 1 NFC Mobile 
Payments. Geneva: ITU. 
276 
 
Jain, A. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys Vol. 15, No1, 71-121. 
Jasen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Karppinen, K., & Moe, H. (2012). What we Talk about When We Talk about Document 
Analysis. In N. Just, & M. Pupis, Trends in communication Policy Research: New 
Theories, Methods and Subjects (pp. 177-193). Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: Intellect. 
Kaufmann, D. (1998). Research on Corruption:critical empirical issues. In A. K. Jain, 
Economics of Corruption (pp. 129-176). Mass: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Kayode, A., Sunday, O., Adagba, Silas, & Aniyo, S. (2013). Corruption and services 
delivery:The case of Nigerian public service. Wudpecker Journal Public damnistration, 
1-6. 
KCC. (2011). Kenya Consumer right and responsibilities brochure. Nairobi: Communications 
Commission of Kenya. 
Kingdom, J. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown. 
Klein, P. G. (1999). The New Institutional Economics. Encyclopediaof Law and Economics, 
456-459. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 12 - 51. 
Korobkin, R. B., & Ulen, T. S. (2000, July). Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics. California Law Review, 88(4/1), 
1051 - 1144. 
Kotakorpi, K. (2006). Access Price Regulation, Investment, and Entry in Telecommunications. 
Elesevier, 1013 - 1020. 
Krueger, A. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American 
Economic Review, 291-303. 
Laffront, J. J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A theoryof incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
277 
 
Landry, R. (1996). A Framework for the study of incomplete institutions . Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis . Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. 
Levine, M. E. (1990). Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Towards a 
Synthesis. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, Vol. 6, 167-198. 
LEvy, B., & Spiller, P. (1994, October). The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organisation, 10(2), 201-246. 
Levy, B., & Spiller, P. T. (1994). The institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A 
Comarative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. Law, Economics and 
Organization, 201 - 246. 
Levy, B., & Spiller, P. T. (1996). Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: Comparative 
Studies of Telecommunications. Nw York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lindlof, T & Taylor, B. (2010). Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 3rd edition. 
London: Sage. 
Lindlof, T and Taylor, B. (2002). Qualitative Communication Research Methods, 2nd edition. 
London: Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Livingstone, S. L. (2007). Citizen, Consumers and theCitizen-Consumer: articulatingthecitizen 
interest in media and communications regulation. Journal of Discourse & 
Communications, Vol. 1(1): 85-111. 
Livingstone, S., & Lunt, P. (2007). Representing Citizens and Consumers in Media and 
Communications Regulation. ANNALS, AAPSS, P.611: 51-65. 
Lunt, P., & Livingston, S. (2012). Media regulation: governance and the interests of citizens 
and consumers. London: Sage. 
Maegli, M. (2012). Regulatory Institution and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal 
Sector. A PhD thesis ‘No 5351’ of school of Federal Polytechnic, Lausanne at the 
college of Management of Postal Technology Research, Suisse. Suisse. 
Maicas, J. P., Polo, Y., & Sese, F. J. (2009). Reducing the Level of Switching Costs in Mobile 
Communications: The case of Mobile Number Portability. Elsevier, 544 - 554. 
278 
 
Majone, G. (1990). Deregulation or re-regulation?: Regulating refoerm in Europe and in the 
United States. London: Pinter. 
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge. 
Majone, G. (2003). Risk Regulation in the European Union: Between Enlargement and 
Internationalisation. (G. Majone, Ed.) Florence, Italy: European University Institute. 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Mansell, R., & Raboy, M (Eds.). (2011). Introduction: Foundations of the theory and Practice 
of Global Media and Communications policy in he Handbookof Global Media and 
Communication Policy -Wiley-Blackwell (2011. London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Martini, M. (2014). Nigeria: Evidence of corruption and influence on social norms. 
http://www.transpareny.org: Transparency International. 
May, T. (2001). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (3rd Edition). Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
May, T. (2011). Social research issues: methods and Process (4th edition ed.). 4th edition 
Maiden Head: Open University Press. 
McQuail, D. (2010). Mass Communication Theory (6th ed). London: SAGE Publications. 
Melody, W. H. (1997). Interconnection Cornerstone of competition. In W. H. Melody, 
Telecom reforms: Principles,polices and regulatory practices (pp. 49-62). Lyngby: Den 
Private Ingeniorfond Technical University of Denmark. 
Menard, C., & Shirley, M. M. (2005). (Eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. 
Netherlands: Springer. 
Metcalf, P. (1998, August). The Book in the Coffin:On the Ambivalence of "Informants". 
Cultural Anthropology, 13(3), 326-343. 
Michalis, M. (2007). Governing European Communications From Unification to Cordination. 
Lanham, MD; Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Milne, C. (1997). Regulating Quality of Service. In W. H. Melody(Ed), Telecom Reform: 
Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices (pp. 179-188). Copenhagen: CTI. 
279 
 
Milne, C. (2000). "Affordability of Basic Telephone Service: An Income Distribution 
Approach". In Telecommunications Policy, 24(10), 907- 927. 
Minimum.Wage.Act. (2000). The National Minimum Wage Act. Abuja: FGN Press. 
Monye, F. (2003). Law of Consumer Protection. Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books Limited. 
Monye, F. (2003). Law of Consumer Protection. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. 
Mueller, M. (2013). Universal Service:Competition, Interconnection and Monopoly in the 
Making of the American Telephone System. Massachussette: MIT Press . 
Muzzini, E. (2005). Consumer Participation in Infrastructure Regulation Evidence from the 
East Asia and Pacific Region. Washington D.C.: World Bank Working Paper No. 66. 
Nagarajani, V. (2007). Reconceiving regulation: Finding a place for the consumer. 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal, Vol. 15 No.1, pp. 93-107. 
Nations.Online. (2016). One World - Nations Online. Retrieved August 5, 2015 , from 
nationsonline.org: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/west-africa-
map.htm 
NCA. (2003). Nigeria Communications Act (Vol. 90). Lagos: The Federal Government Press, 
Lagos, Nigeria. 
NCC. (2005). Market Structure of The Nigerian Telecommunications Industry. Abuja: Govt. 
Press. 
NCC. (2009). Nigerian Communications Commission: Annual Reports and Accounts. Abuja: 
NCC. 
NCC. (2010). Nigerian Communications Commission: Annual Reports and Accounts. Abuja: 
NCC. 
NCC. (2011). Nigerian Communications Commission: Annual Reports and Accounts. Abuja: 
NCC. 
NCC. (2012). Nigerian Communications Commission: Annual Reports and Accounts. Abuja: 
NCC. 
280 
 
NCC. (2013). Nigerian Communications Commission: Annual Reports and Accounts. Abuja: 
NCC. 
NCC. (n.d.-a). Nigeria Communications Commisssion: Consumer Bill of Rights. Retrieved 
October 1, 2015, from ncc.gov.ng: 
http://consumer.ncc.gov.ng/Archive/publication/fact/bill.pdf 
NCC. (n.d.-b). Nigerian Communications Commission: Enforcement. Retrieved November 9, 
2015, from ncc.gov.ng: 
http://www.ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1259:enfo
rcement-activities&catid=66:cat-web-legal&Itemid=214 
NCC. (n.d.-c). Nigerian Communications Commission: Regulations. Retrieved November 21, 
2015, from ncc.gov.ng: 
http://www.ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemi
d=89 
NCC.Communicator. (2014, March). Nigerian Communications Commission. Retrieved 
December 28, 2015, from ncc.gov.ng: 
http://www.ncc.gov.ng/thecommunicator/index.php?option=com_content&view=fr
ontpage&Itemid=28 
NCC.COmmunicator. (2015, Quarter 4). Nigerian Communications commission. Retrieved 
December 21, 2015, from ncc.gov.ng: 
http://www.ncc.gov.ng/thecommunicator/index.php?option=com_phocagallery&vie
w=category&id=20:2015-quarter-4-gallery 
NCC.CSS. (2012). Nigeria Consumer Satisfaction Survey Final Report Part 1: Overview for 
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) 
Submitted by NCC Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCCCSS) Team: Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation (CTO),. Abuja: Fed. Govt. Press. 
NCC.CSS. (2012). Nigeria Consumer Satisfaction Survey Final Report Part 2: Data Analysis for 
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) Consumer Affairs Bureau (CAB) 
Submitted by NCC Consumer Satisfaction Survey (NCCCSS) Team: Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation (C. Abuja: Fed. Govt. Press. 
NCCSMP. (2014). Strategic Management Plan (SMP) 2014-2018. Abuja: NCC. 
NCCStat. (2014). NCC Yearend industry statistics. Abuja: NCC. 
281 
 
NCCStat. (2015). NCC Yearend industry statistics. Abuja: NCC. 
Ndibe. (2013, February 11). Sahara Reporters. Retrieved October 20, 2015, from 
saharareporters.com: http://saharareporters.com/2013/02/11/who%E2%80%99s-
exploiting-nigerian-mobile-phone-users-okey-ndibe 
Ndukwe, E. (2002). The GSM Story: The Birth of Nigeria's Remarkable Telecoms Success. 
Abuja: House of Leila. 
Nkamnebe, A. D., Idoko, E., & Kalu, S. (2009). Consumer Protection in market transaction in 
Nigeria. Innovative Marketing, 5(4), 89 - 94. 
North, D. C. (1993). The New Institutional Economics and Development. econwpa.repec.org, 
10. Retrieved December 14, 2015, from 
http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/eh/papers/9309/9309002.pdf 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economics Perspectives, 5(1), Winter 97-112. 
North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
NTP. (2000). Nigerian Telecommunications Policy. Lagos: Govt Press. 
OECD. (1996). The Role of Information in Telecommunications Regulations. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD. (2008). Enhancing Competition in Telecommunication, Protecting and Empowering 
Consumers ( Ministerial Background Report). London: OECD Publishing. 
Ofcom. (2009). Mostly Mobile. London: Ofcom. 
Ofcom. (2010). Communications Market Report. London: Ofcom. 
Ofcom. (2013). The Consumer Experience of 2013. London: Ofcom. 
Ofcom. (2013b). The Availability of Communications Services in the UK. London: Ofcom. 
Ofcom. (2014). Consumer Experiences of Mobile Phone Calls. London: Ofcom. 
282 
 
Ogbodo, D. (2014, August 18). This Day. Retrieved November 9, 2015, from thisdaylive.com: 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ncc-why-most-telecom-subscribers-get-ripped-
off/186657/ 
Ogechukwu, A. D. (2013, march). Consumerism the Shame of Marketing in Nigeria: 
Challenges to Corporate Practices. Universal Journal of Management and Social 
Sciences, 3(3), 49 - 70. 
Ogundele, S. (2010, 03 16). Sahara reporters. Retrieved from Saharareporters.com: 
http://saharareporters.com/2010/03/16unbriled-bribery-and-corruption-nigerian- 
Okeke, C., & Isaac, N. (2015, April 29). Leadership. Retrieved from leadership.ng: 
http://leadership.ng/business/429295/fg-hands-over-nitelmtel-to-natcom-
consortium 
Okonji, E. (2012, May 12). ThisDayLive. Retrieved January 9th, 2016, from thisdaylive.com: 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ncc-fines-mtn-glo-etisalat-airtel-n1-
17bn/115641/ 
Okonji, E. (2014, August 18). This Day. Retrieved November 9, 2015, from Thisdaylive.com: 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/protecting-subscribers-through-telecom-
consumer-parliament/194541/ 
Okonji, E. (2015, May 21). ThisDayLive. Retrieved January 9th, 2016, from thisdaylive.com: 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/again-ncc-moves-to-address-unsolicited-text-
messages/209872/ 
Okonjo-Iweala, N. (2012). Reforming the Unreformable. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Okonne, D. (2014, December 15). National Mirror. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from 
nationalmirroronline.net: http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/telecom-subscribers-
to-get-refunds-over-poor-quality-of-service-from-january-2015/ 
Opata, C. B. A. (2013). Looking towards Europe: regulation of dominance in Nigerian 
telecommunications. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (C. R. N. I.), 
14(4), 338-3364. 
Osafo-Kwako, P., & Apampa, S. (2009). The Political Economy of Budget Process, No1 
Background Paper. Abuja, Nigeria: CSEA. 
283 
 
Ospina, S. (2002). Telecommunications for All: Does Liberalisation Help? Destin, 1 - 42. 
Osuagwu, P. (2015, December). Vanguard. Retrieved from vanguardngr.com: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/its-no-longer-business-as-usual-ncc-warns-
operators/  
Otubu, A. (2013). The regulator and the regulated: an examination of the legal framework 
for telecommunications in Nigeria. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 
19(7), 216-222. 
Page, M., Molina, M., & Jones, G. (2013). GSMA The Mobile Economy. London: A T kearney 
Ltd. 
Patton, M. (1999, December). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. 
HSR: Health Services research, 34(5 Part II), 1189-1208. 
Peltzman, S. (1976). Towards a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 19, pp 211-240. 
Peltzman, S. (1989). The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation. 
Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1-61. 
Petrazzini, B. A. (1996). Competition in telecoms: Implications for universal service and 
employment, Public Policy for the Private Sector. World Bank, No 96. 
Petrazzini, B. A. (1997). Regulating Communication Services in Developing Countries. In W. 
Melody, TElECOM REFORM Principles Policies and Regulatory Practices (pp. 349-364). 
Lyngby, Denmark: Technical University of Denmark. 
Pope.Francis. (2015). Not just numbers: they are people. London: Jesuits & friends. 
Posner, R. (1971). Taxation by Regulation. Bell journal of Economics and Management 
Science, Vol. 2, pp 22-50. 
Posner, R. A. (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. Bell journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 5(2), 335 358. 
Prakash, A., & Potoski, M. (2015). Dysfunctional institution? Toward a New Agenda in 
Governance Studies. On-Line Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd, 1-11. 
doi:doi:10.1111/rego.12113 
284 
 
Punch. (2011). Poor Quality of service of mobile operators. Lagos: Punch Newspapers. 
Pyramid.Research. (2010). The Impact of Mobile Services in Nigeria: How Mobile 
Technologies Are Transforming Economic and Social Activities. Abuja: Govt Press. 
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., & Elam, G. (2003). Designing and Selecting Samples. In J. Ritchie, & J. 
Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers (pp. 77-108). London. Thousand Oaks. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Robin, B. (2012). The U N guidelines for consumer protection: Making them work in 
developing countries . Consumesr International, 113 - 139. 
Saleth, M, & Dinar, A. (1999). Water Challenges and Institutional Response: A cross 
CountryPerspective, Policy Research, Working Paper 2045. Washington DC: The 
World Bank. 
Saleth, M., & Dinar, A. (2004). The Institutional Economicsof Water: A cross-CountryAnalysis 
of Institutions and Performance. Cheltenham, Uk: Edward Edgar Publishing. 
Samuel, E. (2006). CUSTOMER SATISFACTION IN THE MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA. Presented to Blekinge Institute of Technology, Department of 
Management, Ronneby, Sweden, in fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of 
Master of Business Administration. Sweden. Retrieved January 10th, 2016, from 
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A828593&dswid=-5066 
Sanatan, R., & Melody, W. H. (1997). Adopting to a Global Economy: Implications of 
TelecomReform for Small Developing Countries. In W. H. Melody, TELECOM REFORM 
Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices (pp. 323-332). Lyngby, Denmark: 
Technical University of Denmark. 
Screpanti, E., & Zamagni, S. (2005). An Outline of the History of Economic Thought, 2nd 
edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for analysing talk, text and 
interaction 2nd edition. London: Sage. 
Silverman, D. (2006). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for analysing talk, text and 
interaction, 3rd edition. London: Sage. 
285 
 
Simmonds, G. (2003). Consumer representation in Europe: policy and practice for utilities and 
network industries. Part 11. London: The University of Bath ISBN. 
Snape, D., & Spencer, L. (2003). The Foundation of Qualitative Research. In J. Ritche, & J. 
Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers (pp. 2-23). London, Thousand Oak,s Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Southwood, R. (2006). "Consumer protection in the digital age:assessing current and future 
activities", Background Paper to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
Global Seminar on Quality of Service and Consumer Protection. Geneva , Switzerland, 
31 August - 1 Sept . Geneva: ITU. 
Spiller, P. (2012). Political Economy of Regulation. Corsica, France: ESNIE. 
Spiller, P., & Tommasi, M. (2003). The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy:A 
Transactions Approach andAn Application to Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stevens, R. (2009). Consumer Protection: Meeting the Expectations of the Connected. ITU 
InfoDev, 1-26. 
Stigler, G. I. (1971). The theory of Economic Regulation. Bell journal of Economicsand 
Management science, Vol.2, pp 3-21. 
Stigler, G. J. (1974). Free riders and collective action: an appendix to theories of economic 
regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 
pp359-365. 
Sutherland, E. (2016). The case study in telecommunications policy research. Info , 16-30. 
Take, I. (2012). Regulating the Internet Infrastructure: A comparative Appraisal of the 
Legitimacy of ICANN, ITU and the WSIS. Regulation and Governance, 6(4), 499 - 523. 
Tamibini, D. (2012). Consumer representation in U K communications policy and regulation. 
Emerald, Iss: 2 pp 3-16. 
Tarjanne, P. (1997). The limits of National Sovereinty:Issues for the Governance of 
International Telecom. In M. H. Melody, TELECOM REFORM: Principles, Policies and 
Regulatory Practices (pp. 37-46). Lyngby, Denmark: Technical University of Denmark. 
286 
 
Technology.Times. (2012, October 14). Technology Times. Retrieved February 3, 2016, from 
technologytimes.ng: http://technologytimes.ng/from-tt-archives-commissioners-
may-drop-gwandu-from-board-amid-ncc-row/ 
Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Weaith and 
Happiness. London: Penguin Books Ltd. 
Thussu, D. (2006). International Communication Continuity and Change, 2nd edition. Part of 
Hachette Livre UK: Hodder Education. 
Townsend, D. N. (1994). The vital role of Regulation in Telecommunications Sector Reform. 
In W. a. Stern, Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector, Lessons 
from Experience. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
Townsend, D. N. (2001). Book Reviiew: Telecommunications Regulatory Handbook. 
Pergamon, 641 - 645. 
Toyin, F., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). A history of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Transparency International. (2014). Transparency International. Retrieved February 23, 
2015, from transparency.org: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014 
Transparency International. (2015). Transparecy International. Retrieved February 23, 2016, 
from transparency.org: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/ 
Trebing, H. M. (1997). Emerging Market Structures and Options for regulatoryRreform in 
Public Utility Industries. In w. (. Melody, TELECOM REFORM: Principles, Policies and 
Regulatory Practices (pp. 25-36). LYNGBY, Denmark: Technical University of 
Denmark. 
Tshabalala, S. (2015, October 26). QZ. Retrieved from QZ.com: 
http://qz.com/533041/africas-largest-mobile-network-is-being-fined-5-2-billion-for-
flouting-nigerias-sim-card-rules/(last accessed 28 October 2015)  
Ubochioma, W. (2013). Regulation of competition in Nigeria's liberalised 
telecommunications market: a case for complementing sector-specific regulation 
with a general Competition Law Commission. Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review, 19(6), 179-188. 
287 
 
Ukodie, A. (2006). Phone for All. Lagos, Nigeria: Planet Press. 
Unilag FM. (2015, May 19). Daily Independence. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from 
independentnig.com: http://independentnig.com/2015/05/unsolicited-sms-ncc-
urges-operators-filter-messages/  
Van den Bulck, H. (2012). Towards a Media Policy Process Analysis Model and Its 
Methodological Implicaions. In N. Just, & M. Pupis, Trends in communication Policy 
Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects (pp. 217-231). Bristol, Uk and 
Chicago: Intellect. 
Vukowick. (2002). Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective. 
Georgetown: Transnational Publishers inc., US. 
Wallsten, S. J. (2001). Telecommunications Priatisation in Developing Countries: The Real 
Effects ofExclusivity Periods. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
WAO. (2010, May). Ombudsman-WA-News. Retrieved February 3, 2015, from 
ombudsman.wa.gov.au: 
http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/Publications/Documents/newsletters/Ombudsm
an-WA-Newsletter-Edition-8-FINAL.pdf 
Wellenius, B. (1993). Telecommunications: World BanK experiences and strategies. 
Washington D C: World Bank. 
Wellenius, B. (1997, October). Telecommunications Reform- how to succeed: Public Policy 
for Private Sector. World Bank, 1-4. 
Williamson, O. E. (2005, April). The Economic Governance. American Economic Association, 
95(2), 1 - 18. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New 
York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000, Sept.). The New Institution Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595 - 613. 
World Bank. (2015). The World Bank - World Development Indicators: Monitary Indicators. 
Retrieved from world bank.org: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.15 
288 
 
Xavier, P. (2008). "Enhancing Competition in telecommunications: protecting and 
empowering consumers", Ministerial Backround Report to OECD Ministerial Meeting 
on the future of the Internet Economy, Seoul, Korea, June 17 - 18. Seoul: OECD. 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. 2nd edition Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.; London: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: design and methods. 3rd edition Thousand Oaks, Calif.; 
London: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods. London: Sage. 
 
 
  
289 
 
 
            
            
  
 
